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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation and key questions
The world is at,1 but the world is not [at] enough2. The at tax idea has
given rise to an ongoing debate both in academics and politics. Further on, it has
recently been very successful, especially in transition countries in Eastern Europe.
Although at taxes are high on the political agenda in various Western European
countries, they have not been implemented in these grown-up welfare states.3
The introduction of a at tax with a basic tax allowance, a low uniform mar-
ginal tax rate, and a broad tax base as a reform of existing tax systems is supposed
to have several advantages. [T]he at-tax plan we have developed [...] is, we be-
lieve, the most fair, e¢ cient, simple, and workable plan on the table.4 Most
importantly, positive e¤ects on employment and GDP as well as reduced tax dis-
tortions are expected. In addition, at tax reforms are thought to reduce admin-
istration and compliance costs as well as incentives for tax avoidance or evasion.
Therefore, the at tax [...] is probably my favorite one of all. [...] But if we did
pass it, all of a sudden, what do you have? You have the whole tax system run
by a little old lady on a home computer, doing the work of all these thousands of
1Friedman (2005).
2The World Is Not Enough(released in 1999) is the nineteenth lm of the James Bond series
and was directed by Michael Apted.
3Cf. ? and Nicodeme (2007).
4Hall and Rabushka (2007), p. xiii-xiv.
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bureaucrats and accountants. Passing that would be amazing, wouldnt it?5
If it is such a good idea, why have only few countries implemented it? A reason
for the recent at tax success in transition countries could be the use of the low
marginal tax rate by new governments as a signal for a regime shift towards more
market-oriented policies (see ?). Therefore, if such a reputation does not need to
be acquired (e.g. in Western Europe), the at tax idea might be less appealing.
The simple fact though is that most of the world is not using at taxes, and more
seriously, they could not achieve many of these [at tax] objectives even if they
did.6 Indeed, the distributional e¤ects seem to prevent a at tax adoption in
democracies with a well-established middle class. So maybe it is not such a good
idea after all? [I]t is possible to have a at tax, or to have democracy, but not
both.7 Are all the countries with at taxes on the wrong track? Adopting the
at tax would improve the overall performance of the economy. [...] Everyones
aftertax income would rise.8
This disagreement on the implication of a at tax raises questions. On the one
hand, rather straightforward questions like What is a at tax?, Where to nd
it?or How to design it?, are addressed in the next section. On the other hand,
more complex problems arise:
1. How at is the world?, i.e. to what extend do existing tax benet systems
di¤er from linearity?
2. What e¤ects can be expected from a at tax reform?, i.e. does a at tax
always yield adverse distributional e¤ects in conjunction with positive ef-
ciency e¤ects? Or is it possible that a at tax reform can overcome the
fundamental equity e¢ ciency trade-o¤?
3. Could or should the world be at?, i.e. are there compelling reasons why
countries should introduce at taxes, or why they should not? Is it really
possible that everybody could be better o¤ after such a reform?
5Clint Eastwood, Hollywood director and lm star, in Denis Mamill, The age of Eastwood:
Clint on fame, directing daughter Alison in Midnight 7, why Dirty Harry is History, New York
Daily News, 19 November 1997.
6Murphy (2006), p. 95.
7Hettich and Winer (1999), p. 92.
8Hall and Rabushka (2007), p. xv.
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The standard economic answer to these questions is: It depends. Therefore,
the key question underlying this analysis is: It depends on what?. The motiv-
ation of this book is to answer these questions and to identify hereby the driving
forces behind the economic e¤ects of a at tax reform. There are two dimensions
to be considered that are mutually interdependent: the details of the reform and
the environment of its implementation. First, the at tax design (e.g. parameters
such as marginal rate and allowance, tax base simplication or cash ow corporate
taxation) plays an important role for the results. Second, the results crucially de-
pend on the country under observation. The underlying income distribution and
demographic structure as well as the institutional background (i.e. the tax benet
system, welfare state) are decisive for the outcome of such a reform.
The present book contributes to the existing literature in various ways. First,
we provide a comprehensive survey of the state-of-the-art in simulation modelling
for the ex-ante analysis of tax reform proposals and introduce three extensions to
this methodology. Second, we analyse and compare di¤erent types of welfare
states and tax benet systems especially with respect to the distribution and
redistribution of income to explain di¤ering results across countries. Third, we
conduct an extensive analysis of the key sources of the economic outcomes of at
tax reforms. For this purpose, the extended methodology of simulation analysis is
applied to analyse di¤erent hypothetical at tax scenarios and the impact of their
key elements (tax base simplication, marginal tax rate and basic allowance) on
equity and e¢ ciency for Germany and the other EU-15 countries in a common
microeconometric framework. The analysis di¤ers from the existing literature
mainly by analysing the distributional e¤ects as well as the e¤ects on welfare and
employment in a uniform simulation model and by applying a systematic approach
for choosing the at tax parameters. In the remainder of this rst introductory
chapter, we will proceed as follows. In the next section 1.2, we will briey describe
the general at tax idea, review the literature on at tax reform and introduce
the systematic approach of choosing its parameters. Then, in section 1.3, we will
contextualize the di¤erent chapters and summarise their main results.
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1.2 The Flat Tax
In this section, we describe when to call a tax at, discuss reasons why a country
should, or should not, introduce a at tax and summarise which countries have
at taxes. Furthermore, we review the empirical evidence on at tax reforms and
present a concept of systematically choosing at tax parameters.
1.2.1 What makes a tax at?
The probably most famous at tax proposal is associated with Robert Hall and
Alvin Rabushka.9 Their Flat Taxis dened as a comprehensive income tax with
a single marginal tax rate that is also applied to business income on a cash-ow
basis. A personal allowance is available for labour income. Therefore, the Hall-
Rabushka-Flat-Tax (HR) is essentially a consumption tax (VAT) with a rebate
for low income households. However, this proposal has not been implemented in
any country yet. Nonetheless, the HR proposal fuelled the political and academic
debate about at taxes around the world, starting in the U.S. and then continuing
in Europe, as well. In this debate, the phrase at taxis used more loosely and
generally not associated with HR anymore.
Flat tax implies that some sort of proportionality is embedded in the income
tax system, i.e. income is taxed at the same (at) rate along the whole range of
income. Its design, however, can be very di¤erent. There are two dimensions to
be distinguished: tax schedule and tax base.
In general, a tax schedule can apply the same rate on all sources of income (i.e.
comprehensive tax) or di¤erent rates on di¤erent types of incomes (i.e. schedular
tax). Most countries with a at tax system apply di¤erent rates to personal and
corporate income, although a common rate has become more popular among the
countries recently implementing these systems. Usually, the tax rate does not vary
for components of personal income, i.e. capital and labour income is taxed at the
same marginal rate independent of the level of income. There is also a number of
countries which tax only capital income at a at rate and levy a progressive rate
schedule on labour income. However, these are usually not considered as at tax
9See Hall and Rabushka (1983) and Hall and Rabushka (1985).
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systems but dual or semi-dual income tax systems.10
For the tax base one can di¤erentiate between concepts that allow or do not
allow for tax reliefs which can be categorised into ve groups (see OECD (1996)):
1. tax exemption (E): part of income is tax exempt, i.e. not taxed,
2. income-related tax deduction (D): amount, that is not xed but that depends
on the level of income, is subtracted from taxable income,
3. tax allowance (A): xed amount (per tax unit) is subtracted from taxable
income,
4. preferential tax rate: some (sources of) incomes are taxed at a lower rate,
5. tax credit : (xed) amount is subtracted from the tax liability.11
Exemptions, deductions and allowances are subtracted from gross income X
to determine the tax base:
taxbase = X   E  D   A
Certainly, only the at tax without any tax reliefs is a pureat tax as in this
case tax payments are indeed proportional to incomes. A at income tax as such
has only been applied in Georgia and recently in Bulgaria. In all other cases, the
tax incidence on incomes is progressive, i.e. a single marginal at tax rate (FTR)
is combined with a general personal at tax allowance (FTA):
T = FTR max(taxbase  FTA; 0)
Furthermore, in most countries also exist further tax reliefs (on gross income)
beyond the basic at tax allowance.
10See OECD (2006) for more about dual income tax systems. These countries include e.g. the
Scandinavian countries.
11If the tax credit exceeds tax liability two possibilities arise: either the amount of the excess of
the tax credit over the tax liability is paid to the taxpayer, in which case it is a non-wastable
(i.e. refundable) tax credit, or this does not happen, and then the tax credit is wastable(i.e.
non-refundable).
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A further step towards overall at tax incidence would be integrating income
tax with other taxes and benets. An example of this is a at tax with a refundable
tax credit, e¤ectively combining taxes and benets due to negative income tax at
low-income levels. Depending on the generosity of the tax credit, it is either
labelled as negative income tax or basic income (at) tax.12
In this book, we analyse di¤erent at tax concepts. Therefore, we cannot
provide an unique working denition of what we call at tax. In the following
chapters, we use the expression at taxif at least a single marginal tax rate on
labour income is considered. In chapters 3 and 5, we analyse personal income tax
reforms with a single marginal tax rate, i.e. a at rate personal income tax. In
chapter 3, we also simulate a comprehensive cash ow at tax on personal and
corporate income in the tradition of Hall and Rabushka (cash ow at tax). In
chapter 4, we integrate the income tax with social insurance contributions and
cash benets to simulate two di¤erent scenarios: a negative income at taxand
a basic income at tax.
1.2.2 Why (or why not) introducing a at tax?
Introducing a at tax is supposed to have several advantages but also some dis-
advantages. First of all, a single marginal tax rate can be justied by optimal tax
literature. Mirrlees (1971) simulated the optimal tax schedule being close to linear-
ity. However, this seminal contribution rests upon strong assumptions. Loosening
these assumptions shows that the optimal tax schedule can be far from linearity
(see e.g. Tuomala (1990) or Saez (2002)).13 Nevertheless, proponents of a at tax
system dream of tax returns tting on a postcard (Hall and Rabushka (2007)) or
a beer coaster (Kirchhof (2003)) because of simplied tax ling. Proponents also
expect more prosperity and wealth because of increasing economic growth. How
shall this be achieved? There are two main benets usually associated with at
tax systems: increasing incentives and compliance.14
Firstly, at taxes can enhance incentives for working (labour supply), saving,
12For more on this see e.g. Atkinson (1995).
13However, this does not necessarily imply a progressive tax schedule at all. Diamond (1998) and
Saez (2001), for example, derive a U-shaped pattern of marginal tax rates as being optimal.
14Cf. e.g. ?.
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investing and taking risks (entrepreneurship). This does not necessarily come from
the atness of the tax schedule per se but could also be attributed to other forms
of reduction in (average and marginal) tax rates especially at the top of the income
distribution. Although there is a trend of lowering marginal statutory tax rates
(and reducing the number of tax brackets), top rates can still be rather high in
existing systems, e.g. around 40-60% in EU-15 (Eurostat (2007)). While the
gains from at and lower tax rates are explicit for the top income range, they are
not so obvious for low incomes. The results here depend on the chosen at tax
parameters and the underlying income distribution. If e.g. e¤ective marginal tax
rates (EMTR) decrease for high income households but increase for low to middle
income households, the overall incentive e¤ects will be ambiguous ex ante and
depend on each groups elasticity.
Secondly, as a at tax is often part of a more fundamental tax reform, it can
simplify income taxation signicantly and therefore increase tax compliance and
reduce tax planning, avoidance and evasion. This e¤ect is perhaps weaker in de-
veloped countries, but it is often central for this kind of reforms in developing
and transition countries. Nevertheless, the current systems in Europe on average
have evolved to quite complex entities, therefore often violating the principle that
taxes ought to be clear and simple. A simpler system is not only easier to grasp
from the point of view of a single taxpayer, but is also more transparent at the
aggregated level. Simplication can also decrease bureaucracy and therefore the
costs of administration and compliance. Flatness itself only simplies the rate
schedule structure which can to some extent reduce tax arbitrage between di¤er-
ent sources of income. However, the primary source of complexity is rather the
tax base with its various exemptions. Other tax reforms of the type tax rate cut
cum base broadeningsimplifying the tax system can as well increase compliance
and reduce evasion.15 Nevertheless, from a political economy point of view, intro-
ducing a completely new tax system labelled at taxmight be a good chance to
fundamentally reform the existing tax system.
Moreover, another political economy argument for a simple tax system and a
(linear) tax schedule with some restrictions regarding the tax parameters can be
drawn from Brennan and Buchanan (1977). If the government is not benevolent
15Cf. e.g. Gale (1998).
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but solely pursuits self-interest of policymakers, a at tax can restrict the size of
government by decreasing the potential to maximise revenue through higher tax
rates.16 This argument, however, can be questioned in various dimensions (see ?).
For instance, the size of government can be limited by other institutional devices.
Furthermore, changing the assumptions to a less extreme view of politicians can
lead to quite di¤erent solutions.
However, at taxes can have a serious drawback in terms of their impact on
the distribution of tax burdens.17 Previous at tax reforms and typical proposals
lower marginal tax rates at the high income levels but increase the tax burden
for middle-income ranges (especially if they are designed to be revenue neutral),
resulting in a widening of the distribution of after-tax incomes. Therefore, the
crucial question is, if a at tax system equitably distributes the tax burden. The
answer depends on the chosen parameter values (marginal rate and basic allow-
ance) and is not trivial to answer. In terms of progressivity, a at tax system
(with a basic allowance) can be more or less progressive than an existing gradu-
ated rate structure again depending on the parameter values. Moreover, choosing
these parameters plays a key role for the expected e¢ ciency gains in terms of in-
centives and compliance. A low marginal rate (and allowance) will lead to higher
incentives but redistribution in favour of high income households. A high marginal
rate (and allowance) will benet low income households more but reduce incent-
ives. Nevertheless, the middle income households will likely lose in every (revenue
neutral) scenario. These distributional e¤ects could be the main reason limiting
the at tax spread in developed countries with a well established middle class.
To sum up, the expected e¤ects of a at tax are not thoroughly positive in
every dimension (e¢ ciency, equity, simplicity) nor unambiguous. Therefore, the
next subsections summarise the existing at taxes around the world and review
the empirical evidence of at tax reforms in the literature.
16See also Brennan and Buchanan (1980).
17Cf. e.g. Slemrod (1997)
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1.2.3 Where can at taxes be found around the world?
Until the rst half of the 19th century, at taxes were common throughout the
world.18 Progressive tax schedules were rst called for by Marx and Engels (1848)
in their Manifesto of the Communist Party. Since the rising success of progress-
ive rate structures, at rate income taxes only existed in tax havens like Hong
Kong or the Channel Islands for a long period of time. But during the last dec-
ade, the at tax idea has been remarkably successful, coincidentally especially in
former Communist countries in Eastern Europe. In 2008, there were altogether
24 countries in the world having at tax systems, half of them in Eastern Europe.
Since its introduction in Estonia in 1994 several countries followed suit. The two
other Baltic countries followed the Estonian example by setting the single tax rate
close to the highest marginal rate in the existing system. Russia, however, was not
only the rst major country to introduce a at tax, it also started a second at
tax wave with countries setting the tax rate close to the lowest existing marginal
rate. Table 1.2.1 lists the countries having a at income tax system in order of the
year of adaption.19
There are striking di¤erences between the tax systems labelled at tax. Most
countries have introduced a at tax rate at or close to the level of previous lowest
marginal rate, exceptions are Latvia and Lithuania who have chosen the opposite.
Some countries apply the same tax rate on personal and corporate income, the
Slovak Republic even on VAT. The pattern of setting general allowances however
is less clear. In most countries a xed allowance was retained or introduced,
exceptions include Russia with a gradual withdrawal and Ukraine with a sudden
withdrawal above certain income levels which makes the e¤ective marginal tax rate
high at some stages. However, the amount of allowance varies signicantly. For
example, Georgia and Bulgaria have no allowance at all, whereas most countries
having it increased during the reforms (?). Furthermore, in most countries, the
introduction of the at tax system was accompanied by additional reforms of
18Already in the holy bible the tithe, i.e. a 10% at tax, was paid as a tax or contribution to
religious or secularised organisations (see Leviticus 27:30-33).
19Several countries have no tax on personal income which could be considered as the attest of
all taxes with a zero marginal rate. These countries include: Andorra, the Bahamas, Bahrain,
Bermuda, Burundi, Cayman Islands, Kuwait, Monaco, Nigeria, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia,
Somalia, United Arab Emirates, Uruguay and Vanuatu (see Nicodeme (2007)).
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e.g. the tax base, social insurance contributions, benets, indirect taxation or tax
administration. Therefore, there is not one single at tax system in practice, there
are many di¤erent tax systems labelled as at. Hence, it is far from obvious
that one rate would t all20.
Personal Incom e Tax Rates Corp orate Incom e Tax Rates Basic a llowance
Year Before A fter 2008 Before A fter 2008
Jersey 1940 20
Hong Kong 1947 16
Guernsey 1960 20
Jamaica 1980 33.3 25 33.3 33.3
Boliv ia 1986 10 13 25 25
Eston ia 1994 16-35 26 22 35 26 22 Modest increase
L ithuania 1994 18-33 33 24 29 29 15 Substantia l increase
Latvia 1997 25 and 10
a
25 25 25 25 15 S light reduction
Russia 2001 12, 20, 30 13 13 30 35 24 Modest increase
Serb ia 2003 10-40 14 14 14 14 10
Iraq 2004 up to 75 15 15 15 15
Ukraine 2004 10-40 13 15 30 25 25 Increase
S lovak Rep. 2004 10-38 19 19 25 19 19 Substantia l increase
Georgia 2005 12-20 12 12 20 20 20 E lim inated
Romania 2005 18-40 16 16 25 16 16 Increase
Kyrgyzstan 2006 10-20 10 10 20 10 10 Unchanged
Paraguay 2006 none 10 10 20 10 10
Macedonia 2007 15-24 12 10 15 12 10 Unchanged
Kazakhstan 2007 5-20 10 10 30 30 30 Substantia l increase
Mongolia 2007 10-30 10 10 15/30 10/25 10/25 Substantia l increase
Iceland 2007 24.75, 26.75 22.75 22.75 18 18 18 Modest increase
A lban ia 2007 1-20 10 10 20 20 10 Increase
Montenegro 2007 15-23 15 15 15/20 9 9 Increase
Czech Rep. 2008 12-32 15 15 24 22 24 Substantia l increase
Bulgaria 2008 10-24 10 10 10 10 10 E lim inated
Table 1.2.1: Flat taxes around the world (rates in percent)
Sources: Nicodeme (2007), Mitchell (2007) and ?.
To sum up, despite many di¤erences in their design, the existing at tax sys-
tems generally have three elements in common. First, a single positive marginal
20Nicodeme (2007), p. 142.
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tax rate below the previous top marginal rate, second, a rather broad tax base in
comparison to the previous system, and third, a rather high exemption threshold.
1.2.4 What can be expected from a at tax reform?
Actual reforms
Only two actual reforms have been addressed in the literature: the 2001 Russian
reform by Ivanova, Keen and Klemm (2005) and the 2004 reform in the Slovak
Republic by, among others, Brook and Leibfritz (2005). In the Russian case, the
reform was followed by signicant real growth in personal income tax revenue.
But there was no strong evidence that this was caused by the reform itself or
by improved law enforcement, nor could any positive labour supply responses be
identied.21 The Slovakian reform was expected to increase the level and e¢ ciency
of capital formation and enhance the incentives of unemployed workers to seek
work. However, no evidence apart from revenue-neutrality has been reported yet.
Although most real world reforms have been very recent, research on their e¤ects
is probably also limited due to the nature of those countries, i.e. no or little
high-quality (micro-)data is available for the pre-reform period.
Hypothetical reforms
In the literature, there are several studies on e¢ ciency and equity aspects of hypo-
thetical at tax reforms. One focus of these studies is the impact on employment
and growth. Browning and Browning (1985) estimate an increase in labour sup-
ply in the US by 5%, whereas Heer and Trede (2003) simulate an increase in
employment by 2% in Germany using a macro model. Cajner, Grobovsek and
Kozamernik (2006) use a CGE model for Slovenia to simulate several tax reform
scenarios. They nd that, in general, progressive tax systems yield better results
in terms of welfare than at tax regimes but some at tax scenarios might perform
better in terms of growth and employment. Jacobs, de Mooij and Folmer (2007)
21See also Gaddy and Gale (2005) and Gorodnichenko, Martinez-Vazquez and Peter (2007).
Furthermore, the situation in Russia is di¤erent in comparison to Western European countries
insofar as the latter have a long tradition of taxation and a rather large tax administration to
ensure tax compliance. Therefore, we assume e¤ects of a at tax reform on compliance to be
less important in Western Europe than in transition countries of Eastern Europe.
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use a CGE model for the Netherlands to analyse two hypothetical at tax scen-
arios. They nd a trade-o¤between equity and e¢ ciency, i.e. either inequality and
employment increases or, if inequality is kept constant, employment decreases.
A second group of studies focuses on the distributional e¤ects of at tax re-
forms. Ho and Stiroh (1998), Dunbar and Pogue (1998) and Ventura (1999) show
for the US that high income households are relieved, whereas especially middle
income households are burdened by a at tax reform. Altig, Auerbach, Kotliko¤,
Smetters and Walliser (2001) conclude that the lowest income households lose
through a at tax. In a study for the Netherlands, Caminada and Goudswaard
(2001) also derive the result that a at tax would yield redistribution at the ex-
pense of the lowest income deciles, but the magnitude of these e¤ects is quite small.
Several studies (e.g. Aaberge, Colombino and Strøm (2000) for Italy, Norway and
Sweden, Adam and Browne (2006) for the UK, Decoster and Orsini (2007) for
Belgium, Kuismanen (2000) for Finland and González-Torrabadella and Pijoan-
Mas (2006) for Spain) nd that the hypothetical introduction of a at tax would
redistribute in favour of high income households and increase labour supply (in-
centives).
1.2.5 How to choose at tax parameters?
An important aspect which was rarely addressed in previous studies is the setting
of tax system parameters for the ex ante analysis of hypothetical tax reforms. In
terms of at tax reforms this translates into the question of how to set the at
tax rate and the basic allowance. In our case we are interested in the relationship
between at tax parameters and distributional e¤ects.22 Davies and Hoy (2002)
show theoretically that the inequality of after-tax distribution of income is mono-
tonically declining in the at tax rate and the associated level of basic allowance
22The setting of the key at tax design features (marginal rate, basic allowance, tax base) cru-
cially depends on the objective of the reform (like simplifying the system, improving compli-
ance, broadening the tax base, increasing or decreasing the tax burden for selected groups,
higher, lower or constant revenue) and if other reforms (like shifting tax burden between direct
and indirect taxes, social insurance, social security) are planned to accompany the at tax
introduction.
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generating the same tax yield.23 Furthermore, for revenue neutral tax reforms
replacing a graduated rate tax with a at rate tax, they prove the existence of
critical at tax rates such that after-tax income inequality is - compared to the
(existing) graduated rate tax:
1. the same for a given inequality index at a certain at tax rate, t = tF 2
(tlF ; t
u
F ),
2. always higher (according to any inequality index) for any at tax rate equal
to or below a lower bound, t  tlF ,
3. always lower (according to any inequality index) for any at tax rate equal
to or above an upper bound, t  tuF .
1lFt
u
Ft
*
Ft
GRT Lorenz dominates FRT FRT Lorenz dominates GRTLorenz curves intersect
Inequality according to index I
is less under GRT than unter FRT
Inequality according to index I
is less under FRT than unter GRT
Figure 1.2.1: Comparison of critical tax rates
Source: Davies and Hoy (2002), p. 40.
Figure 1.2.1 illustrates these regularities. In other words: When moving from
a graduated income tax to a at tax system that yields the same revenue, three
critical at tax rate values with respect to after-tax income exist. The rst depends
on the chosen inequality index, the other two do not, i.e. they stem from the
concept of Lorenz dominance. First, for a given inequality index I, a at rate value
tF can be found such that inequality remains unchanged. Further on, inequality
in terms of this index is always higher (lower) below (above) this critical value
23As a at tax schedule has only two parameters - marginal rate and basic allowance - it is only
possible to choose one freely when accounting for revenue neutrality.
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after the at tax introduction. Second, there exist a lower bound tlF such that for
all marginal rates below this critical value inequality in terms of any inequality
measure is always higher than compared to the existing system (i.e. the existing
graduated rate tax Lorenz dominates the at tax). Third, inequality is always
lower above an upper bound tuF according to any inequality index (i.e. the at tax
Lorenz dominates the existing graduated rate tax). These results apply to any
inequality measure satisfying the Pigou-Dalton principle of transfers and under
the assumption that behaviour is not a¤ected by tax system changes.
The lower bound corresponds to a at tax rate if the personal allowance is
xed, i.e. is at the same level as for the pre-reform graduated rate tax. The upper
bound is such that a person with the highest income pays the same tax under
each scheme. Additionally, the at rate at the lower bound is supposed to exceed
the lowest marginal tax rate under the graduated rate and the at rate at the
upper bound remains below the highest marginal tax rate under the graduated
rate. The critical value between those boundaries cannot be determined a priori
as it depends on a chosen inequality index.
We rely on these theoretical insights to systematically construct hypothetical
at tax reforms. However, these theoretical regularities are only approximations for
empirical estimations because existing tax systems are further complicated by the
presence of other tax deductions and allowances. Some systems do not even have
a (well-dened) basic allowance to start with. More so, the denition of revenue
neutrality is not straightforward. If revenue neutrality is only limited to income
taxes then it might not preserve the mean of the disposable income distribution,
as there are often instruments whose eligibility or amount depend on net income
after taxes (e.g. means-tested non-taxable benets) and, therefore, might change
their value when tax systems are modied. If the overall net balance from taxes
and benets is retained then income tax revenues rarely remain constant. Further
on, the premise of ex-ante revenue neutrality (i.e. without behavioural responses)
is a rather strong assumption but it is necessary to apply the Davies and Hoy
(2002) approach.24
24If the scenarios were chosen to be revenue neutral ex-post, i.e. after labour supply reactions,
the marginal tax rates could be lower (higher) in case of increasing (decreasing) labour supply
but the underlying research question would be di¤erent. Our aim is to analyse scenarios that
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1.3 The agenda
As stated above, the aim of this book is to identify the conditions which mainly
inuence the economic e¤ects of a at tax reform. The setup of this analysis is as
follows. Chapter 2 introduces the methodology. Chapter 3 analyses the relevance
of the at tax design. In chapter 4, the European countries are compared regarding
their institutional background and the underlying income distribution. In chapter
5, the role of these country specic aspects and their impact for possible at tax
reforms is investigated. Chapter 6 draws conclusions. In the following, we briey
summarise the content of the following four chapters and sketch the main results.
1.3.1 Chapter 2: Methodology
In this chapter, the methodology used for the analysis in this book is described
together with three contributions to the literature on the ex-ante analysis of scal
policy reforms.
First, the simulation models are introduced. The method of simulation analysis
aims at analysing and quantifying the e¤ects of di¤erent policies on individuals and
key economic indicators. The rst contribution to this literature is the development
of a linked microsimulation and CGEmodel (FiFoSiM) which will be also described
in this chapter.
Second, to analyse the impact of policy reforms on equity in terms of distri-
butional e¤ects four subconcepts are described and compared: inequality, polar-
isation, progression in taxation, and income poverty and richness. The second
methodological contribution of this book is the introduction of a class of sophist-
icated richness measures.
Third, distributional e¤ects can be computed abstracting from behavioural
changes (rst round e¤ects) or allowing for behavioural responses of the individual
agents in the economy (second round e¤ects). Behavioural responses typically
included in the analysis are labour supply responses. Further on, the distortion
of the labour-leisure-decision can be estimated to evaluate the welfare impacts of
are equal ex-ante and to reveal the ex-post di¤erences by analysing the economic e¤ects of the
scenarios in terms of equity and e¢ ciency.
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the reform proposal. The application of the theoretical measures of welfare to the
ex-ante evaluation of scal reforms is the third contribution of this book.
In the following chapters, this methodology is applied to analyse di¤erent at
tax reform proposals and their consequences.
1.3.2 Chapter 3: Simplication and at tax in Germany
The recent success of the at income tax in Eastern Europe suggests that this
concept could also be a model for countries in Western Europe. In this chapter,
we conduct a simulation analysis of the economic e¤ects of three di¤erent at tax
reforms for Germany.
In the rst step, we analyse the e¤ects of simplifying the tax base, i.e. the
abolition of a set of deductions from the income tax base. We nd that the e¤ects
of revenue neutral tax base broadening depend on the type of rate schedule adjust-
ment. The combination with a at rate tax increases income inequality, but it also
leads to e¢ ciency gains in terms of labour supply and welfare. The combination
with a rate schedule adjustment which preserves the directly progressive schedule
reduces inequality and e¢ ciency.
In the second step, we analyse the e¤ects of two revenue neutral at tax scen-
arios with di¤erent marginal tax rates without changing the tax base. We nd that
a at rate tax with a low tax rate and a low basic allowance yields positive static
welfare e¤ects amounting to approximately 1.8 per cent of income tax revenue but
increasing income inequality. The increase in income inequality can be avoided by
combining a higher tax rate with a higher basic allowance. But, in this case, the
e¢ ciency gains vanish.
In the third step, we analyse the introduction of a cash ow at tax in the
tradition of Hall and Rabushka (1985). When taking the general equilibrium e¤ects
into account, a personal income at tax can indeed overcome the fundamental
equity-e¢ ciency trade-o¤. This, however, is true only in the long-run, whereas the
adverse immediate distributional e¤ects prevail. Furthermore, combining this at
tax with a at cash ow tax on corporate income still increases inequality.
To sum up, our analysis shows that the selection of the schedule and tax base
parameters are crucial for the e¤ects of at tax reforms in terms of equity and
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e¢ ciency. We conclude that, due to their limited e¢ ciency e¤ects and their prob-
lematic distributional impact, at tax reforms are rather unlikely to spill over to
the grown-up democracies of Western Europe. With its socio-economic and demo-
graphic structure, Germany can be seen as a typical Western European democracy.
Therefore, the qualitative results of our analysis are of interest to a wider range of
countries. This is further investigated in the next chapters.
1.3.3 Chapter 4: Are European welfare states at?
Countries worldwide di¤er with respect to various dimensions including the design
of their tax benet system. The outcome of a at tax reform therefore depends not
only on its design but also on the country in which the reform will be implemented.
In this chapter, we compare the European countries and classify them into four
types of welfare states with respect to the design of the tax benet system in terms
of distribution and redistribution of income: Anglo-Saxon, Nordic, Continental and
Mediterranean welfare states.
Anglo-Saxon countries provide a minimum level of social protection. Tax rates
and social insurance contributions are rather low. Continental countries use bene-
ts that depend on the history of paid contributions (Bismarckian system) which
are nanced though rather high compulsory contributions. Nordic countries ap-
ply high taxes but lower contributions for a similarly high level of redistribution.
However, they use universal benets not depending on the contribution history
(Beveridgean system). Mediterranean countries provide a rather low level of so-
cial security (comparable to the Anglo-Saxon countries) using contribution-based
Bismarckian social insurance systems (like Continental countries).
These results suggest that the outcome of a at tax reform should di¤er
across heterogeneous countries but it is expected to be similar within homogeneous
clusters of countries. Further on, we ask to what extent existing tax and trans-
fer systems e¤ectively di¤er from linearity. We use the deviation from linearity
as a summary measure for the welfare state design. We nd that a at negative
income tax is a rather good approximation of the existing tax benet systems in
some European countries, including Germany. However, the goodness-of-t varies
across the EU-15 countries implying that some countries have highly non-linear
18 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
systems.
1.3.4 Chapter 5: Flat tax reforms in Western Europe
As mentioned before, the implementation of at taxes is limited mainly to countries
in Eastern Europe. One may argue that at tax receives less political support in
countries with a well-established middle class due to its distributional e¤ects. The
aim of this chapter is to provide an empirical analysis of the distributional and
e¢ ciency e¤ects of di¤erent hypothetical at tax reforms for Western European
countries. We undertake a systematic approach for choosing at tax parameters
and rely on EUROMOD, a tax-benet microsimulation model for the EU-15, which
ensures comparable results through a common framework.
Our simulations show that, on the one hand, at tax rates required to attain
revenue neutrality with existing personal allowances improve labour supply in-
centives. However, they mainly benet households with high incomes resulting in
higher inequality, poverty and polarisation. On the other hand, at rates neces-
sary to keep the inequality levels unchanged are rather high but do not weaken
labour supply incentives in all considered countries, therefore allowing for some
scope for at taxes to overcome the fundamental equity e¢ ciency trade-o¤. Our
analysis suggests that an implementation of a at tax regime seems most likely in
countries with a Mediterranean type of welfare state which is characterised by a
high existing polarisation of the income distribution.
Chapter 2
Methodology
2.1 Introduction
In the discussion of the at tax a notable and troubling feature [...] is that it
has been marked more by rhetoric and assertion than by analysis and evidence.1
Given that at taxes have not yet been implemented in Western countries, the
e¤ects of at tax reforms in these countries can only be studied on the basis of
simulation models. The method of simulation analysis aims at analysing and quan-
tifying the economic e¤ects of di¤erent policies based on the given institutional
background to compare and evaluate di¤erent reform proposals with respect to
equity and e¢ ciency e¤ects.
For the analysis of scal reforms, microsimulation and CGE models have been
widely used in the literature. To utilise the complementary advantages of both
types, these models can be linked. To analyse the impact of policy reforms on
equity in terms of distributional e¤ects, four subconcepts can be di¤erentiated:
inequality, polarisation, progressivity, and poverty and richness. Distributional ef-
fects can be computed without (rst round e¤ects) or with (second round e¤ects)
allowing for behavioural responses of the individual agents in the economy. Beha-
vioural responses typically included in the analysis are labour supply responses.
Based on these labour supply e¤ects, the distortion of the labour-leisure-decision
can be estimated to evaluate the welfare impacts of the reform proposal.
1?, p. 3.
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Before analysing di¤erent at tax reform scenarios in the following chapters,
this chapter describes and extends the method of simulation models for the ana-
lysis of scal policy reforms with three contributions: First, the construction of a
linked microsimulation and CGE model, second, the denition of a comprehensive
measure of richness, and third, the application of theoretical measures of welfare
to the ex-ante analysis of scal reforms. Each contribution will be explained in the
next sections in the context of the methods developed in the literature. Section
2.2 introduces the method of simulation analysis. Section 2.3 reviews the analysis
of distributional e¤ects. This analysis is extended in section 2.4 to incorporate
behavioural responses in terms of labour supply and welfare e¤ects. In sections
2.5 and 2.6 the simulation models FiFoSiM and EUROMOD which are used for
the analyses in this book are described in detail.
2.2 Simulation models
2.2.1 Introduction
In this section, simulation models are introduced and described as a method for the
ex-ante evaluation of the various consequences of scal reforms.2 Various proposals
to reform the complex tax and benet systems exist in every welfare state, and
new proposals are being presented in policy debates each year. In the run-up of
the implementation of a certain reform, in many cases the expected consequences
remain an unsolved puzzle. Especially the behavioural responses of the (bounded)
rational individuals are extremely di¢ cult to estimate ex-ante. Knowing these re-
sponses, though, helps to evaluate and judge di¤erent reform proposals regarding
their target achievement and cost e¢ ciency. Estimating them, however, is not a
trivial task. The complexity of existing welfare states requires the usage of simpli-
ed models for the evaluation of reform proposals. Theoretical models should be
kept small and simple to be able to understand the general principles. They allow
to point out a single argument in a simplied framework and to construct hypo-
theses which can be tested empirically. Empirical models allow for an econometric
evaluation of a given reform and are especially useful whenever the magnitude,
2This section is based on Peichl (2005).
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and thus not only the sign, of the e¤ects are to be estimated. The quality of
the empirical analysis crucially depends on the availability of high quality micro
data. If the reform already has been implemented and data is available for the
pre- and post-reform period, an ex-post analysis is possible using standard econo-
metric procedures. On the other hand, if the reform has not been implemented,
only simulation models can provide information for an ex-ante analysis of di¤erent
reform proposals.
In general, simulation models are tools which are designed to answer what if
questions about di¤erent policy reform options. The method of simulation analysis
uses actual economic data to estimate how an economy might react to changes in
external factors (e.g. policy parameters). Simulation models map the complex tax
benet system to analyse and quantify the e¤ects of di¤erent policies based on the
given institutional background. Other than in the natural sciences, it is seldom
possible in economics to construct natural experiments for the analysis of a given
treatment (policy). Policy simulations can be interpreted as quasi-experiments
which allow the economist to ex-ante analyse a reform proposal controlling for
behavioural responses of the micro units in the economy. Simulation models are
frequently used by economists, policy-consultants and policy-makers to predict
the impacts of changes in scal policies on individuals (gains and losses, income
distribution), the government budget and key economic indicators (e.g. growth,
employment, prices, consumption) to provide the political decision makers with
well-founded decision guidance. This is done by setting up alternative scenarios
by varying the rules of the tax benet system and then simulating the impacts of
these changes on individual and aggregated variables.
Several di¤erent types of simulation models can be used depending on the
research question in mind. In the following, we focus on public economics models
which can be used for the analysis of tax benet reforms. Figure 2.2.1 classies
these model types according to the underlying level of aggregation into ve classes.3
Microanalytic models focus on the direct e¤ects of scal reforms on the micro
units and do not consider the broader economic environment in which the di¤er-
3Cf. Spahn, Galler, Kaiser, Kassella and Merz (1992). Basic macro simulation models as well as
group simulation models are rarely used anymore and therefore excluded from this review. See
Heilemann and Wolters (1998) and Müller (2005) for further reading on these models.
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Figure 2.2.1: Classication of simulation models
ent agents are acting, whereas macroanalytic models try to additionally capture
indirect macroeconomic e¤ects. Micro models o¤er great exibility specically
regarding the mapping of complex tax benet systems, whereas macro models
usually give no insight into how aggregate changes in the economy and the new
equilibrium solution a¤ect individuals and their behaviour. During the last years,
a tendency of linking micro and macro models has emerged in computational eco-
nomics to utilise the complementary advantages of micro and macro models.
The aim of this section is to describe the status-quo of the research in the
eld of simulation models by introducing and comparing the di¤erent types of
models. The following subsections describe in more detail the standard procedures
of computable general equilibrium models (CGE), microsimulation models (MSM)
and linked micro macro models.
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2.2.2 Computable General Equilibrium Models (CGE)
General equilibrium theory has provided important insights about mechanisms
that determine the allocation of resources on mutually interdependent markets.
Computable General Equilibrium (CGE)4 models use this general equilibrium the-
ory to empirically analyse and quantify this allocation of resources. CGE models
are used instead of analytical general equilibrium models whenever the size and
complexity make such analytical models mathematically intractable. Although
CGE models are based on the microeconomic general equilibrium theory they
usually use aggregated macro data for the analysis. The rst CGE model was
presented in Johansen (1960). With the development of fast computers and suit-
able software a large number of CGE models has been developed and applied to
policy analysis since then.
CGEmodels use as realistic values as possible of exogenous variables (e.g. elast-
icities, tax rates) to numerically compute the values of the endogenous variables
(e.g. prices, quantities) with the aim of quantifying economic equilibria to compare
the impact of policy measures on these equilibria. Applications of CGE models
include analyses of tax reforms, changes in trade policy regimes, economic integ-
ration, agricultural policies and energy policies. The analysis focuses particularly
on the long-run allocation of factors and goods, whereas short-term distributional
e¤ects cannot be analysed in a sophisticated way using this type of models.
Standard procedure
A CGE model is usually a multi-sector model based on real world data of one or
several national economies to model the interactions of individual households and
rms on interdependent markets. However, in a typical CGE model there is only
one or possibly a few (1 - 5) representative agents, while the number of rms (pro-
duction sectors) is generally larger (3 - 75). A CGE model consists of equations
describing the variables and a database consistent with these equations. For all
agents (households, rms, government) an optimising behaviour, i.e. utility and
4Sometimes this class of numerical economic models is also called Applied General Equilibrium
(AGE) models. This subsection is based on Peichl (2005), Bergs and Peichl (2006) and Bergs
and Peichl (2008). Further introductions to CGE models can be found in Kehoe and Prescott
(1995), Fehr and Wiegard (1996) or Bergman (2005).
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prot maximization on the part of households and rms, is assumed to model their
behaviour on di¤erent markets. In general, standard models assume product and
factor markets to be competitive and relative prices exible enough to simultan-
eously clear all markets. However, it is possible to allow for non-market clearing
(e.g. unemployment or inventories), imperfect competition (e.g. monopolistic com-
petition)5, heterogeneous agents, and taxes or externalities (e.g. pollution). CGE
models are almost always focused on the real side of the economy and thus do not
include nancial assets. Consequently a typical CGE model endogenously determ-
ines relative product and factor prices, but cannot determine nominal prices. In
particular CGE models are aimed at quantifying the impact of specic policies on
the equilibrium allocation of resources and relative prices of goods and factors.
For the numerical computation of equilibria, it is essential to specify functional
forms of production and utility functions as well as the values of the exogenous
parameters of the model. The specication of these functions and parameters is of
key importance for the model results. There are two general approaches. On the
one hand, these parameters can be estimated using econometric methods based
on time series or panel data or, on the other hand, these values can be calibrated6
using a micro consistent dataset reecting an economic equilibrium at a given point
in time. Often both methods are combined and some parameters are estimated
(or estimates are taken from the literature) and other parameters are calibrated
to replicate the benchmark equilibrium given in the data. The construction of
a micro consistent database can be rather time consuming if information from
several sources has to be combined. In general, the skeletal structure is based on
an input-output-table which is enhanced to a so called Social Accounting Matrix
(SAM).7
CGE models allow quantifying the impacts of policy reforms. However, they
- as all models do - obviously rest upon strong simplifying assumptions about
optimising behaviour, competitive markets and exible prices. Furthermore, the
calibration method which is often used to dene key model parameters is often
seen to be rather arbitrary. In view of this, the validity and therefore also the use-
5See e.g. Harris (1984).
6See Mansur and Whalley (1984) and Lau (1984) for an extensive discussion of the calibration
method.
7See Pyatt and Round (1985) and Kehoe (1998) on how to construct a SAM.
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fulness for policy evaluation of the results is often seriously questioned. However,
the usefulness of a CGE model depends on the aims and purposes it was designed
for and what the alternatives are. If a general equilibrium model cannot be solved
analytically, a numerical solution can help to identify general equilibrium e¤ects
of policy changes even if key parameters of the model are quite uncertain. The
role of these parameters for the results can be explained using extensive sensit-
ivity analyses. Furthermore, even if the precise magnitude of the e¤ects remains
uncertain, it still might be possible to identify if the e¤ects are small or large or
at least to compare and rank di¤erent scenarios based on these results.
CGE categories
Di¤erent categories of CGE models can be distinguished. First of all, it should
be emphasised that the models within each category can di¤er in many ways (e.g.
heterogeneity in terms of number of agents, sectors, factors or commodities, as well
as the representation of the government or foreign trade with the rest of the world).
Nevertheless, some common elements can be attributed to di¤erent categories. The
most appropriate classication for most modelling approaches is to distinguish
between static and dynamic models. In addition it is useful to distinguish between
single-country (national) and multi-country (global) models. Generally, single-
country models are much more detailed in terms of sectors and household types
and are especially designed to analyse country-specic policy issues. Multi-country
models are used for multi-lateral policies (e.g. trade agreements, emission trading
schemes) and are usually less detailed in terms of intra country heterogeneity.
Comparative-static models are by far the most common class of CGE models.8
The economy is modelled at two given points in time only: the status quo bench-
mark and the future counterfactual equilibrium. The results of these models are
the long-run di¤erences (usually reported in percent changes) between the bench-
mark equilibrium and the future equilibrium to which the economy converges after
a given exogenous shock. The transition path towards this new equilibrium is not
explicitly modelled. This, however, allows for a more detailed specication of the
single-period economy in terms of numbers of agents, sectors or commodities to
8See e.g. Shoven and Whalley (1984), Shoven and Whalley (1992) or Kehoe and Kehoe (1994)
for an introduction.
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be represented in the model.
Dynamic CGE models, by contrast, explicitly model this transition path. The
equilibrium is computed for all future points in time (at discrete intervals) until
the model horizon ends. These models are far more challenging to design, main-
tain and solve but allow a more realistic representation of the adjustment process
of a policy change. However, the increasing complexity of dynamic models often
reduces the heterogeneity of the agents and therefore, in general, smaller number
of agents and sectors are represented in dynamic models. Dynamic models assume
rational expectations of agents, i.e. they use all available information for the best
guess of the future. This makes it necessary to simultaneously solve for all periods.
Stochastic CGE models explicitly incorporate uncertainty about the future into
the analysis. In contrast, recursive-dynamic CGE models assume that behaviour
depends only on current and past states of the economy (assuming myopic expect-
ations).9 These models can be solved sequentially (one period at a time). Dynamic
models can be further distinguished according to the representation of the house-
hold side of the economy. CGE models based on the Ramsey (1928) growth model
assume an innitely living representative agent. In contrast, overlapping genera-
tions models (OLG) assume periodically overlapping generations. These models
can be further distinguished into models with identical lifetime for all generations
(see Auerbach, Kotliko¤ and Skinner (1983) and Auerbach and Kotliko¤ (1987))
or models with a stochastic time of death (see Blanchard (1985)).
Applications
There are many elds for applications of CGE models in economics. The short
review in this section focuses on recent models for the analysis of tax reforms
especially in Germany.10
Hutton and Ruocco (1999) use a static model to analyse di¤erent tax reforms
in Germany, France, Italy and the UK especially with respect to their labour
market performance. Sørensen (2002) also uses a static model for the analysis of
the German tax reform of 2000.
9See Ballard, Fullerton, Shoven and Whalley (1985).
10See e.g. Fehr and Wiegard (1996) for a review of additional models. An application for the US
can for example be found in Altig et al. (2001).
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Keuschnigg and Dietz (2003) use an OLG model to analyse the corporate tax
reform in Switzerland. This model is adapted to Germany by Radulescu and
Stimmelmayr (2004) who analyse the introduction of a dual income tax. Fehr and
Wiegard (1998) use an Auerbach-Kotliko¤OLG model to analyse di¤erent income
tax reform proposals.
Graaand, de Mooij and Nibbelink (2001) and Bovenberg (2003) use the recursive-
dynamic model MIMIC to analyse the impact of tax reforms on the Dutch labour
market. The German PACE-L model was constructed following the MIMIC ap-
proach. This model is used to analyse the labour market e¤ects of hypothetical
income tax (Boeters, Gürtzgen and Schnabel (2006)), VAT (Boeters, Böhringer,
Büttner and Kraus (2006)) or welfare (Böhringer, Boeters and Feil (2005)) reforms.
2.2.3 Microsimulation Models
Microsimulation models (MSM) are quantitative models of the tax benet system
and have been introduced into social sciences and economics by Orcutt (1957) and
Orcutt, Greenberg, Korbel and Rivlin (1961).11
Standard procedure
Microsimulation models are partial equilibrium models focusing on one side (e.g.
the household side) of markets and do not consider the broader economic envir-
onment in which the micro units are acting. Tax benet models usually only
simulate rst round e¤ects where the behavioural response of the agents (to the
change imposed on the system) is not captured. These tax benet models can be
combined with a labour supply model allowing the simulation of (partial) second
round e¤ects in terms of behavioural responses on the labour market.
In the centre of this microanalytic approach is the behaviour of individual
agents to which the observed social and economic processes can be attributed.
MSM are based on micro data which o¤ers a great exibility especially regarding a
detailed mapping of the complex tax benet system. These data samples allow the
modelling of structural characteristics of micro units (persons, households, rms)
11This subsection is based on Peichl (2005). See e.g. Gupta and Kapur (2000), Harding (1996)
or Bourguignon and Spadaro (2006) for further MSM surveys.
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within a particular tax benet system. This allows MSM to reect the considerable
heterogeneity within the population by taking into account the characteristics and
circumstances of each individual. MSM can be used to analyse the status quo of tax
benet rules by providing detailed data on single policy variables. Furthermore,
these factuals are then used as a benchmark (baseline) to evaluate the impact
of a reform scenario. Such a counterfactual can be a single policy or various
interacting and interdependent policies within the complex tax benet system as
well as fundamental reform proposals of the whole system. To analyse a reform
scenario, the socioeconomic system is modelled and applied to the sample micro
units, which in turn are weighted with population weights to extrapolate results
for the whole population. Therefore, the results of MSM can be analysed either at
the individual level or at di¤erent levels of aggregation. Despite these advantages
there are some limitations. Every empirical analysis relies on high quality data
of all key variables. If such data is not available, simplifying assumptions are
necessary which lead to biased estimations. If, e.g., key information necessary for
some (minor) tax rules is not available, it is not possible to include these rules into
the mapping of the tax benet system.
MSM categories
Microsimulation models can be di¤erentiated according to the time dimension into
static and dynamic models and according to the modelling of behavioural responses
into behavioural and non-behavioural models.
Static vs. dynamic MSM
Static MSM use cross-sectional data at a given point in time. Often this data has
to be aged to the year of analysis which might be further in the future using the
static ageing technique, i.e. reweighting of individual records based on macroe-
conomic indicators.12 Static models mimic the tax law by applying the (current
or an alternative set of) tax benet rules to individual units. These models are
essential tax benet calculators for all individuals and therefore allow to model
the tax benet rules for every point of the income distribution. This allows the
12See Gupta and Kapur (2000) for a review of the ageing techniques.
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user to simulate the instantaneous rst-round e¤ects (in terms of the scal and
distributional e¤ects, i.e. the gains and losses in di¤erent variables at the indi-
vidual or aggregated level) of policy changes. They allow for a comparative-static
analysis of the pre- and post-reform state of the economy without looking at the
adjustment process.
Dynamic MSM try to endogenously explain this process of adaptation through
the incorporation of dynamic ageing of individual records over time based on the
probabilities of the happening of di¤erent real life events (e.g. marriage, divorce,
birth of a child). The relevant life processes are simulated and the individual
characteristics are recalculated at each period in time which allows moving the
micro units forward through time. On the one hand, dynamic MSM allows the
modelling of demographic changes over time, but on the other hand, dynamic
models have a higher demand regarding the modelling, the data requirements and
the computational resources than static models. Therefore, often static models
which are easier to build and maintain are used in combination with a behavioural
model for the analysis of the short-term e¤ects of policy reforms.
Behavioural responses
Behavioural responses can be simulated with both static and dynamic models.
Sometimes behavioural models are labelled dynamic. Although dynamic models
often include behavioural responses, they do not necessarily have to include them.
Non-behavioural models do not allow the individuals to change their behaviour
as a consequence of a given policy reform. These models are often used to estimate
the immediate scal and distributional e¤ects. This is done by generating income
proles for various groups of individuals to highlight discontinuities in the tax
benet rules which in turn can be modied by policy-makers.
Behavioural models simulate some kind of behavioural response to a policy
change. These responses can include the supply and demand of factors and goods.
The most common applications are models of labour supply. Labour supply models
allow the modelling of both the extensive (participation) and the intensive (hours
worked) labour supply decision. The labour supply model can be either integrated
into the microsimulation model or it can be linked to a MSM as an external
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module. There are several possibilities of how to model the labour supply of a tax
unit (e.g. individual vs. household labour supply, discrete vs. continuous working
hours, selection of utility functions). Recent surveys of the empirical labour market
literature and di¤erent kinds of labour supply models are for example provided by
Heckman (1993), Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) or Creedy, Duncan, Harris and
Scutella (2002).
Applications
Various microsimulation models exist worldwide. The review in this subsection
focuses on German models which are used for the analysis of reforms of the tax
benet system.13
Wagenhals (2001a) uses GMOD to simulate the scal and distributional e¤ects
of the income tax reform act of 2000. Wagenhals (2001b) analyses the incentive
and distributional e¤ects of the reform proposal of Kirchhof, Altehoefer, Arndt,
Bareis, Eckmann, Freudenberg, Hahnemann, Kopei, Lang, Lückhardt and Schut-
ter (2001). Haan and Steiner (2005) use STSM to estimate the scal, distribu-
tional and labour supply e¤ects of the income tax reform act of 2000. Steiner and
Wrohlich (2004) analyse the labour supply e¤ects of the German system of family
taxation. Merz and Zwick (2002) and Merz, Stolze and Zwick (2002) analyse the
income tax reform act of 2000 with MICSIM especially with respect to the upper
end of the income distribution.
Immervoll, Kleven, Kreiner and Saez (2007) use the European model EUR-
OMOD to analyse di¤erent reform scenarios in the EU-15 countries and Verbist
(2004) analyses the distributional e¤ects of the existing tax benet systems in
these countries.
2.2.4 Linked Micro-Macro Models
On the one hand, CGE models provide an economy wide perspective of a given
shock after the economy has fully equilibrated.14 The need to specify and calibrate
functional forms and parameters for all agents on all markets reduces the number
13See e.g. Wagenhals (2004) or OHare and Gupta (2000) for further surveys.
14This subsection is based on Peichl (2008).
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of agents to be modelled dramatically. Therefore, in general, few representative
agents are used which reduces exibility and the possibilities of a detailed model-
ling of the tax-benet system. In consequence, these models give no insight into
how aggregate changes in the economy and the new equilibrium solution a¤ect
individuals. On the other hand, MSM are based on micro data which o¤ers great
exibility specically regarding the mapping of the complex tax benet system.
These models are partial equilibrium models focusing on one side (e.g. the house-
hold side) of markets and do not consider the broader economic environment in
which the micro units are acting.
During the last years, a tendency of linking micro and macro models has
emerged in computational economics to utilise the complementary advantages of
MSM and CGE models.15 A linked model can provide a more powerful tool for
policy analysis than using results from two stand-alone MSM and CGE models.16
Outputs from the macro model can be used to align the predictions of the mi-
cro model and to enable general equilibrium feedbacks and interactions among
variables in the micro model. Outputs from the micro model can be used to calib-
rate the macro model and provide a microeconomic basis for aggregate behaviour.
Hence, the key advantage of a linked micro macro model is the feedback which is
used to resolve the model corresponding to a revised set of parameters. However,
achieving these feedback e¤ects through linking MSM and CGE models is not a
trivial task.
The idea of linking micro- and macroeconomic simulation models is almost
as old as the stand-alone models themselves.17 Orcutt (1967) suggests to link
models operating at di¤erent levels of aggregation through intermediate variables.
Nevertheless, the number of researchers developing linked micro macro models
is still very small worldwide (see Davies (2004)). Nonetheless, recent advances
in computational and econometric methods are leading to a growing interest in
combining these modelling techniques. The yet recent development in this area
can be clearly attributed to the progress in computer and information technology
which makes these large-scale models feasible to solve.
15Cf. Davies (2004) for an overview. Most of these models deal with trade liberalization in
developing countries.
16Cf. Anderson (1990).
17See Orcutt (1967) or Conrad (1991) for Germany.
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There are two general possibilities for linking the models. On the one hand,
one can completely integrate both models into a joint model18 or on the other
hand, one could combine two separated models via interfaces (layered approach).19
The rst approach requires the complete micro model to be included in the CGE
model which demands high standards for the database and the construction of the
integrated model. This often results in various simplifying assumptions.
Figure 2.2.2: Top-down and bottom-up
The layered approach can be di¤erentiated into top-down (see Figure 2.2.2,
left-hand side), bottom-up (see Figure 2.2.2, right-hand side) or top-down
18Cf. Cogneau and Robilliard (2000) or Cororaton, Cockburn and Corong (2005). See also Arntz,
Boeters and Gürtzgen (2006) for description of how to integrate a discrete choice labour supply
into a CGE model.
19Cf. Bourguignon, Robilliard and Robinson (2003).
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bottom-up (see Figure 2.2.3) approaches.20 The top-down approach computes
the macroeconomic variables (price level, growth rates) in a CGE model as input
for the micro model which is adjusted to match an exogenous macro aggregate.
The bottom-up approach works the other way around and information from the
micro model (elasticities, tax rates) is used in the macro model (e.g. for calibration
of the representative agents). Both approaches su¤er from the drawback that not
all feedback is used. The top-down bottom-up approach combines both methods
to a recursive approach. In an iterative process one model is solved, information is
sent to the other model, which is solved and gives feedback to the rst model. This
iterative process continues until the two models converge. Böhringer and Ruther-
ford (2006) describe an algorithm for the sequential calibration of a CGE model
to use the top-down bottom-up approach with micro models with large numbers
of households.
Figure 2.2.3: Top-down bottom-up
To be able to successfully link MSM and CGE models there have to be some
common variables through which the two models can exchange information. Usu-
ally, it is necessary to aggregate or disaggregate these variables to be comparable
with the variables in the other model. Of course, the less variables have to be
(dis)aggregated the more of the underlying heterogeneity in the data will be re-
20Cf. Savard (2003) or Böhringer and Rutherford (2006).
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tained. Furthermore, it has to be checked if the same variable in both models
represents the same population (e.g. household consumption in the micro model
vs. aggregated total consumption including government in the macro model). In
addition, it has to be checked if one run of each model represents the same time
horizon. Usually, a MSM computes short-term e¤ects, whereas a CGE models
aims at the long-run equilibrium. Therefore, the information exchange between
both models has to take into account these temporal di¤erences. If, for example, a
given labour supply shock from the MSM model has not fully equilibrated within
the CGE model and information is passed back and forth again, a second labour
supply shock might overlap the rst one and either foil or fortify the rst shock.
Applications
So far, the application of linked micro macro models to analyse tax reforms is
rather limited.21 Boeters, Feil and Gürtzgen (2005) use the bottom-up approach
to calibrate the three representative households of a CGEmodel to analyse di¤erent
hypothetical reform proposals of the social assistance benet system in Germany.22
A similar approach is chosen by Fuest, Peichl and Schaefer (2005a) to evaluate a tax
reform proposal for Germany with respect to scal, employment and growth e¤ects.
Arntz, Boeters, Gürtzgen and Schubert (2006) use the recursive top-down bottom-
up approach to analyse reform proposals designed to encourage labour supply at
the lower end of the wage distribution in Germany. However, various simplifying
assumptions regarding the aggregation and disaggregation of information on labour
supply responses that is passed between the models have to be made.
Aaberge, Colombino, Holmøy, Strøm and Wennemo (2007) use an integrated
micro macro model of Norway to analyse the impact of population ageing on scal
sustainability with endogenous labour supply. Although their model is integrated,
they use an iterative approach. Labour supply responses are computed using the
MSM model and are then used in the CGE model to estimate changes in wage
rates.
21There are, however, more applications to trade reforms (see e.g. Davies (2004) for a survey).
More recent applications include Hérault (2005), who uses the top-down approach to analyse
the e¤ect of trade liberalisation on poverty in South Africa.
22The same model and approach is also used by Boeters, Gürtzgen and Schnabel (2006).
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Rutherford, Tarr and Shepotylo (2005) link a CGEmodel to the Russian House-
hold Budget Survey (representing 55,000 households) in order to analyse the dis-
tributional e¤ects of Russias WTO accession. They use the information of the
micro model to calibrate the representative agent of the CGE model and iterate
both models until they converge in terms of price changes and aggregate demand
equalling aggregate supply.
2.2.5 Summarising comparison of model types
The method of simulation analysis can be seen as an economic quasi-experiment
for the ex-ante evaluation of policy reforms to analyse and compare the impacts of
di¤erent reform scenarios before they are implemented in real life. Di¤erent types
of simulation models evolved over time. The three most common and appropriate
models for the analysis of scal reforms, microsimulation models (MSM), com-
putable general equilibrium models (CGE) and linked micro macro models have
been described in this section. The main research questions for these categories
are presented in Table 2.2.1.
CGE MSM Micro-Macro
Framework total partial total
Data macro micro both
Research questions:
- Growth X X
- Allocation / E¢ ciency X (X) X
- Labour supply (X) X X
- Labour demand X X
- Revenue X X
- Distribution X X
Table 2.2.1: Comparison of model types
CGE models excel through their outstanding theoretical foundation and the
consideration of various interdependencies. They allow estimating various behavi-
oural responses and adjustments on several markets, e.g. modelling labour supply
and demand on the labour market. In contrast, microsimulation models take only
the labour supply side into account. Nevertheless, these models allow for a much
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more detailed mapping of the complex rules of the tax benet system and account
for a much greater heterogeneity than CGE models could ever do because of the
aggregated data they are based on. Furthermore, the need to specify and calibrate
functional forms and key parameters gives rise to various critiques against CGE
models because of limited econometric foundations of the calibration technique in
general. During the last years, a tendency of linking micro and macro models has
emerged to utilise the complementary advantages of MSM and CGE models.
So far, the linked micro macro models which have been used for the analysis
of tax benet reforms do not su¢ ciently use all the possibilities stand-alone MSM
and CGE models o¤er. The further development of computational power and more
powerful algorithms (see e.g. Rausch and Rutherford (2007)) should allow for a
complete integration of both types of models. This in turn will then enable to
analyse the complex interdependence of various policy measures with respect to
scal, distributional, employment and growth e¤ects within the same econometric
framework. Further development on the microsimulation modelling of the corpor-
ate sector is also desirable. This, of course, crucially depends on the availability of
corporate micro data. Such a corporate MSM could then be linked with a house-
hold MSM and integrated into a CGE model which would then be based on micro
data for both sides of the economy.
When conducting a simulation analysis or interpreting its results one should
be aware of potential errors or biases. According to Betson (1990) sampling
errors, imputation errors, ageing errors, individual response errors and
environmental errors can be distinguished. Sampling errors can always occur
when subsamples from the whole population are used in an empirical analysis
which can increase or decrease the variation in the data. Thus, estimates from
the simulation model might di¤er from estimation based on the whole population.
If the sample was not drawn randomly, the assumptions of statistical procedures
might be violated and special corrections have to be used in the analysis. Fur-
thermore, there might be also non-sampling errors in the dataset, resulting e.g.
from non-response and reporting or data processing mistakes. The weighting of the
individual records with population weights to estimate aggregated values for the
whole population can reduce these errors, as the weighting factors are chosen to en-
sure that the sample estimates conform to macroeconomic indicators of the whole
2.2. SIMULATION MODELS 37
population. However, when these population factors are modied, e.g. using static
ageing techniques of reweighting, this can give rise to ageing errors if the modic-
ation itself is biased. Imputation errors arise when data from di¤erent sources are
used for the imputation of missing values or variables. As a consequence, distribu-
tional assumptions might be violated leading to biased estimations. But not only
the data is error-prone but also the modelling of the benchmark or the counter-
factual scenario itself gives rise to potential mistakes. Individual response errors
can arise from simplifying and/or behavioural assumptions in the model. Simpli-
fying assumptions are always subject to errors, but have to be used to overcome
data limitations or to make the model operational. Behavioural assumptions are
necessary for the estimation of behavioural responses. To do so, functional forms
and co-variables of the econometric model have to be specied based on beliefs of
the underlying behaviour of the individuals. Incomplete or imperfect beliefs can
lead to misspecications and biased results. Environmental errors can e.g. arise
from the negligence of the broader economic environment or individual reactions
to policy changes.
When building and using a simulation model, a researcher should be aware of
these potential errors and should try to avoid them if possible or at least to docu-
ment the possible biases in the analysis. Extensive sensitivity analyses should be
conducted when building a model or simulating a new scenario. When interpret-
ing the results of a simulation study, one has to be aware of these potential errors
and has to take a closer look at the underlying data, methods and assumptions.
Furthermore, estimations from simulation models should not be used as an exact
forecast of a single number but to compare and rank di¤erent scenarios according
to various dimensions. Despite all these potential errors, simulation models nev-
ertheless provide a powerful tool for the ex-ante evaluation of scal policy reform
proposals.
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2.3 Measuring distributional e¤ects
2.3.1 Introduction
Reforms of the welfare state usually a¤ect the structure of tax burdens, the amount
of benets received and thus the distribution of disposable incomes. Since in a
democratic political system, such reform proposals need to win the majority of
votes before they can be implemented, it appears crucial to analyse who may
gain or lose and how the distribution and redistribution of incomes and burdens
may change as a consequence of such reforms. The purpose of this section is to
provide an overview of how to analyse the distributional e¤ects of scal reforms.23
Thereby, distributional e¤ects shall be di¤erentiated by four subconcepts, i.e. 1.)
the traditional concept of inequality, 2.) the rather novel concept of polarisation,
3.) the concept of progression in taxation, and 4.) the concept of income poverty
and complementarily richness.24
Before starting with the description, some denitions and clarications are
necessary. Firstly, it appears reasonable to limit an analysis of distributional e¤ects
to incomes, primarily due to a better availability of data on incomes compared
to data on total assets of people.25 Secondly, it appears necessary to dene an
appropriate concept of income. Considering incomes as they have actually been
generated on markets, yields a concept of pre-government income. Thereby, the
sum of earnings generated from independent and dependent personal services,
private assets as well as private transfers is called the market income. Based on
market incomes, post-government incomes in economic terms are derived by taking
governmental payments into consideration. On the one hand income tax liabilities
and social security contributions are deducted, and on the other hand pensions
from the statutory pension insurance as well as social transfers are added. The
resulting di¤erence between market incomes and post-government incomes may
be interpreted as the result of governmental redistribution. However, it appears
23This section is based on Ochmann and Peichl (2006) and Peichl, Schaefer and Scheicher (2006).
24One should note that, the methods and measures described in this section can be used in any
empirical analysis, i.e. in both ex-ante and ex-post studies of scal reforms. They are not
limited to the application of simulation models.
25However, this does not imply that the methods and measures introduced in the following
subsections cannot be applied to di¤erent concepts like wealth or welfare.
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relevant to take into account that income units in tax statistics usually represent
incomes of more than one person together, so that an analysis should allow for
di¤erences in the income unitsneeds. In general, equivalence scales reect both,
economies of scale in household size, and di¤erences in household characteristics,
such as needs, location, age, number and age of children, and health. The most
widely applied concepts of equivalence scales exhibit simple scale parameters that
attach weights to household members in relation to their age.26
The setup of this section is organised as follows: subsection 2.3.2 opens up the
distributional analysis with the concept of inequality. Subsection 2.3.3 then follows
with polarisation, whereupon subsection 2.3.4 subjects progression in taxation,
and subsection 2.3.5 deals with the measurement of poverty and richness. In these
four subsections, various indices of measurement are derived, compared to each
other, sensitivities are discussed, and advantages as well as disadvantages derived.
Subsection 2.3.6 concludes.
2.3.2 Measuring Inequality
Descriptive Measures / Measures of Dispersion
Let an income distribution be a random variable X = (x1; x2; :::; xn); where xi  0
is the income of individual i; i = 1; :::n:27 A rst index of dispersion may be
derived with the help of the concept of the Lorenz curve. The Lorenz curve may
be displayed as an increasing convex frequency polygon of n pieces running from
(0; 0) to (1; 1); indicating how many percent of the sum of all values belong to the
F -% smallest values of X: Relating the area located between the Lorenz curve and
the diagonal to the area of the triangle beneath the diagonal of the unit square
yields the Gini (1914) coe¢ cient of inequality:
26Cf. Buhmann, Rainwater, Schmaus and Smeeding (1988).
27In the following, we focus on discrete values of X due to lack of space. The continuous case
and the corresponding formulas of the various indices is of further subject in the working paper
version of this section (see Ochmann and Peichl (2006)).
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In case of maximum inequality, IGGini corresponds to 1  1n ; and in the case that
all values are equal, IGGini corresponds to zero. One may derive a standardised Gini
coe¢ cient as IGini =
A
1
2
(1  1
n
)
= n
n 12A =
n
n 1I
G
Gini =
Pn
i=1 li
2i n 1
n 1 : In case of max-
imum inequality, IGini corresponds to one, and in the case that all values are equal,
IGini corresponds to zero. Although the Gini coe¢ cient became the probably most
popular index of inequality, it is by far not the only index that has been applied
throughout the literature, and it neither appears to be a perfectly appropriate in-
dex in all settings of analysis. For example, the Gini coe¢ cient bears the drawback
that it may indicate the same value of inequality for two distinct distributions in
the case of intersecting Lorenz curves, since the Gini coe¢ cient is a measure of
overall dispersion, which gives no information about dispersion in the upper or the
lower level of the distribution. The simplest measure that considers the fact that
values deviate from each other, is the range. It calculates the maximum spread
of the distribution, i.e. Range = xmax   xmin: However, this measure takes only
two values into consideration and neglects everything that takes place in between.
In order to further elaborate the matter of deviation, one may apply the relat-
ive mean deviation (RMD) which relates the deviation of each value xi from
the mean of the distribution x to x itself: RMD =
Pn
i=1
jxi xj
nx
= 1
n
nX
i=1
xi
x
  1 :
RMD corresponds to the maximum deviation of the Lorenz curve from the diag-
onal line of absolute equality, i.e. RMD = maxp(0;1)[p   L(p)]: As done usually
when measuring dispersion of any frequency distribution, one may simply apply
the variance (VAR) of the distribution: V AR = 1
n
nX
i=1
(xi x)2: However, taking
simply the variance as a measure of inequality yields the drawback that the degree
of inequality is absolute, neglecting the mean around which the values spread.
However, relating the variance to the mean of the distribution solves this problem
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and yields the coe¢ cient of variation (CV):
CV =
p
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=
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=
vuut 1
n
nX
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(
xi
x
  1)2: (2.3.2)
Measures from Information Theory
Another group of indices is derived with the help of a concept of probability of
the occurrence of events that is based on information theory. Information theory
focuses on messages about the occurrence of a specic event !i; out of the set 

of possible events, with P (f!ig) = pi denoting the probability that event !i will
actually occur,
Pn
i=1 pi = 1; i = 1; :::n: Before messages about the probability of
occurrence come in, one may measure the expected information content of a mes-
sage E(p1; :::pn) =
Pn
i=1 pie(pi) =  
Pn
i=1 pi log pi; with e(pi) = log
1
pi
=   log pi
denoting the information content of a message. It is further dened: 0  E  log n;
with E = 0 if there is one i with pi = 1; and all other pj = 0 for j 6= i; i.e. minimum
entropy, and E = 1 if pi = 1n ;8 i = 1; :::n; i.e. maximum entropy.28
In Theil (1967) the entropy concept is applied to the measurement of inequality.
He substitutes the probabilities pi by income proportions ai = xinx : In order to
make the measure take its maximum value in case of maximum inequality, Theil
(1967) subtracts entropy from its maximum value. Thus, inequality is measured
by log n  E(a1; :::; an): From this approach, he develops two measures:
I0Theil = log n+
nX
i=1
xi
xn
log
xi
xn
=
1
n
nX
i=1
xi
x
log
xi
x
: (2.3.3)
I1Theil =  
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n
nX
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n
nX
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log(
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) (2.3.4)
I0Theil is further on referred to as the Theil index, whereas I
1
Theil is also referred
to as the mean logarithmic deviation (MLD).29
In Shorrocks (1980) the entropy concept is also applied to measuring inequality.
He introduces a class of inequality measures that deal with the extent to which
28Cf. Theil (1967), pp. 24-26.
29In case of xi = 0; Theil denes I(xi = 0) = 0: Cf. Theil (1967), pp. 93-95.
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inequality in the total population can be attributed to income di¤erences between
major population subgroups. He develops a generalisation of Theils approach of
applying the entropy concept, i.e. the indices of the generalised entropy
(GE) family of inequality:
IcGE(F ) =
1
n
1
c(c  1)
nX
i=1
[(
xi
x
)c   1];  1 < c < +1; c 6= 0; 1: (2.3.5)
The constant c is a sensitivity parameter, which may also be interpreted as a
parameter of inequality aversion.30 In case of c = 0; the indices of the GE family
equal theMLD, i.e. I1Theil; in case of c = 1; they equal the Theil index, i.e. I
0
Theil;
and in case of c = 2; they equal half the squared coe¢ cient of variation, I2GE =
CV 2
2
.
In the case of c =  1; they are referred to as the GE index.
Comparison of Indices
Fullment of Axioms and Principles In order to make their results com-
parable to each other, one may demand indices of inequality to full several basic
axioms and principles.31: an index of inequality fulls the axiom of monotonicity if
it indicates increasing inequality in case of a reduction in low-level incomes and in
case of an increase in high-level incomes. The axiom of normalisation demands the
range of values of an index to be limited to [0; 1]: An index is translation invariant
if inequality remains unchanged in turn of absolute as well as proportional trans-
lations to all incomes. The axiom of symmetry is fullled if inequality remains
unchanged at any reordering of incomes, and the population principle demands
that inequality remains unchanged if the population is replicated. An index is
called additively decomposable if overall inequality may be decomposed into the
sum of between-group inequality and within-group inequality, with the latter term
denoting a weighted sum of the sub-group inequality values. The Pigou-Dalton
transfer principle demands that a progressive transfer, i.e. a transfer from a richer
to a poorer person that does not alter the relative ranks of the two, must always
30Cf. Shorrocks (1980), pp. 613-614 and 622.
31A methodological derivation of these axioms and principles as well as the derivation of the
Lorenz dominance and the generalized Lorenz dominance criterion can be found in Ochmann
and Peichl (2006).
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decrease the degree of inequality, whereas a regressive transfer, i.e. a transfer
from a poor to a richer person preserving relative ranks, must always increase the
degree of inequality. An extension of this transfer principle - the principle of di-
minishing returns - assigns greater signicance to a progressive transfer between
two individuals with a given di¤erence in incomes the lower these incomes are.
The principle of positional transfer sensitivity demands that a transfer from any
income to a lower one, with a xed proportion of all incomes lying between these
two, must have more signicance at the lower end of the distribution scale than at
the higher end.32 The detailed performance of the various indices at fullment of
these axioms may be found in Ochmann and Peichl (2006). The results are only
briey summarised in table 2.3.1.
Index Axioms and Principles
Nota- Mono- Normali- Transl. Sym- Popu- Decom- Trans- Dimin.
tion tonicity sation Inv. metry lation posabil. fer P. Ret.
IGGini yes on [0; 1] yes yes yes no yes no
RMD yes on [0; 2] yes yes yes no no no
V AR yes no no yes yes yes yes yes
CV yes no yes yes yes yes yes no
LV AR yes no yes yes yes no no no
V ARL yes no yes yes yes no no no
MLD yes no yes yes yes yes yes yes
I0Theil yes no yes yes yes yes yes yes
I 1GE yes no yes yes yes yes yes yes
Table 2.3.1: Indices of Inequality - Fullment of Axioms and Principles
Sensitivity on the Distribution Scale The various indices of inequality moreover
vary greatly with respect to sensitivity to transfers along the distribution scale.
The Gini coe¢ cient is more sensitive in the lower levels of the income scale than
in the higher levels, however it attaches the most weight to transfers among incomes
in the middle of the scale. Thus it is most sensitive to transfers among mid-level
incomes and generally in cases where values lie close to each other; in such cases
it is highly sensitive compared to other indices. Similarly, the relative mean
32Cf. Dalton (1920), p. 351, Chakravarty and Muliere (2004a), pp. 8-12, and Kolm (1976), pp.
87-88.
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deviation, especially 1
2
RMD, is highly sensitive around the arithmetic mean in-
come and relatively insensitive everywhere else. The coe¢ cient of variation
is more than average sensitive among mid-level incomes and extremely sensitive
to transfers in the highest levels of the distribution scale. The CV appears to be
appropriate for the evaluation of transfers among mid-level incomes and especially
at the top of the income scale. The Piesch index is also relatively more sensitive
to transfers among high incomes. However, the logarithmic variance and the
variance of the logarithms are highly sensitive among low incomes, and they
are more sensitive among mid-level incomes than the CV , I0Theil, and I
G
Gini.
Index Sensitivity on the
Name Notation Formula Distribution Scale
Gini coe¢ cient IGGini
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2i n 1
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Relative mean deviation RMD 1
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 mid-level
Variance V AR 1
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i=1(xi   x)2 highest level
Coe¢ cient of variation CV
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Logarithmic variance LV AR 1
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)2 low-level
Variance of the logarithms V ARL 1
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2 low-level
Mean logarithmic deviation MLD 1
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) mid- and low-level
Theil index I0Theil
1
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i=1
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x
log xi
x
high-level
GE index I 1GE
1
2n
Pn
i=1[
x
xi
  1] low-level
Table 2.3.2: Indices of Inequality - Notation and Sensitivity on the Distribution Scale
Since it usually violates the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle in the upper level
of the scale, the logarithmic variance (LVAR) appears to be only adequate for
partial analyses in the middle and lower levels. The sensitivity of the indices of
the GE family varies according to the value of their sensitivity parameter c. For
large absolute values of c, IcGE becomes more sensitive to variations in the tails
of the distribution, specically more sensitive in the upper scale for large positive
values of c and more sensitive in the lower scale for large negative values of c. Thus,
the mean logarithmic deviation is relatively more sensitive in the centre, but
also towards lower levels, while the Theil index is relatively medium-sensitive
in mid- and low-levels and more than average sensitive in high-levels of the scale.
Moreover, the GE index is relatively more sensitive in the lower levels, and CV
2
2
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is relatively more sensitive in the upper levels.33 Table 2.3.2 summarises the most
important indices of inequality and their sensitivity on the distribution scale.
2.3.3 Measuring Polarisation
The concept of polarisation has only been recently analysed in literature. Measures
of polarisation may be grouped into two categories, i.e. measures based on axioms,
and measures based on the concept of a declining middle class.
Measures Based on Axioms
The simplest indices of polarisation point out distances between certain ranges of
the distribution scale. Such ratios apply the quantile function Q(F; q) = minfx j
F (x)  qg = xq at two distinct points of the distribution scale and compute the
ratio of the values of Q(F; q) at these points. Quantile ratios may be interpreted
as the factor with that the incomes in the lower quantile in consideration need
to be multiplied, in order to lift them up to the higher quantile, thus indicating
a proportional gap between these quantiles. Specically, mostly applied quantile-
ratios are the 0.75/0.25-quantile ratio (the quartile ratio) and the 0.9/0.1-
quantile ratio.
The rst class of measures of polarisation is based on axioms similar to the
axioms derived for indices of inequality.34 Following Esteban and Ray (1994),
let x1; :::; xn be values of a rst variable, e.g. income X; that may be grouped
into K disjoint groups according to a second variable, e.g. profession Y; with
x = (x1; :::; xK)
0 denoting the vector of mean incomes of the K groups, while
xi 6= xj 8 i; j; i.e. mean incomes of two groups are never equal. The vector of
the K groupsfractions of the overall population is denoted by w = (w1; :::wK)0:
Based on this categorisation, Esteban and Ray (1994) characterise polarisation by
33Cf. Atkinson (1970), pp. 255-257, Chakravarty (1988), p. 147, Buhmann et al. (1988), p. 125,
and Champernowne (1974), p. 805.
34These axioms are the monotonicity axiom, the normalization axiom, the axiom of translation
invariance, the symmetry axiom, the population principle, and the additive decomposability
axiom (see Esteban and Ray (1994)). It should be noted that the Pigou-Dalton transfer
principle is, in its original version, not valid for the measurement of polarisation.
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the simultaneous occurrence of su¢ ciently large groups, thereby applying intra-
group homogeneity and inter-group heterogeneity.
Intra-group homogeneity is applied by an identication function, I : RK+ ! RK+ ;
w ! w = (w1 ; :::wK)0: Thereby, intra-group homogeneity increases in the degree
of identication with people in the same group, which in turn increases in the
number of people with the same income in this group and with decreasing dif-
ferences between the incomes in the same group. Polarisation in turn increases
in increasing intra-group homogeneity. Thereby,  is a parameter of polarisation
sensitivity, with 1    1:6.35 Inter-group heterogeneity, however, is applied by
an alienation function, V : RKK+ ! RKK+ ; X !
X  X 0 ; where alienation
increases in increasing absolute di¤erences between the mean incomes of the K
groups. Polarisation in turn increases in increasing alienation. As a result, polar-
isation increases the more people with equal incomes belong to the same group and
the greater are the di¤erences between mean incomes of the groups. The Esteban
and Ray (1994)-index of income polarisation is derived as:
POER(X;w) =
1
x
(w1+)0
X  X 0w (2.3.6)
with   [1; 1:6] and x = 1
n
Pn
i=1 xi: It bears the advantages that it is based on a
model approach with two specic partial functions, and that the di¤erences com-
pared to the measurement of inequality are revealed by a parameter of polarisation.
Disadvantages of the index are the presumed a priori categorisation into groups
by a second variable and its representation by the groupsmean incomes, as well
as the lack of representation of deviation of incomes from the mean income within
groups when regarding intra-group homogeneity, thereby overestimating polarisa-
tion. Moreover, the maximum value of POER characterizes maximum inequality,
instead of maximum polarisation. The Esteban and Ray (1994) approach is ex-
panded by Esteban, Gradín and Ray (1999) to include intra-group inhomogeneity
into the analysis and by Duclos, Esteban and Ray (2004) to identify the interaction
between identication and alienation.
35The greater , the greater is the di¤erence between polarisation and inequality measured,
whereat  = 0 yields IGGini.
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Measures and the Declining middle class
The concept of the declining middle classmore closely enlightens the di¤erences
between measuring inequality and measuring polarisation. While at the measure-
ment of inequality the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle demands that a progressive
transfer must always decrease inequality and a regressive transfer must always in-
crease inequality, at the measurement of polarisation this principle is not valid.
In order to derive this result, let income X be uniformly distributed on [0; 1]; and
make two progressive transfers that do not cross the median, with one above and
one beneath the median. The graph of f(x) clearly possesses two peaks then,
i.e. f(x) turns bimodal, so that polarisation clearly increases, while inequality
decreases according to the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle. Thus, this principle is
not valid for the measurement of polarisation. When focusing on the declining
middle class, the following indices of polarisation highlight two matters character-
izing polarisation, i.e. bimodality and spreadoutness. The rst one characterizes a
distribution with one mode above and one mode below the median income, while
the latter one simply denotes deviation from the median income.
In Wolfson (1994) and Wolfson (1997) two polarisation curves are derived.
Based on the empirical quantile function, they apply one major di¤erence to the
derivation of the Lorenz curve: the values are standardised by the median income
m, instead of the mean income , yielding the empirical quantile function of the
median-standardised incomes. This curve lies beneath the abscissa for values below
the population fraction of 50% and above the abscissa for all values above 50%.
Then mirroring the negative part of the empirical quantile function at the abscissa,
yields Wolfsons rst polarisation curve, displaying the deviation of the population
fractions from the median income, which is the central benchmark in the concept of
the declining middle class. Integrating the rst polarisation curve in turn yields
the second polarisation curve, which maps the cumulated deviations of the incomes
from the median income. The Wolfson index of polarisation corresponds to four
times the area beneath this curve, i.e.
POWOL(F ) = 2

m
[1  2LF (1
2
)  IGGini] (2.3.7)
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with LF (12) denoting the Lorenz curve at the 0:5-percentile, and I
G
Gini denoting the
overall Gini coe¢ cient.36 POWOL bears the advantages that it links the measure-
ment of polarisation with the measurement of inequality in terms of the Lorenz
curve, and that polarisation may be easily derived by the median tangent on the
Lorenz curve, while highlighting the di¤erences to measuring inequality. Moreover,
no groups need to be formed beforehand. POWOL bears the disadvantages that it
is highly sensitive to the denition of the median income, especially in the case of
few values, and it is not normalised on [0; 1]; rather it may take very high values
in case of high inequality, when 
m
is very high.
In Wang and Tsui (2000) the approach of Wolfson (1994) is extended, charac-
terizing polarisation by an increasing spread and by increasing bimodality. They
derive the Wang-Tsui class of polarisation indices:
POrWTS(x) =
1
n
nX
i=1
xi  mm
r ; r  [0; 1] (2.3.8)
m denoting the median income and xi denoting the increasingly ranked incomes.
POrWTS thereby measures the weighted relative deviation from the median income.
Thus, POrWTS is easily calculated and bears room for interpretation. Drawbacks
include the fact that POrWTS is highly sensitive tom, which thus needs to be clearly
dened. POrWTS is neither dened for maximum polarisation nor for m = 0: In
some cases, POrWTS yields contradicting results about an increase and a decrease
in polarisation, and it takes values greater than one in case of high inequality.
2.3.4 Measuring Progression in Taxation
The idea behind redistribution is to use progression in taxation as a political device,
in order to reduce the degree of inequality in an income distribution.37 In this sub-
section, the concept of progression in taxation is introduced. According to taxation
36This equation holds, since the ordinate of the second polarisation curve may be restandardised
with m ; yielding the ordinate-scale of the Lorenz curve, and then the abscissa may be shifted
to t the [1:0; 1:0]-plane diagonally, resulting in the Lorenz curve.
37In the following, it is assumed that tax liabilities are solely income-determined, i.e. other social
non-income factors such as marital status, age and home-ownership are neglected for the sake
of simplicity.
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theory, income tax progression is generally characterised by an increasing average
tax rate in percentage of income as income increases, i.e. the higher the income,
the greater the share of this income that is paid for taxes. Thereby, progressive
income taxation is accompanied by two e¤ects, referred to as the redistributive
e¤ect on the one hand and disproportionality, also interpreted as deviation from
proportionality, on the other hand.
Following Lambert (2001), let x be the income of a taxpayer and let the twice
di¤erentiable function t(x) denote the income tax schedule or tax liability, with
0  t(x) < x and 0  t0(x) < 1. For strict (weak) progression it then holds
d[
t(x)
x
]
dx
> 0;8 x > 0 (d[
t(x)
x
]
dx
 0;8 x > 0). Let a(x) = t(x)
x
denote the average tax
rate and let m(x) = dt(x)
dx
= t0(x) denote the marginal tax rate. Then, it follows
that d[
t(x)
x
]
dx
= a0(x) = xt
0(x) t(x)
x2
= m(x) a(x)
x
and for strict progression d[
t(x)
x
]
dx
> 0 )
m(x) > a(x) 8 x; i.e. the marginal tax rate lies everywhere above the average
tax rate, as they are both increasing in x and result in a strictly progressive tax
system.
A concept that is closely linked to progressivity is the concept of redistribution.
The overall e¤ects of redistribution of a tax system may be decomposed into two
sube¤ects, the vertical equity (VE) e¤ect and the reranking (RR) e¤ect. While
the concept of horizontal equity demands an equal tax treatment of taxpayers
in identical circumstances, e.g. identical incomes, the concept of VE calls for an
appropriate unequal treatment of unequals, i.e. unequal abilities of earning income,
thereby enhancing redistribution.38 However, if there appears reranking of incomes
through taxation the net e¤ect of redistribution of a tax system is counteracted.
Thus, LX T (p) LX(p) = CX T (p) LX(p)  [CX T (p) LX T (p)] = V E  RR;
i.e. redistribution expressed by the di¤erence between the pre-tax and the post-
tax Lorenz curves may be decomposed into the sube¤ects of VE and RR. The
concept of horizontal inequity is closely linked to the e¤ect of RR: RR of incomes
by taxation is a necessary and at the same time su¢ cient condition for horizontal
38The ability-to-pay principle follows the concept of vertical equity when demanding a tax sys-
tem to equalize everybodys loss in utility of income. Assuming a common increasing, twice
di¤erentiable and concave utility-of-income function U(x); 8 x > 0; this concept of equal loss
in utility for all, i.e. U(x)  U [x  t(x)] = u0; u0 denoting an equal absolute reduction in util-
ity, relates to progressive income taxation, rather than to proportional taxation, cf. Lambert
(2001), pp. 174-175 and 183.
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inequity. An index of horizontal inequity based on this concept will be introduced
later on among the indices of redistribution.
Local versus E¤ective Progression
Measures of structural or local progression measure the degree of income tax pro-
gression along the income scale, whereas measures of e¤ective progression rather
measure the degree of overall progression in a tax schedules e¤ects, given in a
scalar index number39. As shown above, for strict progression it must hold that
m(x) > a(x): Thus, a rst index of local progression corresponds to the rst
derivative of the average tax rate: PGAV (x) =
d[
t(x)
x
]
dx
= xt
0(x) t(x)
x2
= m(x) a(x)
x
:
PGAV serves as a basis for two more important indices of local progression that
measure the excess of the marginal tax rate over the average tax rate at income
level x: The rst one measures liability progression, dened as the elasticity of
tax liability to pre-tax income at any x, with t(x) > 0: PGLP (x) = "t(x);x =
dt(x)
dx
x
t(x)
= m(x)
a(x)
: For a strictly liability-progressive income tax system, it holds that
m(x) > a(x), m(x)
a(x)
> 1; i.e. a one per cent increase in pre-tax income leads to an
increase in tax liability of more than one per cent. The second index measures re-
sidual progression, dened at any x as the elasticity of post-tax income to pre-
tax income: PGRP (x) = "x t(x);x =
d[x t(x)]
dx
x
x t(x) =
1 m(x)
1 a(x) : It indicates by which
percentage the post-tax income increases if the pre-tax income increases by one
percent. For a residual progressive tax system it holds that 0 < 1 m(x)
1 a(x) < 1; i.e. the
post-tax income increases by less than one percent if the pre-tax income increases
by one percent. Moreover the degree of residual progression clearly increases if
PGRP decreases. Therefore it makes sense to dene PGRP (x) =
1
PGRP (x)
= 1 a(x)
1 m(x)
so that it holds that the degree of residual progression increases with increasing
PGRP : Another index of local progression equals the second derivative of the
average tax rate: PGAV 2(x) =
d2[
t(x)
x
]
dx2
= t
00(x)
x
  2m(x) a(x)
x2
with PGAV 2 > 0 in-
dicating accelerated progression, PGAV 2 = 0 indicating constant progression, and
PGAV 2 < 0 indicating decelerated progression.
In Musgrave and Thin (1948) an index of e¤ective progression is introduced
which is independent of the local tax base, but rather considers the overall distri-
39Cf. Lambert (2001).
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bution of pre-tax and post-tax income:
PGeffMUT (x) =
1  IGiniX T
1  IGiniX
(2.3.9)
where IGiniX denotes the Gini coe¢ cient of the pre-tax income distribution, and
IGiniX T denotes the Gini coe¢ cient of the post-tax income distribution. Thereby,
IGiniX and I
Gini
X T are derived by simply applying I
G
Gini as dened in equation 2.3.1
to pre-tax incomes, as well as to post-tax incomes, respectively.
Indices of Disproportionality
This section introduces indices that are built on the concept of progressivity, which
focuses on diversion from proportionality. Thereby, a taxation schedule exhibits
disproportionate e¤ects if tax liabilities are not levied proportionately to incomes
(see Kakwani (1977)). Such e¤ects from progressive taxation may be shown again
by applying the concept of the Lorenz curve. Next to tax liability t(x); let F (x)
denote the distribution function of pre-tax incomes and let f(x) be its density
function. Then it follows that T (x) = n
R
t(x)f(x)dx may denote total revenue
from income taxation, and g(x) = T
X
=
R f(x)t(x)dx

; g > 0 the overall average tax
rate or total tax ratio, with n for the number of all taxpayers and X = n for the
total pre-tax income. The Lorenz curve for pre-tax incomes follows as LX(p) =R b
0
xf(x)dx

, the Lorenz curve for post-tax incomes as LX T (p) =
R b
0
[x t(x)]f(x)dx
(1 g) and
one for tax liabilities40 as LT (p) =
R b
0
t(x)f(x)dx
g
; 0  p  1: The di¤erence [LX(p) 
LT (p)] may be interpreted as the fraction of the total tax burden shifted from low
incomes, i.e. the bottom 100p percent, to high incomes, i.e. the top 100(1   p)
percent, by progression in the tax schedule. An index of disproportionality based
on this di¤erence is also proposed by Kakwani (1977):
PGKAK(p) = 2
1Z
0
[LX(p)  LT (p)]dp (2.3.10)
40Precisely, LX T (p) and LT (p) are concentration curves cumulating shares by rank. If assumed
that no reranking occurs by taxation, they may be regarded as Lorenz curves, as Lambert
(1994), p. 23 concludes.
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Applying an extended Gini coe¢ cient of the pre-tax income distribution IGini;extX (v) =
1  v(v  1)R 1
0
(1  p)v 2Lx(p)dp and an extended concentration coe¢ cient for tax
liabilities CextT (v) = 1 v(v 1)
R 1
0
(1 p)v 2LT (p)dp an extension of PGKAK can be
derived as PGextKAK(v) = v(v 1)
R 1
0
(1 p)v 2[LX(p) LT (p)]dp = CT (v) IGini;extX (v)
which focuses more on disproportionality towards the lower end of the income scale
as v increases. Both, PGKAK and PGextKAK ; increase if liability progression of an
income tax system increases at an unchanged pre-tax income distribution. Thus,
they satisfy a consistency property, which states that at a given pre-tax income
distribution, increasing local progression, in terms of liability progression, implies
increasing e¤ective progression, in terms of progressivity.
In Suits (1977) an index analogous to Kakwanis index is derived, in order to
measure disproportionality, however, Suits builds on relative concentration curves.
Plotting cumulated fractions of tax liabilities on cumulated fractions of pre-tax
incomes, yields the relative concentration curve of tax liabilities CrelT (q) : q =
LX(p)) CrelT (q) = LT (p) with CrelT (q) upward-sloping and convex for a progressive
tax schedule. Then Suits (1977) measures aggregate disproportionality by:
PGSUI(q) = 2
1Z
0
[q   CrelT (q)]dq = 2
1Z
0
[LX(p)  LT (p)]L0X(p)dp (2.3.11)
Thus, PGSUI can be obtained from PGKAK by attaching the weight L0X(p) to
the di¤erence between the Lorenz curves, which then yields an index of e¤ective
progression. PGSUI  [ 1;+1]; with PGSUI =  1 in case of extreme regression,
when the poorest pays all the taxes and PGSUI = 1 in case of extreme progression,
when the richest does so. However, PGKAK  [ (1 + IGiniX ); (1   IGiniX )]; i.e. its
boundaries depend on the degree of inequality in the income distribution, with
PGKAK =  (1 + IGiniX ) in case of maximum regression and PGKAK = (1  IGiniX )
in case of maximum progression.41
41Cf. Lambert (2001), pp. 201-204.
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Indices of Redistribution
The di¤erence [LX T (p)   LX(p)] may be interpreted as the fraction of the total
post-tax income shifted from high incomes, i.e. the top 100(1   p) percent, to
low incomes, i.e. the bottom 100p percent, by progression in the tax schedule,
indicating e¤ects of overall redistribution of incomes. Moreover, Reynolds and
Smolensky (1977) introduce an index measuring redistributive e¤ects of pro-
gression based on the distance between LX T (p) and LX(p):
PGRSM(p) = 2
1Z
0
[LX T (p)  LX(p)]dp (2.3.12)
which allows a link to residual progression. With CX T denoting the concentration
coe¢ cient for post-tax incomes and IGiniX denoting the Gini coe¢ cient of pre-tax
incomes, it follows that42 PGRSM = IGiniX   CX T ; i.e. PGRSM measures the
reduction in the Gini coe¢ cient resulting from the progressive tax schedule. Again
analogously to PGextKAK ; there is: PG
ext
RSM(v) = I
Gini;ext
X (v)  CextX T (v):
2.3.5 Measuring Poverty and Richness
Indices of Poverty
Before measuring any kind of poverty, one must make sure that it is precisely
dened who should be considered poor. A poverty line helps identifying the poor
by representing the level of income necessary to maintain a subsistence level of
standard of living. It may be dened either in absolute terms as a plain amount of
pre-government or post-government income, adjusted or unadjusted, below which
people are considered poor, or it may be dened relatively, e.g. to the mean
or median income of the overall distribution. This leads to the classication of
poverty indices as either absolute or relative poverty indices.
Following Chakravarty and Muliere (2004b), let Q(X) = fijxi  zg denote
the set of poor persons, xi being person i
0
s income and q denoting the num-
ber of people identied as poor, according to their incomes at the income dis-
42Cf. Musgrave and Thin (1948), as well as Lambert (2001), pp. 196-198.
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tribution of X  Rn+; i.e. the cardinality of the set Q(X): Then, relating the
number of poor people to the overall number of people in the population yields
the head-count ratio, i.e. PVHCR(X; z) = qn : It is as well an absolute index
as a relative index. Furthermore, relating the average income shortfall of the
poor to the poverty line, yields the poverty-gap ratio, i.e. PVPGR(X; z) =P
iQ(X)
(z xi)
qz
: Combining both indices yields the normalised poverty decit:
PVNPD(X; z) = PVHCR(X; z)PVPGR(X; z): Sen (1976) introduces an index that
sums up the weighted income gaps among the poor, attaching higher weights to
higher deprivation. His index became famous as the Sen index:
PVSEN(X; z) =
Pq
i=1(z   bxi)(q + 1  i)
(q + 1)nz
(2.3.13)
with bxi denoting the illfare ordering of person i.43 Blackorby and Donaldson (1980)
introduce a generalisation of the Sen index, i.e. the Blackorby-Donaldson
index of poverty:
PVBLD(X; z) = PVHCR[1  E
q(Xq)
z
] (2.3.14)
with Eq(Xq) denoting the equally distributed equivalent income of the poor, eval-
uated according to a regular, homothetic social welfare function. PVBLD measures
the relative gap between the poverty line and the equally distributed equivalent
income of the poor, times the number of poor people.44 PVSEN and PVBLD are
both sensitive to PVHCR, to the degree of poverty among the poor, and to the
degree of inequality among the poor. Also generalizing the Sen index, Kakwani
(1980) introduces the Kakwani index of poverty:
PVKAW (X; z) =
q
nz
Pq
i=1 i
r
qX
i=1
(z   bxi)(q + 1  i)r (2.3.15)
for r > 0: For r = 0; it follows that PVKAW = PVHCRPVPGR and for r = 1
it follows that PVKAW = PVSEN : In Chakravarty (1983) the proportionate gap
between the poverty line and the equally distributed equivalent income Eq(Xq) is
43For large q; the Sen index may be expressed by the head-count ratio, the poverty-gap ratio
and the Gini coe¢ cient among the poor: PVSEN = PVHCR[PVPGR + (1  PVPGR)IqGini]:
44An absolute version of PVBLD corresponds to PVBLD = q[z   Eq(Xq)]:
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applied, based on the censored income distribution. He derives the Chakravarty
index of relative poverty45:
PVCHK(X; z) = 1  E
n(X)
z
(2.3.16)
Clark, Hemming and Ulph (1981) apply the symmetric mean of order k for En(X)
in equation 2.3.16 yielding the Clark, Hemming, Ulph (CHU) index:
PVCHU(X; z) = 1 
[ 1
n
Pn
i=1(x

i )
k]
1
k
z
(2.3.17)
for k < 1; k 6= 0.46 As k decreases greater weight is put to transfers at the lower
end of the distribution. In Foster and Shorrocks (1991) a group of subgroup de-
composable indices is suggested. They dene a continuous, decreasing and strictly
convex function f : R1+ ! R1, with f(t) = 0; 8 t  1: The Foster-Shorrocks
indices result in:
PVFSH(X; z) =
1
n
X
iQ(X)
f(
xi
z
) (2.3.18)
For f(t) =   log t; t > 0 PV n;1FSH becomes the Watts (1968) index:
PVWAT (X; z) =
1
n
X
iQ(X)
log(
z
xi
) = PVHCR[I
q
Theil(X
p)  log(1  PVPGR)] (2.3.19)
where IqTheil denotes the Theil index of inequality among the distribution of the
poor. Foster, Greer and Thorbecke (1984) apply f(t) = (1   t); so that PVFSH
in equation 2.3.18 becomes the Foster, Greer, Thorbecke (FGT) index:
PVFGT (X; z) =
1
n
X
iQ(X)
(
z   xi
z
) (2.3.20)
The coe¢ cient  > 1 may be interpreted as a parameter of poverty aversion,
since greater values of  attach increasingly greater weight to large poverty gaps.
All in all, the most popular indices of poverty that appear to be the most
45In the absolute version, PVCHK denotes PVCHK = (z   En(X)):
46In the case of k = 0; the CHU index denotes: PVCHU (X; z) = 1 
Qn
i=1
(xi )
1
n
z :
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Index Axioms and Principles
Nota Fo Wk. Strg. Sym Incr. Cont Popu Mon. Dim.tr. Subgr.
tion cus mon. trans. met. pov.l. inuity lation sen. sensit. Decom.
PVHCR yes no no n/a n/a yes n/a no no yes
PVPGR n/a yes no n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a no n/a
PVSEN yes yes no yes yes no no n/a n/a no
PVBLD yes yes no yes yes no no n/a n/a no
PVKAW n/a n/a no n/a n/a no no n/a yes no
PVCHK yes yes yes yes yes yes y/n* n/a y/n* y/n*
PVCHU yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes no
PVFSH yes yes yes yes n/a yes yes yes yes yes
PVFGT yes yes yes yes n/a yes yes yes yes yes
* Whether PVCHK does or does not fulll these axioms depends on the form of the underlying welfare function.
Table 2.3.3: Indices of Poverty - Fullment of Axioms and Principles
elaborate ones, are the following: the Sen index and the Kakwani index, which
is built on the Sen index, moreover the Chakravarty index, and the CHU index,
which is related to the Chakravarty index, and nally theWatts index and the FGT
index which are both derived from the Foster-Shorrocks indices. The fullment of
axioms of these poverty indices is summarised in Table 2.3.3.47
Measurement of Richness
While all poverty indices of the previous subsection are well-known, little research
has been done on the measurement of richness yet.48 In a recent paper, Peichl et al.
(2006) dene a new class of richness measures. Let  be the richness line, e.g. 200%
of median income, and r = #fijxi > ; i = 1; 2; : : : ; ng the number of rich persons.
In most studies on income richness, only the proportion of rich persons is used as a
measure of richness: RHC(x) = 1n
Pn
i=1 1xi> =
r
n
: Its denition resembles that one
of the head count ratio for poverty. This denition of richness is not a satisfying
one, because this index will not change if nobody changes his or her status (rich
or non-rich). Therefore, Peichl et al. (2006) dene a class of richness measures
R by R(x) = 1
n
Pn
i=1 v

f

xi


: This approach is more sophisticated because it
also takes the dimension of changes and not only the number of people beyond
47The derivation of fullment of axioms can be found in Ochmann and Peichl (2006).
48For an overview of the sparse literature see Medeiros (2006).
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a given richness line into account. As the incomes of the rich have only a lower
bound , these incomes are transformed relative to the richness line, xi

, to the unit
interval by a strictly increasing transformation function f . Where f : R+ ! [0; 1]
is strictly increasing, v : [0; 1]! R+ (in particular [0; 1]) is increasing and v(f())
is at least concave, that is, has a concave restriction on [a;1[ for some a 2 R+.
Peichl et al. (2006) dene f(y) := 1  1
y
and v(y) := y, with  > 0 , to obtain a
richness index which resembles the FGT index:
R(x) =
1
n
nX
i=1
0@1  1
xi


1xi>
1A = 1
n
nX
i=1

xi   
xi

+

: (2.3.21)
One may also dene f(y) = 1   1
ye
; e > 0, for y > 1 and v(y) = y and obtain
an index similar to that one of Chakravarty:
Re(x) =
1
n
nX
i=1

1 


xi
e
+
; e > 0: (2.3.22)
2.3.6 Summary
In this section, we provided a survey of the distributional analysis of scal reforms.
Thereby, distributional e¤ects were di¤erentiated by four subconcepts: inequality,
polarisation, progression in taxation, and poverty and richness.
When measuring inequality one may apply various indices, either descript-
ive ones simply measuring dispersion, indices based on an entropy concept from
information theory, or indices with a normative background from social welfare
indices. Most of the indices presented are sensitive at di¤erent ranges of the dis-
tribution scale, so that they implicitly measure di¤erent features of inequality at
the same data set. The most popular indices of inequality applied in empirical
analyses are the Gini coe¢ cient, the Atkinson index, and the Theil index. The
Theil index appears to be a famous index for decomposition of overall e¤ects into
partial e¤ects. It also appears to be highly useful, since its general class of GE
indices can be adjusted to sensitivity towards all ranges of the distribution scale
by the sensitivity parameter c:
Polarisation subjects the formation of income groups which are moving away
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from each other, exhibiting the development of two growing peaks at the tails
of the distribution and creating a growing gap around the mean income. Such
polarisation may be measured on the one hand by indices which are based on ax-
ioms, originating from the Esteban-Ray index. These indices measure intra-group
homogeneity applying an identication function as well as inter-group heterogen-
eity applying an alienation function. On the other hand, measures based on the
concept of the declining middle classfocus on the growing gap between the two
peaks on the distribution scale, generally all based on the Wolfson index.
Progressive e¤ects of taxation systems may be grouped by redistributive e¤ects
from pre-tax to post-tax incomes, and e¤ects of disproportionality at the determ-
ination of tax liabilities. The latter one is characterised by progressivity, which
may further be decomposed into e¤ects of vertical equity and reranking e¤ects
as well as horizontal inequity. Direct progression may be further di¤erentiated
from indirect progression according to the presence or the absence of an absolute
tax exemption. Local progression may be di¤erentiated from e¤ective progression,
whereas average tax rates may be compared to marginal tax rates, and elasticities
may be calculated. Indices can be established as well. They generally consider the
relation between certain Lorenz curves and concentration curves: while indices of
disproportionality compare pre-tax Lorenz curves to tax-liability Lorenz curves,
indices of redistribution compare pre-tax Lorenz curves to post-tax Lorenz curves.
Relating these Lorenz curves to each other allows a link between indices of these
two concepts of progression, and thereby determine a progressive tax system.
When focusing on the low end of an income distribution one may nd the
socially undesirable characteristic of poverty. If one then wants to measure a
degree of poverty su¤ered among the very low incomes, one should beforehand
make sure that it is precisely dened what one is about to measure, which means
identifying who should be considered poor. Thereby an exogenously given poverty
line might help determining an appropriate threshold. Indices that may then be
applied to data, range from absolute ones simply counting heads below the poverty
line, via relative ones accounting for poverty gaps, accounting for the mean income
among the poor incomes, attaching weights to higher deprivation, and determining
equally distributed equivalent incomes. Indices again vary greatly at performance
with respect to fullment of desirable axioms and principles. Complementarily
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to poverty analysis, this section introduced a class of comprehensive measures of
richness which allow for a more comprehensive analysis of the top of the income
distribution.
Several of these distributional indices from all four subconcepts will be applied
to analyse at tax reforms in the following chapters. In general, there is a need for
a di¤erentiated communication of the results of distributional analyses in order to
prevent from one-sided and biased public perceptions of necessary public reforms.
2.4 Measuring labour supply and welfare e¤ects
2.4.1 Introduction
Tax reforms a¤ect the behaviour of individuals. To capture these behavioural re-
sponses in a simulation analysis, behavioural modules can be linked to a simulation
model. In the case of microsimulation, the most important reaction to capture is
the change in labour supply. Assuming an utility maximizing behaviour, labour
supply models allow the modelling of both the extensive (participation) and the
intensive (hours worked) labour supply decision of an individual or household. The
change in labour supply (together with e¤ective tax rates) are rst measures of
the e¢ ciency of a scal reform. Based on these utility functions, the concept of
distribution analysis - as described in the previous section - can be extended from
pure monetary variables to welfare measures.
The computation of welfare measures is another important aspect for the evalu-
ation of e¢ ciency e¤ects of tax reforms. An important nding of the long literature
of Welfare Economics is, that it is not informative to compare utility levels between
individuals (see e.g. King (1981)). Instead, money metric measures of utility are
used to asses the level of (or changes in) welfare. Several methods and measures
have been developed including the compensating and equivalent variation.49 The
empirical application of these methods mostly focuses on the ex-post evaluation of
consumer demand using time-series data from before and after a tax reform. The
application of these measures in the labour supply context allows for a more com-
prehensive distributional analysis. Instead of looking only at disposable income,
49See Slesnick (1998) for a comprehensive survey.
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these measures allow to incorporate the preferences (for leisure) of individuals (or
households) into the analysis (see e.g. Haan (2007)). Creedy and Kalb (2006)
propose a method for the ex-ante analysis of the e¤ects of tax reforms on the
labour-leisure decision in the discrete choice labour supply framework set-up by
Van Soest (1995)50 without actually applying it to real micro data.51
This section combines the theoretical cognition of welfare measurement with
the technique of microsimulation allowing to quantify the welfare e¤ects and the
excess burden of tax systems and tax reforms.52 The remainder of this section is
organised as follows: subsection 2.4.2 gives a short review of applied labour supply
analysis. Subsection 2.4.3 reviews the theoretical concepts of welfare measurement
and subsection 2.4.4 illustrates the incorporation of taxes into these concepts. The
empirical application of these concepts is described in the following section 2.5.
2.4.2 Labour supply
To analyse the behavioural responses induced by di¤erent tax reform scenarios we
estimate the expected labour supply responses. Following Van Soest (1995) we ap-
ply a structural discrete choice household labour supply model.53 Recent surveys
of the empirical labour market literature and di¤erent kinds of labour supply mod-
els are for example provided by Heckman (1993), Blundell and MaCurdy (1999)
or Creedy et al. (2002). A major nding of this literature is that labour supply
responds rather along the extensive than the intensive margin (see also Immervoll
et al. (2007)). Working-hours elasticities are close to zero for men (see Blundell and
MaCurdy (1999)) and women (see Mroz (1987), Triest (1990)). In contrast, ex-
tensive labour supply responses seem to be much stronger than intensive (Heckman
(1993)), especially particular subgroups (at the bottom of the income distribution)
50Aaberge, Dagsvik and Strøm (1995), however, proposed a method for estimating the equivalent
variation in the discrete choice labour supply framework of Dagsvik (1994).
51However, this method has by now been applied in several studies, including Brenneisen and
Peichl (2007b), Haan (2007) and Creedy, Herault and Kalb (2008).
52This section is based on Brenneisen and Peichl (2007a) and Brenneisen and Peichl (2007b).
53The Van Soest (1995) approach is essentially a special case of a more general class of dis-
crete choice models introduced by Dagsvik (1994) (see also Aaberge et al. (1995) and Aaberge,
Colombino and Strøm (1999)). In Van Soest (1995) it is assumed that every individual respect-
ively household has the same choice set. The models by Dagsvik (1994) and Aaberge et al.
(1999) allow for choice sets to vary across households and individuals.
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have rather high participation elasticities (see Eissa and Liebman (1996), Meyer
and Rosenbaum (2001) and Immervoll et al. (2007)).
In the standard continuous model (see Hausman (1985)), labour supply re-
sponds only along the intensive margin: an innitesimal change of the marginal
tax rate changes the working hours only a little, whereas participation responses
cannot be analysed within this framework satisfactorily (Blundell and MaCurdy
(1999)). Discrete choice labour supply models allow to analyse both the extensive
(participation) and the intensive (hours worked) labour supply decision within the
same modelling framework (Blundell and MaCurdy (1999), Van Soest and Das
(2001) and Van Soest, Das and Gong (2002)). The intensive decision depends on
the e¤ective marginal tax rate, whereas the extensive participation decision de-
pends on the tax wedge between gross (pre-tax) labour costs and the after-tax net
income of workers (see Kleven and Kreiner (2003)).
The continuous model appears not to capture the data, in the sense that the
number of part-time jobs is strongly overpredicted (Van Soest (1995)). There
seems to be a lack of part-time jobs because of xed costs of hiring workers or
increasing returns to scale of the workers production. Furthermore, because of
xed costs of working (Cogan (1981)) individuals are not willing to work below a
minimum number of hours. In addition, there are working time regulations that
limit the number of possible working hours to a discrete set. Therefore, a discrete
choice between distinct categories of working time seems to be more realistic than
a continuum of innitesimal choices. Using a discrete choice labour supply model
has also the advantage to model nonlinear budget constraints as a result of, for
example, nonlinear taxes, joint ling and unemployment benets (see MaCurdy,
Green and Paarsch (1990), Van Soest (1995) or Blundell and MaCurdy (1999)).
Furthermore, a richer stochastic specication in terms of unobserved wage rates
of non workers and random preferences can be incorporated into a discrete choice
model.
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2.4.3 The e¤ects of taxation on welfare
Consumer surplus as a basic concept
Changes in welfare have often been measured through the basic concept of measur-
ing changes in consumer surplus which can be tracked back to Dupuit (1844). At
that time, the predominant belief was that the value of each good was equivalent
to its market price. Contrary to the common belief, Dupuit argued that the mar-
ket price solely represents the minimum level of value for a specic good.54 This
observation later evolved to become the common denition for consumer surplus
(CS), illustrated in gure 2.4.1 Consumer surplus measures the extra value that
consumers receive above what they pay for a commodity.55
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Figure 2.4.1: Consumer and producer surplus
With the help of the aforementioned denition, Marshalls demand curve56
(yM) could be interpreted as the maximal price that a consumer is willing to
pay for a specic good or the utility of a certain commodity in monetary units.
Consequently, the area (ABp0) between the market price (p0) and the demand
54Cf. Hines (1999).
55Samuelson and Nordhaus (2005).
56The demand function of Marshall represents the utility maximizing consumption supposed that
the budget depending on the prices of the commodities is constant (see Mas-Colell, Whinston
and Green (1995)).
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curve can be interpreted as the consumer surplus. In analogy, producer surplus
can be interpreted as the area between the market price and the producers variable
costs (p0BF ). Combining both areas (ABF ) would correspond with an increase
in utility in the economy as a whole as it is the di¤erence between the maximal
price that a consumer is willing to pay for a specic commodity and its variable
costs of production.57
Not only can the general welfare of an economy, due to the trade of a certain
good, be determined through the use of consumer and producer surplus, but the
e¤ects of taxation could also be identied. If one compares the situation in a
market with or without taxation, a direct e¤ect of taxation on welfare will become
evident. Due to taxation the market price will rise from p0 to pK1 . In consequence,
not only does the quantity (from y0 to y1) of the traded good decrease but both
consumer and producer surplus.58
This decrease provides a basis for an initial estimation of welfare losses. These
could be interpreted on a monetary basis and divided in to three areas.59 The
actual tax revenue can be identied as the size of the area (pK1 CEp
P
1 ) which is
generated through the levy of a quantity tax (pK1  pP1 ). This e¤ect varies according
to di¤erent tax rates. Nevertheless, it is evident that next to the pure tax revenue,
both, producer and consumer surplus, decrease. In the above graph, these losses
are represented by the triangles (CBD) and (DBE). In particular, the loss of
consumer surplus (CBD) has been commonly known as the Harberger Triangle or
as the tax induced dead weight loss.60
As seen above, both consumers and producers are negatively inuenced by
taxes. However, it is the elasticity of the demand and supply curves that determ-
57Cf. Samuelson and Nordhaus (2005).
58In gure 2.4.1 a quantity tax, which has to be paid by the producer, is examined. The type
of levy has neither an e¤ect on the price the consumer has to pay nor on the revenue per unit
that remains for the supplier.
59Cf. Rosen (1978).
60Cf. Auerbach and Hines (2002). Although this type of welfare loss is connected by name to
Arnold Harberger, there have been many popular economists before him like Hotelling (1938),
Hicks (1946), Debreu (1951) and Johnson (1960) who contributed to the development of this
indicator. The essential contribution of Harberger, that lead to the naming, was the broad
empirical application of the existing theory. In an open letter in Harberger (1971), he asked for
a common measure for the evaluation of welfare e¤ects and suggested the consumer surplus.
The area of the deadweight loss is still called Harberger Triangle due to the linear demand
functions that were common at that time.
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ines the extent of which a certain market side is burdened.
Until today, the estimation of welfare losses on the basis of consumer surplus
has been the basis of many calculations, which is due to its simplicity and moderate
information requirements.61 To determine the loss of consumer surplus one merely
needs Marshalls demand curve for the subsequent calculation. This function is
easily estimated with the help of econometric methods. Consequently, the integral
of the demand function between consumer prices with (pK1 ) and without (p
K
0 )
taxation is calculated. To highlight welfare losses, a negative prex is commonly
used.
CS =  
Z pK1
pK0
yM(pK)dpK (2.4.1)
Based on the above integration, the dead weight loss can be easily estimated by
adding the actual tax revenue to the calculation.
Compensating and Equivalent Variation
An alternative indicator for the estimation of taxation induced welfare losses has
been developed by Hicks (1942) and is commonly known as the compensating
variation (CV). This indicator is based around the question, how much monetary
compensation a household should get after a tax reform to counterbalance the tax
induced price changes.
Consider the following scenario: A households main goal is to maximise its
utility under the constraint of xed income. It can choose between two commodit-
ies x and y.62 The households actual choice is modelled by maximizing its utility
according to its preferences and the xed price relation (py
px
) of the two chosen com-
modities. If the household would decide to only buy one commodity, it would only
be able to do this according to its budget. Therefore there is a maximal amount of
x (xMax) that can be purchased. But the household must not only be restricted to
purchasing one commodity, a further possibility is to buy both commodities under
61Cf. Hines (1999).
62In this context, the commodity x can be interpreted as a composed commodity that comprises
every other commodity. It fulls the function of a referent for the households budget. The
price of x is therefore normalized to one. Such a commodity is called Numeraire in current
literature (see Mas-Colell et al. (1995)).
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the constraint of the households budget. The resulting consumption possibilit-
ies are illustrated in the Figure 2.4.2 below. The slope of the budget constraint
(xMax; yMax0 ) determines the negative price relation of x and y. To attain the max-
imal level of utility for a given budget constraint, the household has to choose the
optimal commodity mix. For the household to be on the highest indi¤erence curve
possible, it has to nd the point of tangency between the indi¤erence curve U0 and
the budget constraint (xMax; yMax0 ). At this point A, the slopes of the two curves
are the same, which means that the marginal rate of substitution (the slope of the
indi¤erence curve) is equal to the negative price relation of the commodities.
B
y
x
xCVkomp
A
C
y0Maxy1Max
xMax
U0
U1
Figure 2.4.2: Compensating Variation
Consider the introduction of a tax on commodity y: In this case, both the price
of the commodity and the budget constraint change. The new budget constraint
is illustrated as in the graphic above. The household must lower its consumption
of commodity y as its price py;1 has increased (both negative substitution and
income e¤ects). The e¤ects on the consumption of commodity x, however, are not
as clear. This is due to the fact that a positive substitution e¤ect - commodity x
has become relatively cheaper - is counterbalanced by a decrease of actual income
through taxation: the negative income e¤ect. In e¤ect, both a reduction and
an increase in consumption of x are possible. A possible commodity mix can be
found in B. As mentioned above, this is the point where maximal utility under the
constraint of xed income is achieved, where the slope of the indi¤erence curve
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and the new budget constraint are identical. As seen in the graphic above the
households utility has dropped from U0 to U1. Unfortunately the di¤erences in
utility U0   U1 cannot be used as an indicator for exact measurement in utility
changes as they are ordinal.63 In this case, an instrument needs to be developed
that enables a correct estimation of the decrease in utility through interval-scaled
variables.
At this point, an expense function is extremely useful. It states the minimal
amount of budget that is needed to meet a certain utility level (bU) provided a
given transposed price vector p0 = (px py),64 thus enabling us to transform an
ordinal variable in monetary units and solve the following optimisation problem:
Min!
q
(E = q  pjU(q)  bU) (2.4.2)
The variable q signies the units consumed. The notation E(pj; bU) will be
used throughout the following text as it highlights both the analysed utility and
price level. Due to a change in prices for commodity y the old budget constraint
is no longer applicable. Given the new price vector p1 = (px; py;1) the household
can no longer achieve the former utility level U0 with xMax as an axis intercept.
To remain on U0 as a utility level, the households income must increase. This can
be illustrated by the new demand curve which shows the demand for a commodity
under the assumption that its price rises and while the household is given su¢ cient
additional income that its level of utility remains unchanged. In the gure 2.4.2,
the minimal budget E(p1; U0) which achieves the former utility level is dened by
the new axis intercept xkompCV . The di¤erence between both budgets also dened
as the compensating variation signies the amount of compensation money to be
transferred to the household by the state as to remain on the former utility level
despite the raised prices.
63Cf. Creedy and Kalb (2006). Due to the ordinal property of utility, the di¤erent consumption
alternatives can be sorted according to their utility level but the di¤erences of utility levels
cannot be interpreted (see Varian (2001)). In van Praag (1991) the ordinal and cardinal
concepts of utility are included.
64Cf. Diamond and McFadden (1974).
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CV = E(p1; U1)  E(p1; U0)
= xMax   xkompCV
(2.4.3)
A di¤erent but similar approach for welfare measurement is to ask the house-
hold how much money it is willing to pay to avoid the new taxation system. This
approach is called equivalent variation (EV) approach.65 The amount of money
that they are willing to pay would in e¤ect cause a shifting of the old budget con-
straint (xMax; yMax0 ) until it reaches a new point of tangency with the new utility
level U1 as illustrated in the following gure.
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Figure 2.4.3: Equivalent Variation
Using the expense function, one can dene the equivalent variation as follows:
EV = E(p0; U1)  E(p0; U0)
= xkompEV   xMax
(2.4.4)
In the following section we will focus on comparing the introduced concepts
while highlighting their similarities and di¤erences.
65Cf. Hicks (1942).
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A comparison of the introduced concepts
The easiest approach would be to demonstrate the di¤erent concepts in one graphic.
Because of the equality of both expense functions E(p1; U1) and E(p0; U0) in
the considered framework of a commodity tax, equivalent and compensating vari-
ations can be transcribed into the price-demand diagram of the Harberger Triangle.
In this case, both variables are formulated depending on Hicksdemand curve66
(yH).67
EV = E(p0; U1)  E(p0; U0)
= E(p0; U1)  E(p1; U1)
=
Z p0
p1
dE(p; U1)
dp
dp
(2.4.5)
=
Z p0
p1
yH(p; U1)dp (2.4.6)
The compensating variation is analogously transformed using the above method.
As a result, it only di¤ers in their initial utility level.
CV =
Z p0
p1
yH(p; U0)dp (2.4.7)
The graphic illustration 2.4.4 of EV, CV and CS shows that the decrease in
welfare using the consumer surplus method (p1ADp0) engulfs both other welfare
measurement methods. More precisely, it is EV (p1ACp0) that represents the
lower limit of the surplus decrease and CV (p1BDp0) which represents the upper
limit. The di¤erence between both methods varies with the impact of the income
e¤ect on changes in demand. In fact, it is the impact of the income e¤ect that
determines the proximity of the two variations in the graphic, which also means
that the lower the impact of the income e¤ect, the closer the proximity of the two
variations in the graphic and the smaller the di¤erence between them and the loss
66Hicksdemand curve minimizes the expenses of the consumers on condition that a given utility
level has been reached. The given function species Hicksdemand depending on commodity
prices (see Mas-Colell et al. (1995)).
67Cf. Creedy and Kalb (2006).
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of consumer surplus.68
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Figure 2.4.4: Comparison of concepts
Consequently, the consumer surplus approach has often been criticised for the
fact that it does not di¤erentiate between substitution and income e¤ects. Still, one
cannot ignore the fact that a decrease in welfare is also triggered by an unavoidable
decrease in relative income due to price changes, which should not be neglected
during the choice of optimal taxation.69
Another valid critique is the instruments failings in estimating values for a
simultaneous tax introduction in two di¤erent markets. This is due to the path
dependency of consumer surplus. The value of the estimated welfare does not only
depend on the extent of price changes but also on the order in which the estimation
takes place.70
Consequently, the use of consumer surplus changes for the measurement of
welfare is not usually recommended. To estimate welfare e¤ects and changes of
di¤erent policies for a certain individual, it is essential to estimate an exact value
68Cf. Willig (1976).
69Cf. Leach (2004).
70Only in the case of identical cross prices does the problem of path dependency not arise. This is
the case with symmetrical cross price e¤ects under the assumption of homothetic preferences.
Homothetic preferences can be found, when a consumer always chooses the commodity mix A
over commodity mix B, if he would always choose commodity mix A over commodity mix B
for all  > 0 (see Chipman (1974)). In recent years, however, empirical evidence has proven
that Marshallian demand functions do not hold this requirement (see Slesnick (1998)).
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for the changes and to be able to clearly determine utility losses and gains. Di¤er-
ent tax policies should be ranked according to their potentially achievable utility
levels.71 This index will further be referred to as the Ranking-Criterion. A correct
denition of EV and CV using equations 2.4.3 and 2.4.4 should allow for a correct
identication of the direction of changes in utility.72 A negative prex signies
utility loss, whereas a positive prex a utility gain.
Noticeable, are CVs and EVs characteristics for meeting the Ranking Cri-
terion.73 In contrast to the equivalent variation method, compensating variation
rankings are not always utility-consistent. This problem usually arises in policies
that include both transfer payments and taxes, which is due to the hypothetical
monetary compensation. This ctitious compensation allows for a welfare estim-
ation starting from a hypothetical utility starting point, that in e¤ect can never
be reached by the consumer.74 Utility consistent rankings using compensating
variation methods can only be achieved under the assumption of homothetic pref-
erences.75 In this case, compensating variations su¤er under the same aw that
ruled out the use of the Harberger Triangle as a mean of utility loss estimation.
Nevertheless, Moore (2007) has stressed that the compensating variations disad-
vantage in comparison to the EV is eliminated using aggregated data of the total
population.
2.4.4 Costs of Taxation
Denitions and applicability of the Harberger Triangle, CV and EV have long
been undisputed. Referring to taxation systems, it has also been undisputed that
under e¢ ciency aspects a lump sum tax is most advantageous and that other tax
reforms induce ine¢ ciency due to their distortionary e¤ects.76 Still, a discussion
evolved in the nineties focusing on the consequences of taxation costs on the cost-
71Cf. McKenzie and Pearce (1973).
72Equations 2.4.3 and 2.4.4 have been modied. The common denitions of equations 2.4.3 and
2.4.4 for EV and CV imply utility gains in connection with a negative prex.
73Cf. Mas-Colell et al. (1995). An illustration of the compensatory variations breach of the
Ranking Criterion can be found in Kay (1980) and Moore (2007). A necessary condition for a
ranking consistent with the utility levels is derived in Chipman and Moore (1980).
74Cf. Kay (1980).
75Cf. Chipman and Moore (1980).
76Cf. Hakonsen (1998).
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benet-analysis of the state.77 Two approaches have been clearly documented
in the literature, that highlight the di¤erent calculation methods of these costs.
In analogy to Ballard (1990), we di¤erentiate between two categories: Di¤erential
e¤ect analysis and budget analysis. The two categories enable a concise calculation
of taxation costs with a direct link to their analysis conditions. In the following
text we will refer to the di¤erential e¤ect analysis as excess burden (EB) and to
the budget analysis as welfare costs (WC).78
Di¤erential e¤ect analysis
This approach denes the costs of taxation through a comparison of di¤erent
taxation systems under the assumption of xed government expenditures.79 For
the sake of clarity, we assume xed production prices and a starting point, where
no other taxes exist in the considered market.80
To calculate the excess burden using equivalent variation, one compares the
tax revenue TEV = q(p1; U1)  (p1   p0) to EV, the amount an individual is willing
to pay to avoid a distortionary tax. This amount can also be interpreted as a
lump sum tax an individual is willing to pay to be on the same utility level U1 as
with the introduction of taxes. The di¤erence between the introduced tax system
and the amount the individual is willing to pay, is due to the fact that a lump
sum tax would not change the relative prices of the commodities. There are no
substitution e¤ects. Consequently, although both ctitious and actual households
are on the same utility level, they generate di¤erent tax revenues. The di¤erence
in tax revenue between the hypothetical lump sum tax and actual tax signies the
excess burden (EBEV ):81
EBEV = EV   TEV (2.4.8)
77Cf. Usher (2006a).
78Cf. Ballard (1990).
79Cf. Musgrave (1959).
80Under the assumption of varying production prices, the excess burden can be calculated as the
loss of producer through a decline in consumer surplus. In this case, one must not distinguish
between di¤erent welfare loss calculation methods for rms as income e¤ects are not existent
(see Hines (1999)). However, varying production prices also e¤ect the calculation of the excess
burden on the consumer side. For an all-inclusive overview see Auerbach (1985) and Auerbach
and Hines (2002).
81This type of calculation has been suggested by Kay (1980) as a denition for the excess burden.
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To determine the excess burden of a certain taxation policy using compensating
variation (EBCV ), one must proceed analogously. In this case, the di¤erence
between the amount the individual is willing to accept from the state as means of
compensation for a distortionary tax is compared to the achieved tax revenue. The
achieved tax revenue, however, is the result of the introduction of the new taxation
system after deducting the needed compensation (TCV = q(p1; U0)  (p1   p0)).
EBCV = CV   TCV (2.4.9)
Due to di¤erent taxation methods that are used for calculating the excess
burden, it is no longer possible to rank the di¤erent calculated values as it was
done before. This calculation can be further developed to engulf situations in
which taxation already exists. In this case, one must consider the initial distortion
caused by the already existing tax in the excess burden calculation.82
EBEV = EV   q(p2; U2)  (p2   p1) + [q(p1; U2)  q(p2; U2)]  (p1   p0)
EBCV = CV   q(p2;U1)  (p2   p1) + [q(p1; U1)  q(p2;U1)]  (p1   p0)
It is the assumption of xed tax revenue that isolates the substitution e¤ect of
taxation and that allows for a correct estimation of the excess burden. Neverthe-
less, it also represents a weak point in this approach, as it cannot accommodate
the analysis of an expansion of tax revenue which should also regard the changes in
tax revenue due to the income e¤ect.83 In the next paragraph a budget expansion
will be analysed.
Budget analysis
The second approach concerning the costs of taxation remedies the above men-
tioned weakness of the excess burden calculation method. In the wake of a tax
revenue expansion a budget analysis examines the resulting costs of taxation.84 To
82This type of computation is used in Auerbach (1985).
83Cf. Fullerton (1991). The di¤erential e¤ect analysis can also be used for a budget expansion
under the assumption that the commodities provided by the government are perfect substitutes
of income and that the public provision has no e¤ect on tax revenue (see Ballard (1990)).
84Cf. Creedy (2000).
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determine the beneciary e¤ects of a tax revenue expansion one must contrast the
costs of taxation to the utility increase due to higher investment in public goods.
This approach can also be found in the Samuelson-Rule, which calculates the op-
timal investment level in public goods. According to Samuelson (1954), an optimal
allocation of public goods is achieved, when the marginal rate of transformation
c (marginal costs of public good allocation) and the sum of the marginal rate of
good substitution
P
bi (marginal benet of allocation) are equal. Governments
should expand expenditures in public goods as long as the following formula is
applicable:85 X
bi > c (2.4.10)
Still, a consensus over the connection between taxation costs, social costs and
the benets of expenditures in public goods was not established. Until now, there
is rather confusion concerning the calculation of public good benets.86 In most
cases, certain assumptions are put. The social costs also include the costs of
taxation and they do not a¤ect the level of utility of a chosen project.87
To integrate welfare costs in the Samuelson-Rule we expand it by adding the
marginal welfare costs (MWC) and multiplying it with the marginal costs of public
good supply. MWC refers to the costs of expanding tax revenues by one unit.88X
bi > (c MWC) (2.4.11)
Although the denition of MWC is rather easy to grasp and comprehend, the
estimation of its value is rather complex. For this reason, one can nd several
calculation approaches for this index in the literature. In summary, opinions di¤er
on terminology and the initial reference level.89 Here, we concentrate on the MWC
index that is closest to the aforementioned methods EV, CV and EB. There are
85Cf. Usher (2006a).
86Using CV or EV to calculate the benets of public good supply, the di¤erence in value between
both methods is not only determined by income elasticity but also by the substitution elasticity
between public and private goods (see Liu and Rettenmaier (2005)).
87Cf. Lundholm (2004).
88Cf. Usher (2006b). A detailed discussion on the e¤ects of distortionary taxes on the optimal
level of public goods can be found in Gaube (2000).
89Cf. Auerbach and Hines (2002). For an overview of the di¤erent denitions see Hakonsen
(1998).
74 CHAPTER 2. METHODOLOGY
seldom xed functions for the calculation of taxation costs, for this reason marginal
welfare costs are calculated in the following manner:
MWC =
EV
T
(2.4.12)
In contrast to the di¤erential e¤ect analysis, budget analysis focuses on the
change in total tax revenue (T ) through a variation of a specic tax, which
makes a MWC lower than 1 possible. To understand this, one can think of a tax
change that induces a strong income e¤ect that in e¤ect leads to higher labour
supply.90 The increased labour supply would then automatically increase income
tax revenues and consequently lower welfare costs further.91 Naturally, an increase
in welfare costs can analogously be achieved through higher consumption taxes.92
2.4.5 Summary
This section combined the theoretical literature on welfare measurement with the
technique of microsimulation allowing to quantify the welfare e¤ects of scal re-
forms. The change in labour supply is a measure of e¢ ciency of a scal reform.
Based on the labour supply estimation it is possible to compute welfare measures
as another important measure for the evaluation of e¢ ciency e¤ects. Furthermore,
the distribution analysis can be extended from pure monetary variables to welfare
using these measures allowing to incorporate the preferences of individuals into the
analysis. The empirical application of these concepts is described in the following
section 2.5 and later applied in chapter 3 for the analysis of at tax reforms.
90Leisure is assumed to be a normal good. In e¤ect, lower income leads to less leisure and more
labour supply.
91Cf. Ballard and Fullerton (1992).
92Additionally to these e¤ects, it is possible to include the costs of defraudation of tax into
the concept of MWC because they cause costs higher than the tax revenue similar to the
evasion reactions caused by a lower consumption of taxed goods. On this basis Fortin and
Lacroix (1994) have done an empirical estimation with the data of the city Quebec. The
study demonstrates that MWC are between $1.39 and $ 1.50 per dollar additional tax revenue.
Furthermore, the results point out that a higher degree of penalty leads to a diminution of
defraudation of tax and to a decrease of costs of 14 cent.
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2.5 FiFoSiM
2.5.1 Introduction
The aim of this section is to describe FiFoSiM, the integrated tax benet microsim-
ulation and CGE model which is used for the analyses in this book.93 FiFoSiM
consists of three main parts. The rst part is a static tax benet microsimulation
module. The second part adds a behavioural component to the model: an eco-
nometrically estimated labour supply model. The third module is a CGE model
which allows the user of FiFoSiM to assess the global economic e¤ects of policy
measures. Two specic features distinguish FiFoSiM from other tax benet mi-
crosimulation models: First, the simultaneous use of two databases for the tax
benet module and second, the linkage of the MSM with a CGE model.94
The basic module of FiFoSiM is a static microsimulation model for the German
tax and benet system using income tax and household survey micro data. The
approach of FiFoSiM is innovative insofar as it creates a dual database using two
micro data sets for Germany: FAST01 and GSOEP. FAST01 is a micro datale
from the German federal income tax statistics containing the relevant income tax
data of nearly 3 million households in Germany. Our second data source, the
German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), is a representative panel study of private
households in Germany. The simultaneous use of both databases allows for the
imputation of missing values or variables in the other dataset using techniques of
statistical matching.
93This section is based on the English documentation of FiFoSiM (see Peichl and Schaefer (2006)),
which is a short version of the detailed German description (see Fuest, Peichl and Schaefer
(2005b)). FiFoSiMstands for Simulation model of the Center for Public Economics (CPE)
at the University of Cologne (in German: Finanzwissenschaftliches Forschungsinstitut an
der Universität zu Köln (FiFo)). See also www.cpe-cologne.de for further information.
94One should note that both techniques have not been invented for FiFoSiM, but the application
to the context of tax benet reform proposal modelling is insofar original as it has not been
done for a peer-reviewed German microsimulation model before. In the last years several
tax benet microsimulation models for Germany have been developed (see for example Peichl
(2005) or Wagenhals (2004) for surveys). Most of these models use either GSOEP or FAST
data. FiFoSiM is so far the rst model to combine these two databases. However, the GMOD
model, which is the oldest MSM model still active in Germany, also imputes information from
FAST to GSOEP data (see Wagenhals and Buck (2006)), but not the other wax around.
Moreover, the ZEW also uses a linked CGE-MSM model (see e.g. Franz, Gürtzgen, Schubert
and Clauss (2007)), however their focus is more on CGE than on MSM modelling.
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Figure 2.5.1 shows the basic setup of FiFoSiM. The layout of the tax benet
module follows several steps: First, the database is updated using the static ageing
technique which allows controlling for changes in global structural variables and
a di¤erentiated adjustment for di¤erent income components of the households.
Second, we simulate the current tax system using the uprated data as the bench-
mark for di¤erent reform scenarios which are also modelled using the modied
database.
Figure 2.5.1: Basic setup FiFoSiM
The modelling of the tax and transfer system uses the technique of microsim-
2.5. FIFOSIM 77
ulation. FiFoSiM computes individual tax payments for each case in the sample
considering gross incomes and deductions in detail. The individual results are
multiplied by the individual sample weights to extrapolate the scal e¤ects of the
reform with respect to the whole population. After simulating the tax liabilities
and benet entitlements we can compute the disposable income for each house-
hold. To derive the disposable income Y from gross income X; received benets
(like unemployment benet, social assistance, child benets, etc.) are added and
taxes T and social insurance contributions S are subtracted:
Y = X +B   T   S
Based on these household net incomes we estimate the distributional, labour
supply and welfare e¤ects of the analysed reforms. For the econometric estim-
ation of labour supply elasticities, we apply a discrete choice household labour
supply model. Furthermore, FiFoSiM contains a CGE module for the estimation
of growth and employment e¤ects, which is linked to the tax benet module. This
interaction allows for a better calibration of the model parameters and a more
accurate estimation of the various e¤ects of reform proposals.
The setup of this section is as follows. Subsection 2.5.2 describes (the creation
of) the dual database of FiFoSiM, while subsection 2.5.3 describes the tax benet
module. Subsection 2.5.4 contains a description of the labour supply model, sub-
section 2.5.5 describes the computation of welfare measures and subsection 2.5.6
introduces the CGE module. Subsection 2.5.7 concludes.
2.5.2 Database
A specic feature of FiFoSiM is the simultaneous use of two micro databases
allowing for the imputation of missing values or variables in the other dataset.95
Due to the time lags between the census and the availability of the micro data
les, the data has to be updated to represent the German economy in the period
of analysis. The data sources, the matching and the ageing are described in detail
in the following.
95Furthermore, a third database is used for the CGE module which is described in section 2.5.6.
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Income tax scientic-use-le 2001 (FAST01)
The federal income tax statistic is published every three years but with a time
lag of ve to six years. This statistic contains all information from the personal
income tax form (e.g. source and amounts of incomes, deductions, age, children)
for every household subject to income taxation in Germany. For 2001, almost 30
million households are included in the micro database. FAST01 is the income tax
scientic-use-le 2001 containing a 10%-sample of the German federal income tax
statistics including the relevant tax data of nearly 3 million households.96
The FASTmicro data is especially suitable for a detailed analysis of the German
tax system. All structural characteristics of the taxpayers are well represented and
can be used for a di¤erentiating analysis of tax reforms.
German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP)
The German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) is a representative panel study of
private households in Germany since 1984.97 In 2006 GSOEP consisted of more
than 12,000 households with more than 30,000 individuals. The data include in-
formation on earnings, employment, occupational and family biographies, health,
personal satisfaction, household composition and living situation. The panel struc-
ture of GSOEP allows for longitudinal and cross section analysis of economic and
social changes. Bork (2000) certies GSOEP a rather good mapping of labour
income whereas capital and business income are not represented just as well.
GSOEP contains information about the working time and the social environ-
ment of the households which is used for the labour supply estimations. Further-
more, the bottom end of the income distribution is better represented in GSOEP
than in FAST.
Creating the dual database
A special feature of FiFoSiM is the creation and use of a dual database. To
be more precise, FiFoSiM actually consists of two tax benet microsimulation
96Cf. Merz, Vorgrimler and Zwick (2005) for a description of FAST data.
97See SOEP Group (2001) or Haisken De-New and Frick (2003) for a more detailed introduction
to GSOEP.
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models. The rst one is based on administrative tax data (FAST), the second on
household survey data (GSOEP). The main reason for using the dual database
instead of having only one merged database is the huge di¤erence in the number
of observations (3 million vs. 30,000). Furthermore, both databases have several
shortcomings, as described in the previous sections, but nevertheless, they are the
two most appropriate datasets available for the analysis of the German tax benet
system. Therefore, information from one database is used for the imputation of
missing values or variables in the second dataset and vice versa. A complete
matching of the two databases is also possible but not yet necessary as we only
need some of the variables from the second le, which are missing for our analysis
in the rst le.98 Hence, the dual database of FiFoSiM actually consists of two
enhanced datasets, which allow for a better analysis of tax benet reforms than
two raw datasets. Another aspect is the handling of missing values in existing
variables in each dataset. There exist several principal ways for matching datasets
or the imputation of missing values.99 Those used in FiFoSiM are described in the
following together with information about their respective implementation.
Imputation of missing values For the imputation of missing values in one
variable several concepts exist.100 In general, the imputation of missing values
stands for replacing missing data with plausible values101. Let K be a variable
98There are mainly legal privacy issues in Germany militating against a complete match. Nev-
ertheless, the matching of the anonymised databases does not allow for a deanonymisation of
the individuals in the datasets.
99This section is based on Rässler (2002), who gives an introduction to statistical matching
procedures and imputation techniques, as well as an overview of the vast literature and software
packages that exist. Furthermore, see for example DOrazio, DiZio and Scanu (2006) for an
alternative introduction to these well-known techniques which have been developed during the
1970s (see for example Okner (1972) or Radner, Allen, Gonzales, Jabine and Muller (1980)) and
applied in other elds of research before (see Cohen (1991) for a survey). As far as we know,
the approach of creating a dual database has not previously been adopted by a peer-reviewed
microsimulation model.
100Cf. Rubin (1987) or Little and Rubin (1987) as additional references for the imputation of
missing values. The best but of course most expensive way to impute missing values would be
to collect further information on the missing data. But even this solution cannot compensate
for shortcomings in historic datasets.
101Schafer (1997), p. 1. The alternative to this imputation approach would be to delete (or
at least omit) the cases containing missing values. This procedure would lead to biased
estimations if the people with missing values share the same characteristics.
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from a dataset A with i non-missing values N = (n1; n2; :::; ni) and j missing
values M = (m1;m2; :::;mj): K = (N;M) = (n1; n2; :::; ni;m1;m2; :::;mj) ; and
O = (O1; O2; :::) a vector of (other) variables without missing values, and H be
the same variable as K and P the same as O but from a di¤erent dataset B.
Mean substitution In this approach, the missing values M in variable K are
either substituted by the mean of the non missing values N :
bK = (N;N) = (n1; n2; :::; ni; n; n; :::; n) ;
or they are substituted by the mean of the same variable H from a di¤erent
dataset B :
bK = (N;H) =  n1; n2; :::; ni; h; h; :::; h ;
If the missing values can be attributed to some specic subgroups, then the
missing values for each subgroup are replaced by the mean of each subgroup either
from the non missing values or a di¤erent dataset.
This procedure reduces the variance of this variable and should therefore be
the last option and only considered if other approaches are not applicable. The
latter could be the case if there is, for example, no correlation between the variable
containing missing values and any other variable. This approach is used in FiFoSiM
if a reform proposal includes the taxation of a so far untaxed activity of which no
micro data information is available.
Regression In the regression approach, a function for the estimation of the
missing values is constructed. A (linear) regression102 of the non missing values of
K, N , on the other (non missing) variables O is done:
N = O:
Or, as in the case of mean substitution, the similar variable H from a di¤erent
dataset B is regressed on the other variables P from B :
102For categorical variables often logistic regressions are undertaken. A good textbook introduc-
tion to the di¤erent regression techniques can be found in Greene (2003).
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H = P:
These regression coe¢ cients  are then used to predict the missing values.
Often a stochastic random value bu is added to the prediction of the missing values
M to allow for more variation:
cM = Ob + bu;
orcM = Pb + bu:
These estimates cM are then used to replace the missing values M :
K =

N;cM
In FiFoSiM this approach is mainly used for variables originally coming from
the FAST-Database. Most of these missing values are due to anonymisation and
their values can be restricted to some intervals due to di¤erent information.
Multiple imputation In the multiple imputation approach, multiple values for
each missing value are simulated. That is, the missing data is lled in m times
using the regression approach each time with di¤erent draws from the distribution
of the stochastic error term to generate m complete data sets. These multiple
datasets are generated to better reect the variation in the estimates and the
uncertainty in the imputation procedure itself:
fM i = (emi1; emi2; :::; emij)
Then the average of these estimates for each observation is calculated as the
estimator for the missing values103:
103Hence it is possible to compute the variance, and condence interval or P value of the missing
value.
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cM = 1
i
X
i
fM i;
and is used to replace the missing value in the original dataset:
K =

N;cM =  n1; n2; :::; ni; bmi1; bmi2; :::; bmij
This approach is used in FiFoSiM for most of the GSOEP variables containing
missing values. The relatively small number of cases in the GSOEP allows the use
of several simulation runs for the imputation in a few minutes, whereas for the
FAST data this method takes noticeably longer.
Statistical matching The idea of combining two existing datasets to create
a joint dataset was developed during the 1970s.104 The general principle is to
merge two (or more) separate databases through the matching of the individual
cases. This matching is done on common variables that exist in both databases
(for example gender, age and income).
Figure 2.5.2 illustrates this basic idea of statistical matching. To put it more
analytical105: We have three sets of variables X; Y; Z and two samples A = (X;Y )
and B = (X;Z): X are the common variables in both samples (for example gender,
age and income), Y and Z are sample specic (for example hourly wages and
working hours from GSOEP, special tax deductions from FAST). We can now
create a new, joint sample C = (X; Y; Z) by merging a recipient sample (lets
say A) with observations from a donor sample (B) with exact (or close) values
of X.106 In doing so, one assumes the Conditional Independence Assumption
(CIA)107 holds: Conditionally on X, Y and Z are independent.108
104Cf. Okner (1972), Radner et al. (1980) or Cohen (1991).
105This is based on Sutherland, Taylor and Gomulka (2002).
106Which sample should be chosen as the recipient and which as the donor depends on the
particular matching question.
107See Sims (1972a), Sims (1972b) and Sims (1974). The CIA means that the X variables contain
all information about the relationship between Y and Z. If we know X; Y (Z) contains no
additional information about Z (Y ).
108This can in practice [...] rarely be checked (Sutherland et al. (2002)). If the CIA does not
hold, one can still use methods of statistical matching if the relationship between Y and Z
can be estimated from other sources and incorporated into the matching process (see Paass
(1986)).
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Figure 2.5.2: Basic idea of statistical matching
Of course, one would like to nd perfect matches all of the time.109 But
without corresponding identication numbers and large numbers of variables, a
perfect match may not always be possible.110 In our case, an exact matching is
not possible, therefore we have to use methods of statistical matching to match
close (instead of exact) observations that share a set of common characteristics.
The idea underlying this matching approach is that if two people have a lot of
things in common (like for example age, sex, income, marital status, number of
children), then they are likely to have other characteristics (like for example ex-
penses) in common. The statistical matching of two databases can either be done
by regression or by methods of data fusion.
109This would be possible, if one had variables (name, address, date of birth, social security
number) which uniquely identify an individual. Due to privacy reasons researchers are not
allowed to gain access to raw micro data that include these information without anonymisation.
110If many common variables are continuous, a perfect match seems to be impossible (see Rässler
(2002), p.18).
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Regression In the regression approach, the specic variable from the donor
dataset Z is regressed on the vector of common variables X:
Z = X:
Often a stochastic random value bv is added to the prediction to allow for more
variation: bZ = Xb + bv;
The estimated coe¢ cients  from the donor dataset are then used to predict
the values of Z in the joint dataset:
C(X;Y; bZ()):
A strong correlation between X and Z is important for a successful merging.
This approach is rather easy to perform, but it has the drawback that information
in terms of variation is lost in the second dataset.
Data fusion The data fusion approach can be distinguished into two similar
approaches: nearest neighbour and propensity score matching. The general idea
of both approaches is related, as they only di¤er in the rst step.
The rst step in the nearest neighbour approach is to weight and norm the
common variables, whereas in the propensity score approach111, the propensity
score is estimated. To do so, a dummy variable I is introduced into the pooled
dataset D; containing the common variables X from both samples A;B; indicating
1 if the observation is from the recipient dataset and 0 if it is from the donor
dataset:
I =
(
1 if observation is from the recipient le
0 if observation is from the donor le
111Cf. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983). In general, the propensity score is dened as the conditional
probability of treatment given (the common) background variables. Therefore, the propensity
score is used as a predictor of the probability of being in the treatment group versus being in
the control group. In our case, an observation is in the treatment (control) group if it comes
from the recipient (donor) sample.
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Then a logit or probit estimation of the probability of the observation being
from the recipient sample (that is of the dummy indicator variable being 1) con-
ditional on the common variables X is done:
P (I = 1jX) = f(X):
The function f(X) is called the propensity score and indicates the probability
of the observation belonging to the treatment group (the recipient sample).
The second step is similar for both approaches. The distance between the
observations from both datasets is computed using a distance function112. In the
nearest neighbour case, the distance is based on the weighted common variables, in
the propensity score case, the distance is based on the estimates for the propensity
scores, which can be interpreted as some sort of implicit weighting function.
In the third step, the joint database C = (X;Y; Z) is created by merging the
observations from the two datasets A and B with the minimal distance between
them. Three ways of merging are possible: Either one observation from the donor
dataset is merged to one observation from the recipient dataset (one-to-one mer-
ging), or one observation from the donor dataset is merged to multiple observations
from the recipient dataset (one-to-n merging) or multiple observations from the
donor dataset are merged to multiple observation from the recipient dataset (n-
to-m merging).
In FiFoSiM several of these approaches are used due to the di¤erence in the
number of observations (3 million vs. 30,000). In general, information from the
smaller GSOEP dataset is matched to the FAST data using the regression ap-
proach. FAST information is merged to GSOEP data using propensity score
matching. Missing values in both datasets are imputed using di¤erent approaches
112See Cohen (1991). In general, three di¤erent distance functions can be used to determine
similarity between the two samples: the absolute, Euclidean or Mahalanobis distance. Let xAi
denote the common variables of unit i in sample A and xBj those of unit j in sample B:
The absolute distance is dened as dabsij =
 
xAi   xBj

:
The Euclidean distance is given by dEij =
q 
xAi   xBj
0  
xAi   xBj

:
The Mahalanobis distance (see Mahalanobis (1936)) is based on the correlation matrix S 1X
between the two sets of variables: dMij =
q 
xAi   xBj
0
S 1X
 
xAi   xBj

:
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depending on the specic circumstances in each case.
Updating the data samples
The database is updated to the year of analysis (i.e. 2007) using the static ageing
technique113 which allows controlling for changes in global structural variables as
well as a di¤erentiated adjustment for di¤erent income components of the house-
holds. Especially the income tax data sample needs to be updated as it describes
the situation of 2001. The GSOEP data only needs to be adjusted from 2006. Fur-
thermore, the use of di¤erent ageing factors for each database and the reweighting
of the weighting factors ensure the consistency of the two databases.
The rst step is to reproduce the fundamental structural changes of the popu-
lation. This is done according to the following criteria: age (in 5 year categories),
assessment for income tax (separate or joint) and region (East/West Germany).
The method applied here follows Quinke (2001): The cases from the FAST sample
are compared to aggregated statistical data for the whole population regarding
the above named criteria to calculate the degree of coverage. Assuming that this
degree remains stable over the years, the actual aggregate population statistics
and prognosis for the year 2007 times the coverage degree allows for an approx-
imate adjustment of the database to account for the basic structural changes.
Technically, the sample weights need to be adjusted. The weighting coe¢ cients
indicate how many actual cases of the real population are represented by each
case in the sample. Using the software package Adjust by Merz, Stolze and Imme
(2001) the sample weights are adjusted according to 52 possible combinations of
the attributes (13 age categories times 2 assessment types times 2 regions). Now,
the extrapolation of the sample using the adjusted weights represents the actual
population structure better.
In the second step, the taxpayers incomes are updated with respect to the
varying development of di¤erent income types. Also di¤erent income growth rates
between West and East as well as for positive and negative incomes are taken into
account. This allows for a di¤erentiated estimation of the income development.
Based on empirical research of the DIW (see Bach and Schulz (2003)) di¤erent
113Cf. Gupta and Kapur (2000) for an overview of the techniques to modify the data for the use
in microsimulation models.
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coe¢ cients for positive and negative incomes are applied on each cases income.
For the simulation model this means that each income value is multiplied with the
specic coe¢ cient and thus extrapolated to the current income level. Of course,
the coe¢ cients only represent the average development, but regarding the whole
population this method provides a satisfying approximation to the income struc-
ture of today.
Strength and limitations of the dual database
The use of the dual database and the two tax benet microsimulation models
based on the two enhanced datasets (FAST* and GSOEP*) allows us on the one
hand to check consistency between the two models and on the other hand to
choose the model which is most appropriate for each particular problem we want to
analyse. However, these methods cannot guarantee the resulting datasets to retain
all advantages of both databases. Beside the huge di¤erence in size using methods
of statistical matching leads to the loss of case-specic information. Nevertheless,
both datasets are each enhanced through external information while maintaining
their specic advantages. If the datasets were merged to one single database,
lots of details and the huge number of cases in FAST would be lost. Table 2.5.1
presents some aggregated results for the revenue of the status quo personal income
tax system for the years 2005-7 and for some selected variables that are merged
into the other dataset.
Ref. FAST FAST* GSOEP GSOEP*
PIT 2005 181.00 178.75 181.16 185.85 180.69
PIT 2006 192.85 190.02 192.64 197.27 192.23
PIT 2007 200.67 198.71 201.46 206.51 200.30
Table 2.5.1: Strength and limitations of the dual database
Notes: The reference value (Ref.) for the personal income tax is based on the
estimation of the federal government for each year. * indicates the enhanced dataset.
The GSOEP values would overestimate the personal income tax in each year
mainly because of missing information about deductions. On the contrary, the
FAST simulations underestimate the tax revenue especially because of missing
information about pension payments which are more heavily taxed since 2001.
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These shortcomings can be overcome using the enhanced datasets FAST* and
GSOEP* which are part of the dual database of FiFoSiM.114
The creation of this dual or enhanced database with information from admin-
istrative tax data and a household survey gives the users of FiFoSiM a powerful
tool for the analysis of various questions regarding the German tax benet system.
2.5.3 Tax benet module
In this section, the modelling of the German tax benet system is described. As
it is very complex, we focus on the major parts of the model in this description.115
Modelling the German income tax law
Individuals are subject to personal income tax. Residents are taxed on their global
income, non-residents are taxed on income earned in Germany only.
Income sources The basic steps for the calculation of the personal income tax
under German tax law are according to the scheme of table 2.5.2 as follows.116
The rst step is to determine a taxpayers income from di¤erent sources and to
allocate it to the seven forms of income. The German tax law distinguishes between
seven di¤erent categories of income: income from agriculture and forestry, business
income, self employment income, salaries and wages from employment, investment
income, rental income and other income (including, for example, annuities and
certain capital gains). For each type of income, the tax law allows for certain
income related deductions. In principle, all expenses that are necessary to obtain,
maintain or preserve the income from a source are deductible from the receipts of
that source. The second step is to sum up these incomes to obtain the adjusted
gross income. Third, deductions like contributions to pension plans or charitable
114However, because of further di¤erences between the enhanced datasets, the results still di¤er
between the two enhanced models.
115A more detailed description can be found in the German version of this documentation (see
Fuest et al. (2005b)).
116The reference period in FiFoSiM can be either weeks, months or years. The default
period for the status quo is years.
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donations are taken into account, which gives taxable income as a result. Finally,
the income tax is calculated by applying the tax rate schedule to taxable income.
Sum of net incomes from 7 categories
(receipts from each source minus expenses)
= adjusted gross income
- deductions
(social security and insurance contributions, personal expenses)
= taxable income x
 tax formula
= tax payment T
Table 2.5.2: Calculation of the personal income tax
Taxable income The subtraction of special expenses (Sonderausgaben), ex-
penses for extraordinary burden (außergewöhnliche Belastungen), loss deduction
and child allowance from adjusted gross income gives taxable income.
The special expenses consist of:
 alimony payments (maximum of 13,805 e per year)
 church tax
 tax consultant fees
 expenses for professional training (up to 4,000 e per year)
 school fees of children (up to 30%)
 charitable donations (up to 5% of the adjusted gross income)
 donations to political parties (up to 1,650 e )
 expenses for nancial provision, i.e. insurance premiums (pension schemes
up to 20,000 e per person, health/nursing care/unemployment insurance
The insurance contributions are normally equally split between employer and
employee. Each premium is calculated as the contribution rate times the income
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that is subject to contributions up to the according contribution ceiling. Cur-
rent (2007) contribution rates are 19.9% for old age insurance (5,200 e ceiling
in West Germany / 4,400 e in East Germany), (an assumed average of) 14.2%
for health insurance (3,525 e ceiling), 4.5% for unemployment insurance (ceilings:
5,200 e/4,400 e) and 1.7% for nursing care insurance (same ceiling as health
insurance) plus various special supplements.
The expenses for extraordinary burden consist of:
 expenses for the education of dependants, expenses for the cure of illness,
expenses for home help with elderly or disabled people, commuting expenses
caused by disability in certain cases
 allowances for disabled persons, surviving dependants and persons in need
of care
 child care costs
 tax allowances for self used proprietary, premises and historical buildings
Furthermore, negative income of up to 511,500 e income from the preceding
assessment period [loss deduction carried back] is deductible from the tax base.
Each tax unit with children receives either a child allowance (2904 e per parent
deduction from taxable income) or a child benet (154 e per month for the 1st to
3rd child, 179 e as from the 4th child) depending on which is more favourable. In
practice, each entitled tax unit received the child benet. If the child allowance
is more favourable, it is deducted from the taxable income while in this case the
sum of received child benets is added to the tax due. The model includes this
regulation as it compares allowance and benet for each case.
Taxable income is computed by subtracting these deductions from the adjusted
gross income.
Tax due The tax liability T is calculated on the basis of a mathematical formula
which, as of the year 2007, is structured as follows:
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T =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
0 if x  7; 664
(883:74x 7664
10000
+1500)x 7664
10000
if 7; 664 < x  12; 739
(228:74x 12739
10000
+2397)x 12739
10000
+989 if 12; 739 < x  52; 151
0:42  x  7914 if 52; 151 < x  250; 000
0:45  x  15414 if x > 250; 000
where x is the taxable income. For married taxpayers ling jointly, the tax
is twice the amount of applying the formula to half of the married couples joint
taxable income.
Modelling the benet system
To simulate the labour supply e¤ects, the calculation of net incomes has to take
the transfer system into account as well. Federal transfers such as unemployment
benet, housing benet, and social benets are modelled in FiFoSiM.
Unemployment benet I Persons who were employed subject to social insur-
ance contributions at least 12 months before getting unemployed are entitled to
receive the so-called unemployment benet I (according to the German SGB III).
The amount to be paid depends on the average gross income of a certain period.
This is reduced by 21% for social contributions and the individual income tax.
The unemployment benet I amounts to 60% of the resulting net income (or 67%
for unemployed with children).
The benet period depends on age and seniority (as shown in the following
table 2.5.3). The GSOEP panel data contains information about previous unem-
ployment benet payments, employment periods, etc. When modelling a persons
working time categories it has to be examined whether the person might get unem-
ployment benets in certain working time categories. This is assumed for persons
who received unemployment benets or who were employed subject to social in-
surance contributions at least 12 month within the last 36 month. The amount
of benet paid is calculated as described above. The remaining net income is
deducted from the unemployment benet.
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old regulation until 31.01.2006 new regulation from 01.02.2006
employment age benet period employment age benet period
12 6 12 6
16 8 16 8
20 10 20 10
24 12 24 12
30 45 14 30 55 15
36 45 18 36 55 18
44 47 22
52 52 26
64 57 32
Table 2.5.3: Duration of unemployment benet entitlement
Unemployment benet II The unemployment benet II replaced the former
system of unemployment support and social benets in the course of the so-called
Hartz reform. All employable persons between 15 and 65 years and the persons
living with them in the same household are entitled to receive unemployment
benet II, as soon as they are no longer entitled to receive unemployment benet I.
In contrast to the latter, unemployment benet II depends on the neediness of
the recipient and is therefore means-tested. Needy is a person who, by his own
households income, is not able to satisfy his own elementary needs and those of
the persons living in his household. The unemployment benet II corresponds to
the former social benets system plus housing and heating costs if necessary.
This basic amount for each person is means-tested against the households net
income.
Social benets Persons who are not able to take care of their subsistence are
entitled to receive social benets. Since unemployment benet II (see above)
was introduced, only non employable persons can receive social benets. Further
on, social benets are paid in extraordinary circumstances such as impairment of
health.
Analogously to unemployment benet II the basic amount for each person and
their respective household net income are taken into account to determine the
amount of social benets actually paid.
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Housing benets Housing benets are paid on request to tenants as well as
to owners. The number of persons living in the household, the number of family
members, the income and the rent depending on the local rent level determine if
a person is entitled to receive housing benets.
First, summing up the individual incomes considering the basic allowances gives
the chargeable household income. Then, due to missing information about local
rent levels, the weighted averages of rents up to the maximum support allowed are
taken into account to determine the housing benets.
2.5.4 Labour supply module
We use a discrete choice labour supply model to simulate the e¤ects of di¤erent
tax reforms on the supply of labour.117 Following Van Soest (1995) we assume
that the households head and his partner jointly maximise a household utility
function in the arguments leisure of both partners and net income.118 Household
i (i = 1; :::; N) can choose between a nite number (j = 1; :::; J) of combinations
(yij; lmij; lfij); where yij is the net income, lmij the leisure of the husband and
lfij the leisure of the wife of household i in combination j. Based on our data we
assume that a household is limited to a set of discrete working hours categories.
An individual can choose between the status of being unemployed and 6 di¤er-
ent working hour categories. The possible working hours (a) are categorised in
identical intervals, which comprise of eight hours each: a 2 f0; 8; 16; 24; : : : ; 48g:
The combination of all possible working hour categories results in 49 di¤erent
alternatives that a household can choose from.
We model the following translog119 household utility function
Vij (xij) = x
0
ijAxij + 
0xij (2.5.1)
117See section 2.4 for a discussion of the continuous vs. discrete labour supply literature.
118This approach is known as the Unity Approach in the literature. Research in the eld of house-
hold decision has developed di¤erent modelling methods for this particular case. Vermeulen
(2002) and Vermeulen (2005) present an introduction for the di¤erent modelling approaches
and shed a light on the newest developments in this eld. According to Browning, Chiappori
and Lechene (2006) the unity approach can be used in microeconomic simulation models in
which the Slutzky matrix of the labour supply is symmetrical and negative semi-denite. In
this case, a couple household can be treated as one consumer.
119Cf. Christensen, Jorgenson and Lau (1971).
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where x =

ln yij; ln lmij; ln lfij
0
is the vector of the natural logs of the
arguments of the utility function. The elements of x enter the utility function in
linear (coe¢ cients  = (1; 2; 3)
0) and in quadratic and gross terms (coe¢ cients
A(33) = (aij)). Using control variables zp (p = 1; :::; P )120 we control for observed
heterogeneity in household preferences by dening the parameters m; mn as
m =
XP
p=1
mpzp (2.5.2)
mn =
XP
p=1
mnpzp (2.5.3)
where m;n = 1; 2; 3.
Following McFadden (1973) and his concept of random utility maximisation121
we add a stochastic error term "ij for unobserved factors to the deterministic utility
level Vij:
Uij (xij) = Vij (xij) + "ij (2.5.4)
= x0ijAxij + 
0xij + "ij
Assuming joint maximisation of the households utility function implies that
household i chooses category k if the utility index of category k exceeds the utility
index of any other category l 2 f1; :::; Jgnfkg, if Uik > Uil. This discrete choice
modelling of the labour supply decision uses the probability of i to choose k relative
to any other alternative l:
P (Uik > Uil) = P [(x
0
ikAxik + 
0xik)  (x0ilAxil + 0xil) > "il   "ik] (2.5.5)
Assuming that "ij are independently and identically distributed across all cat-
egories j to a Gumbel (extreme value) distribution, the di¤erence of the utility in-
dex between any two categories follows a logistic distribution. This distributional
assumption implies that the probability of choosing alternative k 2 f1; :::; Jg for
120We use control variables for age, children, region and nationality , which are interacted with
the leisure terms in the utility function because variables without variation across alternatives
drop out of the estimation in the conditional logit model (see Train (2003)).
121Cf. McFadden (1981), McFadden (1985) and Greene (2003).
2.5. FIFOSIM 95
household i can be described by a conditional logit model122:
P (Uik > Uil) =
exp (Vik)XJ
l=1
exp (Vil)
(2.5.6)
=
exp (x0ikAxik + 
0xik)XJ
l=1
exp (x0ilAxil + 
0xil)
For the maximum likelihood estimation of the coe¢ cients we assume that the
hourly wage is constant across the working hour categories and does not depend
on the actual working time.123 For unemployed people we estimate their (possible)
hourly wages by using the Heckman correction for sample selection.124 The house-
holdsnet incomes for each working time category are computed in the tax benet
module of FiFoSiM.
The labour supply module of FiFoSiM is based on GSOEP data, which is
enriched by information taken from the FAST data as described in section 2.5.2.
The sample of tax units is then categorised into 6 groups according to their assumed
labour supply behaviour. We distinguish fully exible couple households (both
spouses are exible), two types of partially exible couple households (only the
male or the female spouse has a exible labour supply), exible female and exible
male single households, and inexible households. We assume that a person is not
exible in his/her labour supply, meaning he or she has an inelastic labour supply,
if a person is either
 younger then 16 or older then 65 years of age,
 in education or military service
 receiving old-age or disability pensions
 self employed or civil servant.
122McFadden (1973). Cf. Greene (2003) or Train (2003) for textbook presentations.
123This assumption is common in the literature on structural discrete choice household labour
supply models (see Van Soest and Das (2001)).
124Cf. Heckman (1976) and Heckman (1979). A detailed description of these estimations can be
found in Fuest et al. (2005b).
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Every other employed or unemployed person is assumed to have an elastic
labour supply. We distinguish between exible and inexible persons, because the
labour supply decision of those assumed to be inexible (e.g. pensioners, students)
is supposed to be based on a di¤erent consumption leisure decision (or at least with
a di¤erent weighting of the relevant determinants125) than that of those working
full time.
married male married female single male single female
participation 0.14 0.15 0.17 0.13
working hours 0.20 0.38 0.28 0.28
Table 2.5.4: Estimated labour supply elasticities
Source: own calculations based on FiFoSiM
After estimating the coe¢ cients of the conditional logit model the labour supply
elasticities can be derived with respect to a one percent change in gross wages.
Following the method of McDonald and Mo¢ tt (1980) the total hours e¤ect can
be decomposed into a working hours e¤ect (i.e. the change in working hours of
currently employed people) and a participation e¤ect (i.e. the change in labour
force participation). The results are summarised in Table 2.5.4. The elasticity
of labour market participation (extensive margin) is close to 0.15 whereas the
elasticities with respect to working hours (intensive margin) are slightly larger.
These results are in line with other ndings for Germany.126
2.5.5 Calculation of welfare e¤ects
To evaluate the welfare e¤ects of di¤erent tax systems one must determine the
consumption/leisure combinations and the budget constraint for all working hour
categories.127 In case of discrete choice labour supply simulations and under the
assumption of non-linear budget constraints a standardised process for the calcu-
lation of welfare costs due to tax changes is not su¢ cient. An easy comparison of
the minimal budgets would not encompass the existing working hour constraints
125Therefore, it is not possible to assume the same econometric relationship for these persons.
126See e.g. Haan (2007) or Arntz, Clauss, Kraus, Schnabel, Spermann and Wiemers (2007).
127See Brenneisen and Peichl (2007a) for an extensive documentation of the welfare module und
a more detailed specication of the used utility function and the budget constraint.
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and would imply unrealistic working hours. More so, the standardised process
also ignores the non-linearity of the budget constraint, which would result in dif-
culties especially if using CV.128 A transfer payment to the household induces
a positive income e¤ect, which leads to a decrease in labour supply. However,
if this decrease overpasses a kink in the budget constraint, it would lead to sub-
optimal compensation schemes. The household can in fact only achieve its new
working hour category, if it accepts a lower income. This means that the state
compensation is no longer su¢ cient.129
The applied approach is based on the works of Creedy and Kalb (2006) and it
incorporates the curve of the budget constraint and labour supply restrictions.130
Due to the fact that the literature distinguishes two di¤erent calculation methods
for welfare costs, the marginal and average welfare costs, we will highlight each
method separately.
Average Welfare Costs
The average welfare costs (AEB) of a tax system are dened as the amount of
money the households are willing to pay to forego the implementation of the
tax system. This amount of money is contrasted to the total tax revenue (T=PI
i=1 giTi) expected from the tax system. In this case, one cannot neglect the
fact that the data used is nothing but a sample and the following results should
be weighed with gi and extrapolated for the total population.
AEBEV =
PI
i=1 gi  EVi
T
(2.5.7)
To estimate the equivalent variation for each household i, one must determine
its specic utility level after the introduction of the taxation system. In this case
the choice probability of the households working hour category j 2 f1; : : : Jg are
calculated using the equation 2.5.6 and compared to one another. The working
128This is due to the fact, that EV uses a hypothetical at tax and the initial utility level without
government intervention, which leads to a linear budget constraint in all cases. For the case of
CV, however, the negligence of this characteristic would lead to faulty welfare cost estimations.
129Cf. Creedy and Kalb (2006).
130Their described method is especially easy and exible in its application, which enables a
adequate analysis of di¤erent government policies.
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hour category k with the highest choice probability is calculated for each household
and marked using a binary variable i;j.
i;j =
(
1 if P (Ui;k > Ui; k) > P (Ui;j > Ui; j) 8 k 6= j
0 else
(2.5.8)
The benet for this alternative is calculated when we insert for each household
its characteristic working hour category, which in e¤ect calculates the deterministic
utility level. This utility level is the basis for the calculation of the indi¤erence
curve und consequently the households income, which in reference to the house-
hold working hour category leaves its utility level unchanged (xed utility level
eknjU1).
To determine the equivalent variation one must compare all viable income
levels in our reference system eknOj , where there are no taxes, to the income level
eknjU1 under the consideration of all working hour categories. The EV represents
the maximum between these di¤erences and can be interpreted as their maximal
willingness to pay.
EVi = max
 
eknOj   eknjjU1
 8j 2 f1; : : : ; Jg (2.5.9)
While using this calculation method one implicitly assumes that di¤erences
between the householdschoices are due to their di¤erent working hour categories.
The actual utility level di¤erences due to di¤erences in income are only visible
through the examination of each working hour category at a time.
For determining the average welfare costs using CV one must sum over all com-
pensating variations of the di¤erent households in the database (amount: I). The
estimated value should then be extrapolated to represent the total population and
contrasted to the tax revenue that can be hypothetically realised after deducting
government transfer payments to the households (TCV =
PI
i=1 giTCV;i).
AEBCV =
PI
i=1 gi  CVi
TCV
(2.5.10)
In the case of compensating variation one must forecast the working hour cat-
egory of each household before taxation. Subsequently, one must determine the
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utility level U0, which enables us to compute xed utility income eknjU0 and by
analogy compared to EV ekn1j . In this instance, it is the minimum of these dif-
ferences that represents the CV, which can also be interpreted as the minimum
compensation a household is willing to accept for the introduction of a new taxa-
tion system.
CVi = min
 
eknjjU0   ekn1j
 8j 2 f1; : : : ; Jg (2.5.11)
The calculation of EV and CV integrated in the welfare module di¤ers from the
calculation used by Creedy and Kalb (2006). Their estimation method relies on the
compensating variation. They analyse the di¤erent income components in equation
2.5.11, which comprises a virtual work income and a residual income. However,
their focus on the di¤erence between the correct and standardised estimation of
CV and EV is not of any advantage to our calculation, which is why we will not
further concentrate on their results.
Marginal and absolute welfare e¤ects
To compute the marginal and absolute welfare e¤ects one must proceed di¤erently
than in the previous sections. The rst change is in identifying a base system
(a starting point without taxation) for comparison, This approach enables us to
integrate the until now unobserved preferences, which is extremely advantageous
while using the FiFoSiM database as each household represents a certain group
of consumers with identical socio-economic characteristics. Williams (1977) and
Small and Rosen (1981) have shown that under the assumption of an extreme
value distribution of tastes, the average, actual utility level of a group can be
determined.131 With the aid of this observation, one can calculate the actual
utility level (WUi), of each representative household.
WUi = ln
XJ
j=1
expVi;j(mi;j)

+ C (2.5.12)
The variable C is actually a constant with an unknown value, which is actually
131Cf. Train (2003). The approach of Williams (1977) and Small and Rosen (1981) is restricted
to linear utility functions and has been adjusted for non-linear functions by Dagsvik and
Karlstrom (2005).
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used to highlight the fact that the utility levels cannot be observed. Subsequently,
it is this weighed index which will be used for determining the EV. The max-
imal di¤erence between the xed utility income and the reference income again
represents EV:
EVi = max
 
eknOj   eknjjWUi
 8j 2 f1; : : : ; Jg (2.5.13)
To determine the absolute welfare e¤ects (TE) of a change in taxation systems,
one must calculate the EV for both the new and the existing taxation system of
every household in the database. Transitional e¤ects can be identied via the
di¤erence of the accumulated welfare measurement instruments. Because of these
e¤ects one can easily isolate and neglect the constant C, which is the main hurdle
that had to be overtaken to enable the use of weighted utility.
TEEV =
XI
i=1
gi  (EVijAlternative - EVijBasis) (2.5.14)
In comparison to the estimation of the absolute welfare costs, the marginal
welfare cost is estimated by analogy.132 The system in which the marginal welfare
costs should be estimated serves as the basis system. The alternative is the same
situation but with an increased tax by one percentage point.133 The calculated
individual values are later aggregated and brought in to be compared to the higher
tax revenue (T=
PI
i=1 gi Ti).
MWCEV =
PI
i=1 gi  (EVijAlternative   EVijBasis)
T
(2.5.15)
The aforementioned results can naturally also be used for the calculation of the
compensating variation. In this case one would also use the change in tax revenue
under the assumption that the household would be compensated (TCV=
PI
i=1 gi 
Ti;CV ).
132The marginal welfare costs of a tax system have already been dened and introduced in
subsection 2.4.4.
133The marginal costs are calculated via discrete changes in the tax system.
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2.5.6 CGE module
The tax benet and labour supply modules of FiFoSiM only account for the house-
hold side of the economy. The computable general equilibrium (CGE) module
allows us to simulate the overall economic e¤ects of policy changes including the
production side.134 Therefore e¤ects on labour demand, employment and economic
growth as well as wage and price levels can be assessed. The static CGE module
of FiFoSiM models a small open economy with 12 sectors and one representative
household.135 The CGE module is programmed in GAMS/MPSGE136.
The model
Households The representative household maximises a nested CES utility func-
tion according to gure 2.5.3.
Figure 2.5.3: Household level FiFoSiM
134This section is based on Bergs and Peichl (2006).
135The expressiveness of this simple CGE module as a stand-alone model is rather limited. In
combination with the state-of-the-art microsimulation module it becomes a powerful tool,
though.
136See Brooke, Kendrick, Meeraus and Raman (1998) and Rutherford (1999).
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At the top nest the household chooses between aggregated consumption (in-
cluding leisure) today Q or in the future S. The result of this optimisation is the
savings supply. On the second level, the present consumption leisure (or labour
leisure) decision takes place. The household maximises a CES utility function U
(C;F ) choosing between consumption C and leisure F :
U (C;F ) =
h
(1  )
1
C;F CC;F + 
1
C;F F C;F
i 1
C;F
: (2.5.16)
where  is the value share, and C;F =
C;F 1
C;F
the elasticity of substitution between
consumption and leisure. The budget constraint is:
pCC = w
 
1  tl (E   F ) + r  1  tkK + TLS; (2.5.17)
where pC is the commodity price, w the gross wage, tl the tax rate on labour
income, E the time endowment, r the interest rate, tk tax rate on capital income
and K the capital endowment. Consumption pCC is nanced by labour income
w
 
1  tl (E   F ), capital income r  1  tkK and the lump sum transfer TLS;
that ensures revenue neutrality. Optimising (2.5.16) subject to (2.5.17) yields the
demand functions for goods and leisure. From the latter we calculate the labour
supply of the household.137
Firms A representative rm produces a homogenous output in each production
sector according to a nested CES production function. Figure 2.5.4 provides an
overview of the nesting structure.
At the top level nest, aggregate value added (V A) is combined in xed propor-
tions (Leontief production function) with a material composite (M). M consists
of intermediate inputs with xed coe¢ cients, whereas V A consists of labour (L)
and capital (K).138 The optimisation problem at the top level in each sector i can
be written as:
137So far, the CGE module models only one type of labour. This rather strong assumption limits
the expressiveness of the household side even more and is subject to future improvements.
138The CGE module allows for sector-specic wages and capital costs (although the latter is
rarely used) depending on the context of the simulated reform.
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Figure 2.5.4: Production structure of FiFoSiM
Yi = min

1
a0i
fi(Li; Ki);
M1i
a1i
; :::;
M12i
a12i

(2.5.18)
In the bottom nest, the following CES function is used:
fi(Li; Ki) = [iL
i
i + (1  i)Kii ]
1
i (2.5.19)
where i = 11 i is the constant elasticity of substitution between labour and
capital.
The exible structure of the model allows for di¤erent levels of aggregation
ranging from 12 to 7 to 3 to 1 sectors.
Labour market To account for imperfections of the German labour market, a
minimum wage wmini is introduced as a lower bound for the exible wages in each
sector139. The labour supply is therefore rationed:
LSi (1  )  LDi : (2.5.20)
139It is possible to model di¤erent minimum wages for each activity.
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The minimum wage is calibrated so that the benchmark represents the current
unemployment level of Germany.
Government The government provides public goods (G), which are nanced by
input taxes on labour and capital tl and tk: A lump sum transfer to the households
completes the budget equation:
G+ TLS = t
lwL+ tkrK: (2.5.21)
Foreign trade Domestically produced goods are transformed through a CET-
function into specic goods for the domestic and the export market, respectively.
By the small-open-economy assumption, export and import prices in foreign cur-
rency are not a¤ected by the behaviour of the domestic economy. Analogously to
the export side, we adopt the Armington assumption140 of product heterogeneity
for the import side. A CES function characterises the choice between imported
and domestically produced varieties of the same good. The Armington good enters
intermediate and nal demand.
Data and calibration
The model is based on a social accounting matrix (SAM)141 for Germany which is
created using the 2004 Input-Output-Table142 and the static ageing technique to
transform the data to 2007.
The elasticities for the utility and production functions are calibrated based
on empirical estimations. The sectoral Armington elasticities are based on Welsch
(2001), the elasticity of substitution between labour and capital is assumed to be
0.39 according to Chirinko, Fazzari and Meyer (2004). The elasticity of intertem-
poral substitution is assumed to be 0.8 (Schmidt and Straubhaar (1996)) as well
as the elasticity of substitution between consumption and leisure (Auerbach and
Kotliko¤ (1987)).
140Vgl. Armington (1969).
141See Pyatt and Round (1985) for an introduction into the process of creating a SAM.
142The German IOT is provided by Statistisches Bundesamt (2005).
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Linking the MSM and the CGE module
FiFoSiM so far uses either the top-down or the bottom-up approach to combine the
microsimulation and the CGEmodule. In the bottom-up linkage the representative
household (income, labour supply, tax payments) in the CGE module is calibrated
based on the simulation results of the microsimulation modules. For the top-down
linkage changes of the wage or price level are computed in the CGE model and used
in the microsimulation modules for the calculation of net incomes and the labour
supply estimation. The top-down bottom-up approach used for this analysis is so
far only executed manually and not automatically.
In the rst step, the scal e¤ects are analysed in the tax benet module without
taking into account the behavioural reactions of the economic agents (rst round
e¤ects). In the second step, we allow for behavioural reactions by estimating
the labour supply responses (second round e¤ects). In the third step, the labour
demand and wage changes (third round e¤ects) are computed in the CGE module.
In the fourth step, the micro data information is used to calibrate the representative
household in the CGE module for the computation of the overall employment and
growth e¤ects (general equilibrium).
2.5.7 Further Development and conclusion
FiFoSiM is a state of the art tax benet simulation model for Germany. FiFoSiM
consists of three main parts: a static tax benet micro simulation model, an econo-
metrically estimated labour supply model and a CGE model. Two specic features
distinguish FiFoSiM from other tax benet models: First, the simultaneous use of
two databases for the tax benet module and second, the linkage of the tax benet
model with a CGE model. FiFoSiM can be used to analyse various policy reforms
of the complex German tax and transfer system.
Nevertheless, several ideas for the further improvement of FiFoSiM exist. One
major aspect of improvement is the modelling of indirect taxes. For this reason,
expenditure data is needed and a third data source has to be included into the
FiFoSiM database. The micro macro linkage between the microsimulation and
the CGE module shall be improved using the top down bottom up approach.
Furthermore, the CGE module is to be improved as well, for example by allowing
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for more di¤erent household types or a more sophisticated modelling of the labour
market. Moreover, dynamic modules are planned. A small Ramsey type dynamic
version of the CGE module exists, but has not been used for any publication yet.
This module shall be improved and used in the future. The development is not
settled yet. We expect new issues of the FAST and GSOEP data, which have to
be implemented in the model, soon.
To sum up, the creation of the dual database and the linkage of the tax benet
model with a CGE model give the users of FiFoSiM a powerful tool for the analysis
of various questions regarding the German tax benet system.
2.6 EUROMOD: model and database
The second microsimulation model we use is EUROMOD143, a static, non-behavioural
tax-benet model for the EU-15. The uniqueness of EUROMOD lies in it being a
research tool that is relevant both on the national and the European level. EUR-
OMOD uses the microsimulation technique to simulate taxes, benets and dispos-
able incomes under di¤erent scenarios for a representative micro-data sample of
households covering the EU-15 countries.
The main stages of the simulations are the following. First, a micro-data sample
and tax-benet rules are read into the model (for each country under observation).
Then for each tax and benet instrument, the model constructs corresponding
units of assessment, ascertains who is eligible for that instrument and determines
the amount of benet or tax liability. The result is then assigned to either an
individual or allocated to the persons sharing the tax unit. Finally, after all taxes
and benets in questions are simulated, disposable income is calculated.
EUROMOD is characterised by greater extent of exibility compared to usual
national models in order to accommodate a range of di¤erent tax-benet systems.
For instance, the model can easily handle di¤erent units of assessment, income
denitions for tax bases and benet means-tests, the order and structure of instru-
ments. Overall, a common framework with standardised denitions allows making
comparisons between countries in a consistent way. Further on, most analyses
143For further information on EUROMOD, see e.g. Sutherland (2001), Lietz and Mantovani
(2006) and Sutherland (2007).
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can be applied on a hypothetical EU-15-land. Moreover, the integrated multi
country model design allows for specic analyses like cross-country comparisons
of certain instruments or policies, policy or system swapping, impact of national
policies at the EU level or of EU policies at the national level.
EUROMOD covers only monetary incomes, excluding unrealised or irregular
capital gains/losses and irregular incomes. It can simulate most of the direct taxes
and benets except those based on previous contributions as this information is
usually not available from the cross-sectional data the EUROMOD input datasets
are based on. The model assumes full benet take-up and tax compliance. Al-
though the latter is an important aspect of at tax reforms, we do not consider
changes in compliance here and limit our analysis to the rst-order static e¤ects
only.
Input dataset for EUROMOD No of
households
Date of col-
lection
Reference time period
for incomes
AT Austrian version of EU-SILC 4,521 2004 annual 2003
BE Panel Survey on Belgian Households 2,975 2002 annual 2001
DK European Community Household Panel 7,044 1995 annual 1994
FI Income distribution survey 10,736 2001 annual 2001
FR Budget de Famille 29,158 1994/5 annual 1993/4
GE German Socio-Economic Panel 11,303 2002 annual 2001
GR Household Budget Survey 6,555 2004/5 annual 2003/4
IR Living in Ireland Survey 14,585 1994 month in 1994
IT Survey of Households Income and Wealth 23,924 1996 annual 1995
LU PSELL-2 2,431 2001 annual 2000
NL Sociaal-economisch panelonderzoek 4,329 2000 annual 1999
PT European Community Household Panel 4,588 2001 annual 2000
SP European Community Household Panel 5,048 2000 annual 1999
SW Income Distribution Survey 33,223 2001 annual 2001
UK Family Expenditure Survey 6,634 2000/1 month in 2000/1
Table 2.6.1: EUROMOD input datasets (version C13)
Table 2.6.1 gives an overview of the input datasets for EUROMOD. Their
sample size varies from less than 2,500 to more than 33,000 households across
countries. All monetary variables are updated to 2003 using country-specic up-
rating factors, as the reference time period for incomes varies from 1994 to 2003.
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Where net incomes were recorded in the original data, gross incomes have been
also imputed.
2.7 Summary
In this chapter, the methodology for the analysis of at tax reforms has been de-
scribed. Simulation models are necessary to provide data for the ex ante evaluation
of the outcomes of hypothetical scal reforms. We apply these techniques in the
following chapters to answer several at tax questions. We use static tax benet
models, without and with allowing for behavioural responses, as well as a linked
MSM and CGE model. We compute values for several distributional measures to
analyse all aspects of income distribution. Behavioural responses include labour
supply e¤ects and account for changes in welfare. All in all, these models provide
powerful tools for the ex ante analysis of the likely impacts of hypothetical at tax
reforms in Western Europe.
Chapter 3
Simplication and at tax in
Germany
3.1 Introduction
The recent success of at taxes in Eastern Europe has not yet reached the grown-
up welfare states of Old Europe. Nevertheless, at tax reform proposals are
high on the political agenda in various Western European countries. If the at
tax continues creeping westwards, geographically, Germany would be the next and
the rst Western country to adopt a at tax. Recently, the council of economic
advisors to the ministry of nance proposed a at rate tax for Germany.1
Given that at taxes have not yet been implemented in Western Europe, the
e¤ects of at tax reforms in these countries can only be studied on the basis
of simulation models. In the literature, there are several simulation studies on
e¢ ciency and equity aspects of at tax reforms.2 One focus of these studies is
the impact on employment and growth. A second group of studies focuses on
the distributional e¤ects of at tax reforms. In summary, the main result of this
literature is that a at tax can increase the e¢ ciency in terms of employment
and growth but will most likely lead to redistribution in favour of high income
1Cf. Wissenschaftlicher Beirat beim Bundesministerium der Finanzen (2004). Furthermore,
the reform proposals of Kirchhof (2003) and Mitschke (2004), which have been controversially
discussed before the election in 2005, chose (almost) at schedules.
2See 1.2.4 for a brief review of this literature.
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households. All previous studies support the existence of a trade-o¤between equity
and e¢ ciency, i.e. either inequality and employment both increase or decrease but
it is not possible to decrease inequality while increasing employment.
The present chapter provides a simulation analysis of three di¤erent at tax
reforms for Germany to further investigate their economic e¤ects. First, we analyse
the consequences of simplifying (and broadening) the tax base when introducing
a at tax. Second, we analyse two revenue neutral at tax scenarios with di¤erent
parameters without changing the tax base. Third, we allow for a loss in revenue
and implement a comprehensive cash ow at tax in the tradition of Hall and
Rabushka (1985). Our analysis is based on a simulation model for the German tax
and transfer system (FiFoSiM)3 using income tax micro data and household survey
data. This allows us to study both equity and e¢ ciency e¤ects in terms of the
distribution of after tax income, the e¤ective marginal income tax rates, the supply
of labour and the welfare of the households within the same microeconometric
framework. The change in e¤ective marginal income tax rates may be considered
as rough indicators for the distortions caused by the tax system. The labour supply
responses and the welfare e¤ects can be seen as more comprehensive indicators
for the e¢ ciency e¤ects. Furthermore, the linked MSM-CGE model allows to
incorporate general equilibrium e¤ects into the analysis of the cash ow at tax
proposal.
With its socio-economic and demographic structure, Germany can be seen as
a typical Western European democracy. Therefore, the qualitative results of our
analysis are of interest to a wider range of countries.4 Our analysis shows that,
when taking the general equilibrium e¤ects into account, a at tax can overcome
the fundamental equity e¢ ciency trade-o¤. However, due to their limited e¢ ciency
e¤ects and their problematic distributional impact, at tax reforms are unlikely
to spill over to the grown-up democracies of Western Europe.
The layout of this chapter is as follows. First, in section 3.2, we analyse the
e¤ects of simplifying the tax base by comparing a at tax scenario with a pro-
gressive adjustment of the rate schedule. Second, in section 3.3, we analyse the
3See chapter 2.5 for a detailed description of the simulation model.
4It has to be taken into account, though, that the structures of the tax benet systems do vary
considerably among the countries of Western Europe.
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e¤ects of two revenue neutral at tax scenarios with di¤erent marginal tax rates
without changing the tax base. Third, in section 3.4, we analyse the introduction
of a cash ow at tax on corporate income. Section 3.5 concludes the analyses.
3.2 Simplication
3.2.1 Introduction
The simplication of the tax system is a key objective of many income tax reform
proposals in various countries.5 This is not only because complexity leads to high
compliance costs for taxpayers and to tax evasion. Beyond this, the complexity
of the income tax system is also widely seen as an obstacle to fairness and e¢ -
ciency beyond costs of administration and compliance. For instance, complexity is
thought to be a barrier to achieving a fair distribution of the tax burden because it
might allow taxpayers with high incomes to use tax loopholes and reduce their tax
burden. Therefore, simplicity of the income tax is generally seen as an important
feature of tax systems. Simplication makes it easier for taxpayers to understand
and pay taxes, and makes it also easier for tax authorities to collect taxes in a fair
way.
Given the importance attributed to simplication in tax reform debates, there is
surprisingly little empirical research on the impact of tax simplication on equity
and e¢ ciency of the tax system. To some extent, this may be due to the fact
that the theoretical and empirical analysis of tax simplication faces considerable
conceptual problems. In particular, tax simplication itself is not a clearly dened
concept. Explicit measures are seldom dened, but seem rather randomly picked
as part of reform proposals. It is also not clear a priori, whether changes in the
tax law increase or decrease the complexity of the tax system. In many cases,
measures which broaden the tax base are considered to be simplications. But
in some cases (e.g. the taxation of the imputed rent of owner occupied housing)
5Cf. Gale (2001) for the U.S., James, Sawyer andWallschutzky (1997) for Australia, New Zealand
and the United Kingdom, Tran-Nam (2000) for Australia or Wagner (2006) and Fuest, Peichl
and Schaefer (2007c) for Germany. This section is based on Fuest et al. (2007c) and Fuest,
Peichl and Schaefer (2008).
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tax base broadening may also complicate the system.6 Despite these di¢ culties, it
is important to investigate whether the basic idea that income tax simplication
through eliminating special loopholes does indeed lead to a more equitable and
e¢ cient tax system and if it can be supported empirically.
In the literature, quantitative studies of the impact of tax simplication on
the e¢ ciency of the tax system and the distribution of income exist for the US.
The debate on tax simplication in the US in the beginning of the 1980s (see
e.g. Pechman (1987) or Slemrod (1984)) was followed by the Tax Reform Act
of 1986 which introduced a tax rate cut cum base broadening-reform with the
aim of simplifying the income tax system (see Slemrod (1992) for an economic
evaluation). Slemrod (1989) estimates the reduction in compliance costs from
alternative simplication options. In a recent contribution, Gale and Rohaly (2003)
study the e¤ect of di¤erent tax simplication proposals. Among other things, they
consider the introduction of a at rate income tax, combined with a value added
tax reform. They nd that such a tax reform would increase the tax burden of the
middle class and reduce the tax burden for very high and very low incomes. This
study does not distinguish between the e¤ects of tax base variation and tax rate
changes, though. As far as we know, there is no empirical analysis of the direct
distributional and e¢ ciency e¤ects of tax simplication for the German tax system.
However, von Loe¤elholz and Rappen (2003) analyse the compliance costs of the
German tax system. But there are several studies on the e¤ects on revenue and
distribution of tax reform proposals including the objective of tax simplication.
For example, Wagenhals (2001b) examines the incentive and distributional e¤ects
of the reform proposal by Kirchhof et al. (2001).
We model income tax simplication as the abolition of a set of deductions
from the tax base included in the current income tax system. We nd that this
form of tax base broadening leads to a more equitable income distribution and,
not surprisingly, an increase in tax revenue. If these measures are combined with
a reduction of income tax rates to preserve revenue neutrality, the distributional
impact depends on the type of rate schedule adjustment. The combination with
a at rate tax implies that the reform redistributes in favour of the very high and
very low incomes, while overall income inequality increases. The combination with
6Cf. Slemrod (1984).
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a less radical rate schedule adjustment, which preserves the directly progressive
rate schedule, yields a tax reform which reduces the inequality of after tax in-
comes. The employment e¤ects also depend on the type of schedule adjustment.
The progressive combination decreases aggregate labour supply, whereas the at
tax slightly increases it. The welfare e¤ects are negative for the progressive com-
bination but positive for the at tax. In this respect, the data conrms the idea
that tax reforms inevitably face a trade-o¤ between equity and e¢ ciency.
The setup of the section is organised as follows: Section 3.2.2 presents the
reform scenarios. Section 3.2.3 illustrates the e¤ects on distribution. Section 3.2.4
presents the e¤ects on the marginal tax rates, labour supply and household welfare
as measures for e¢ ciency. Section 3.2.5 concludes.
3.2.2 Tax simplication scenarios
A simpler income tax system can appear in the form of tax base simplication, the
simplication of the tax rate schedule or both. We focus mainly on tax base sim-
plication. Tax rates are then adjusted to control for revenue neutrality. Among
other things, we consider the introduction of a at rate tax schedule, which is
also an element of tax simplication. Tax base simplication is modelled as the
abolition of a set of specic deductions from the tax base included in the Ger-
man income tax system. Our choice of simplication measures is inuenced by
the ongoing German policy debate about existing tax breaks, deductions and sim-
plication of the income tax system.7 Naturally, the analysis is restricted by the
availability of data. The key idea is to make fewer distinctions across economic
activities and personal characteristics. Taxes should be imposed on a broad base
at relatively low rates that do not vary by income source or expenditure type.8
The chosen measures can be di¤erentiated into two categories: measures con-
cerning the determination of earnings (category A) and those concerning the cal-
culation of the taxable income (category B). Concerning the determination of
7See e.g. Kirchhof (2003), DIHK (2004), Bach (2005), Fuest et al. (2007c) or Wagner (2006).
In principle, the general debate is similar as in various countries: the income tax shall be
simplied through tax base broadening via the abolition of tax breaks and specic deductions.
Nevertheless, the specic debate in each country depends on the country-specic tax system
and cannot be easily compared across countries.
8See Burman and Gale (2001).
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earnings (category A), we focus on labour income related expenses. According
to § 19 EStG (German income tax law) labour income consists of gross wages
minus related expenses; there is a lump sum amount of 920e unless higher ex-
penses can be claimed. An integral part of these expenses are commuting costs.
The applicable law allows for a deduction of 0.3e per kilometre. Furthermore, we
examine the abolition of tax free bonuses for night, weekend and holiday labour.
Concerning capital income we look at the reduction and abolition of the savers
allowance (Sparerfreibetrag: current system 1370e for a single, 2740e for a couple
household). In category B, we look at several tax allowances for age, single par-
ents, children9 and deductions for tax accountancy costs, church tax and donations
(charitable and for political parties).
Tax simplication in terms of tax break abolition generates additional revenue.
As we intend to design a potential tax reform without revenue e¤ects, we model
the following progressive tax schedule according to the current tax law:
T (x) =
8>>>><>>>>:
0 if x  G
( tm te
2(M G) (x G) + te) (x G) if G < x M
( ts tm
2(S M) (x M) + tm)(x M) + (M  G) tm+te2 if M < x  S
ts (x  S) + ts+tm2 (S  M) + tm+te2 (M  G) if x > S
where x indicates the tax base, T (x) the tax payment, G is the basic personal
allowance, M the upper limit of the rst progression zone, S the lower limit ap-
plicable to the top rate ts, te the lowest tax rate and tm the highest tax rate of
the lower progression zone (i.e. the lowest tax rate of the upper progression zone).
To ensure revenue neutrality in combination with tax simplication through base
broadening, we model two forms of schedule adjustment. First, we adjust the rate
schedule to the right (progressive adjustment) and second, we introduce a at tax
rate, which is chosen with a marginal tax rate of 30% to correspond to the proposal
by the council of economic advisors to the Ministry of Finance.10 The progressive
9Child benets are still paid.
10Cf. Wissenschaftlicher Beirat beim Bundesministerium der Finanzen (2004). We have also
computed various scenarios with di¤erent at tax parameters. The empirical results for the
at tax in comparison to the progressive adjustment remain robust. Nevertheless, inequality
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adjustment is chosen to have the same basic allowance as the at rate adjustment.
The parameters for the reform scenarios can be found in table 3.2.1. A graphical
comparison of the di¤erent rate schedules can be found in gure 3.2.1.
G M S te tm ts
status quo 7664 12739 52151 0:15 0:2397 0:42
progr. adjustm. 9500 14575 53987 0:1480 0:2365 0:4144
at tax 9500 9500 9500 0:3 0:3 0:3
Table 3.2.1: Tax rate parameters
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Figure 3.2.1: Marginal tax rates
The e¤ects of these various scenarios are calculated with the microsimulation
model FiFoSiM by changing the policy parameters or switching o¤ the appropriate
is decreasing whereas the e¢ ciency e¤ects are decreasing with increasing at tax parameters
(see also Fuest, Peichl and Schaefer (2007d)).
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module. In the rst step, we abstract from behavioural adjustments, i.e. we assume
that the economic agents do not change their behaviour in response to tax reforms.
In the second step, we consider the e¤ects on labour supply. In the following we
concentrate on the simplication and combination bundles for the sake of clarity.11
3.2.3 Distributional e¤ects
The introduction of a revenue neutral tax reform always yields winners and losers.12
To analyse the distributional e¤ects of di¤erent reform scenarios we compute di¤er-
ent distributional measures based on equivalised household net incomes13. Further-
more, we estimate the polarisation e¤ects of each alternative. Generally speaking,
polarisation is the occurrence of two antipodes. A rising income polarisation de-
scribes the phenomenon of a declining middle class resulting in an increasing gap
between rich and poor. The proportion of middle income households is declining
while the shares of the poor and the rich are both rising.
We compute the Gini coe¢ cient as an inequality measure and the polarisation
index of Schmidt (2004). The main results are presented in table 3.2.2. We
simulate the percentage changes of the mean income in each decile and of the
distributional and polarisation indices compared to the status quo for the tax base
adjustment14, each tax rate schedule adjustment and the combinations of rate
11The segregated e¤ects of every single measure of tax simplication are presented in Fuest
et al. (2008). The distributional e¤ects of the single measures yield some interesting results.
For instance, abolishing the tax free bonuses for night, weekend and holiday labour results
in an increase of income equality which seems to be counter-intuitive. The burden of this
simplication particularly a¤ects middle and high incomes. The same results apply to the
abolition of the deduction for commuting costs. This measure also burdens middle and higher
incomes more heavily than lower income categories. A detailed analysis of the scal e¤ects of
di¤erent parts and deduction rules of the German income tax system 1995 can also be found
in Müller (2004).
12The distributional e¤ects in this section di¤er slightly from the results presented in Fuest et al.
(2007c) because of a newer version of the database. Furthermore, we also analyse the fraction
of people gaining and losing in terms of disposable income.
13We use the modied OECD-scale which weights the household head with a factor of 1, house-
hold members over the age of 14 with 0.5, and under 14 with 0.3. The households net income is
divided by the sum of the individual weights of each member (=equivalence factor) to compute
the equivalence weighted household income.
14The complete tax base adjustment bundle (kumAB) consists of bundles A (kumA) and B
(kumB). All category B measures are combined in bundle B, bundle A contains the abolition
of deductibility of commuting costs (A1: noKm), the abolition of the savers allowance (Sparer-
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schedule reforms and tax base simplication.
tax base adj. schedule adj. combinations
kumAB progr. at rate progr. at rate
1. Decile -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.01
2. Decile -0.12 0.16 0.04 0.05 -0.06
3. Decile -0.67 0.96 0.39 0.52 -0.22
4. Decile -1.06 1.54 0.02 0.74 -1.11
5. Decile -1.31 1.84 -0.48 0.76 -1.90
6. Decile -1.47 2.05 -0.91 0.75 -2.49
7. Decile -1.60 2.14 -1.09 0.66 -2.78
8. Decile -1.57 2.11 -0.83 0.44 -2.61
9. Decile -1.57 1.96 -0.02 -0.05 -1.96
10. Decile -1.72 1.37 6.32 -0.75 4.68
Gini -0.38 0.13 2.86 -0.55 2.54
PolS -0.98 0.72 -0.56 -0.20 -1.69
Winners 0.00 47.94 43.02 30.07 19.94
unchanged 53.19 51.63 52.14 55.12 55.44
Losers 46.82 0.43 4.84 14.81 24.62
Table 3.2.2: Percentage change of household equivalence weighted net income
Source: own calculations based on FiFoSiM
The rst column of table 3.2.2 shows the cumulated e¤ects of the tax base
adjustment (kumAB). The accumulated measures of tax simplication burden the
higher incomes more heavily than the middle and the lower incomes. Inequality
and polarisation are both reduced. The separate examination of each bundle yields
the same qualitative results. The abolition of several tax rule exemptions in both
categories A (determination of adjusted gross income) and B (calculation of taxable
income) a¤ects the high incomes more than the middle and low incomes.
The isolated e¤ects of changes in the tax schedule are as follows. The adjust-
ment to the right of the current schedule (column 2) increases inequality as well as
polarisation. The at rate tax strongly increases inequality while the polarisation
index decreases. The obvious winner of a at tax rate is the 10th decile due to
lower statutory and e¤ective marginal rates and to some extent the rst deciles
while the middle to upper deciles su¤er from an increased tax charge due to the at
freibetrag, A4: noSpfb) and the restriction of labour income related expenses to 1000 e (A8:
wkx).
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tax reform. These e¤ects result in an overall increase in the Gini index. The de-
crease in polarisation is surprising at rst glance, but this result can be attributed
to the following two e¤ects: The heterogeneity between the two groups decreases
because of the higher tax burden for most people above the median income and
because of a decrease of the tax liability of some people below the median. The
homogeneity within the upper group decreases because of the opposite directions
of the e¤ects in those deciles. Both e¤ects lead to a decrease in the polarisation
index. The increase of the polarisation index for the adjusted current schedule
can be explained by the relatively larger relief for people above the median income
resulting in an increasing heterogeneity between the two groups.
The revenue neutral combination of the tax base bundle with a tax schedule
adjustment to the right (column 4) decreases both the inequality and the polar-
isation indices, whereas the combination with a at tax (column 5) increases the
inequality but reduces the polarisation. The explanation is analogous to the ef-
fects of the pure tari¤ reforms. Given these results, we can conclude that revenue
neutral tax simplication does not necessarily lead to redistribution from poor to
rich. The combination with the adjustment of the current tax schedule even leads
to a decrease of inequality, i.e. the simplication of the tax system can lead to
a more equal distribution of after tax income. More inequality only arises if tax
base adjustment is combined with the introduction of a at rate tax.
The fractions of households winning or losing disposable income15 yield the
expected results for the tax base and schedule adjustments. The progressive com-
bination yields a majority of people gaining whereas with at rate combination
more people are losing disposable income than gaining. Because of the large frac-
tion of people losing disposable income, the implementation of a revenue neutral
at tax reform proposal in the political process seems unlikely.
3.2.4 E¢ ciency e¤ects
There are many ways in which tax reforms a¤ect the e¢ ciency of the tax system.
In this section, we analyse the e¤ects of the at tax reform scenarios on the e¤ective
15Households whose disposable income does not change more than 50 euros in either direction
are regarded as unchanged.
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marginal tax rates, the labour supply decision and the welfare of households.
E¤ective marginal tax rates
In this subsection, we analyse the e¤ect of the reform scenarios on the e¤ective
marginal income tax rate faced by di¤erent groups of taxpayers. The underlying
idea is that the marginal income tax rate a¤ects the labour supply and saving
incentives. Here, we focus on the marginal labour income tax rate. The results
are summarised in table 3.2.3.
status quo tax base adj. schedule adj. combinations
E06  kumAB  progr.  at rate  progr.  at rate
1 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00
2 3.01 0.90 -2.25 -1.26 -2.05 -0.68
3 15.29 1.66 -3.07 1.99 -0.92 4.64
4 20.79 0.95 -1.71 1.70 -0.62 2.54
5 23.22 1.11 -1.81 0.03 -0.77 0.79
6 24.27 1.22 -1.90 0.27 -0.63 1.43
7 25.66 1.05 -1.44 1.02 -0.27 1.94
8 27.62 0.76 -0.93 0.95 -0.08 1.37
9 29.81 0.63 -0.65 -0.46 -0.00 -0.34
10 35.06 1.21 -0.40 -5.66 0.74 -5.58
Table 3.2.3: Changes in e¤ective marginal tax rates in percentage points
Source: own calculations based on FiFoSiM
It turns out that tax base broadening without tax rate adjustments increases
the marginal tax rate for all taxpayers. This is not surprising, given the progressive
nature of the income tax schedule. Combining these measures with a reduction
of tax rates over the entire income tax schedule reduces the marginal tax rate for
almost all taxpayers with the exception of the highest income decile. The combin-
ation with a at rate tax, in contrast, reduces the marginal tax rate considerably
(by ve percentage points) for the highest income decile. For the middle income
deciles, the marginal tax rate increases, especially for the third and the fourth in-
come decile. This suggests that the e¢ ciency gains that can be achieved through
tax simplication, combined with the introduction of a at rate tax, are limited.
This is mainly due to the fact that revenue neutrality requires a at tax rate of
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30%. If the broadening of the tax base goes beyond the measures considered here,
revenue neutrality can be achieved at a lower statutory tax rate. In this case, it
would be possible to attain lower marginal tax rates for more households.
Labour supply e¤ects
Table 3.2.4 contains the additional full time equivalents as results of our labour
supply estimations.
couple single
male female male female 
tax base adj.  kumAB -68,423 -25,925 -52,599 -51,832 -198,779
schedule adj.  progr. 56,295 18,374 57,738 44,761 177,168
 at rate 60,853 14,717 51,442 44,077 171,089
combinations  progr. -6,729 -5,863 10,138 -2,56 -5,014
 at rate 2,661 -911 9,325 2,573 13,648
Table 3.2.4: Labour supply e¤ects (full time equivalents)
Source: own calculations based on FiFoSiM.
On average, married men react stronger than women. For couple households,
this can be explained by the German system of joint taxation. In this system it is
quite attractive if only one of the spouses works. The higher tax burden resulting
from the tax base adjustment leads to an overall decrease of labour supply, while
the relief of the tax payers resulting from the schedule adjustments increases the
labour supply. Both schedule adjustments yield similar labour supply responses.
The combinations of tax base and schedule adjustment yield overall labour supply
responses which do not signicantly di¤er from zero. Nevertheless, the di¤erent
directions of the e¤ects indicate responses one would expect intuitively: the at
rate rather increases labour supply, whereas the progressive adjustment decreases
it.
Welfare e¤ects
Table 3.2.5 presents the results of the estimation on the aggregated welfare changes
for the revenue neutral combinations. For a more comprehensive analysis, the
distribution of the welfare changes together with the changes in tax payments and
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the labour supply e¤ects for the income deciles are presented. The variable 4T 0
stands for changes in tax payments before labour supply reactions (LS) and 4T 1
is the change in tax payments after behavioural adjustment. It is important to
distinguish between, on the one hand, the e¤ects of a reform on the welfare of
households in a given income decile as measured by the equivalent variation (EV ),
and, on the other hand, the overall welfare e¤ect generated by a given decile (W ).
Decile  progressive combination  at rate combination
4T 0 4T 1 4LS 4EV 4W 4T 0 4T 1 4LS 4EV 4W
1 -1.7 -4.8 1,171 19.5 14.7 -2.0 -7.8 1,419 32.4 24.6
2 -5.3 -5.2 3,719 33.1 28.0 -5.6 -10.3 2,506 71.0 60.8
3 -34.4 -42.5 7,524 94.1 51.6 -45.1 -63.2 8,302 136.1 72.9
4 -189.7 -148.0 11,771 221.1 73.1 -233.7 -241.9 6,869 323.7 81.8
5 -428.3 -386.0 7,711 457.9 71.9 -655.4 -616.7 -4,487 599.9 -16.9
6 -631.8 -551.0 4,681 599.3 48.3 -766.3 -630.4 -1,425 541.1 -89.4
7 -645.9 -638.1 3,326 653.1 15.1 -201.0 -311.9 5,640 132.1 -179.8
8 -642.7 -553.5 -970 487.1 -66.4 874.5 439.9 -8,057 -677.4 -237.6
9 -356.7 -249.4 -9,856 43.3 -206.0 2,294.0 1,419.9 -29,231 -1,686.5 -266.6
10 2,939.2 2,190.8 -34,087 -3,105.7 -914.9 -1,279.1 -63.6 32,115 1,467.4 1,403.8
 2.9 -387.6 -5,010 -497.2 -884.8 -19.9 -86.1 13,651 939.7 853.6
Table 3.2.5: Distribution of labour supply (fulltime equivalents), tax payments and
welfare changes (in million e)
Source: own calculations based on FiFoSiM.
The overall welfare e¤ects are negative for the progressive adjustment but posit-
ive for the at tax adjustment. The tax increase induced by the tax base measures
increases the distortion of the labour-leisure decision and results in negative labour
supply reactions (see previous section). For the progressive combination, this e¤ect
dominates the positive labour supply e¤ects induced by the schedule adjustments.
Therefore the overall welfare e¤ects of the revenue-neutral combinations are still
negative, whereas for the at tax adjustment the latter e¤ects prevail.
The di¤erences in the welfare e¤ects can be best explained taking into account
the distribution of the labour supply e¤ects and changes in the tax payments.
The welfare e¤ects of the tax base measures are unequally distributed across the
deciles. The strongest reactions of our money metric welfare measure can be found
in the deciles with the highest incomes. Households in these deciles pay most of
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the income taxes and face the highest marginal excess burden. Therefore, the
reaction of these households is crucial for the welfare e¤ects of the reform for the
economy as a whole. In particular the highest income decile plays a key role.
The progressive combination increases the tax payments of this decile by three
billion Euros before labour supply adjustments. Since the positive e¤ects of the
tax rate reduction are weak, overall labour supply declines. This increases the
labour supply distortion, so that the overall welfare e¤ect generated in this decile
is negative. In the case of the at rate combination, the reform reduces the taxes
paid by the highest income decile before labour supply adjustment. As a result,
labour supply increases. The increase in labour supply reduces the tax revenue
losses almost to zero. This explains why the overall welfare e¤ect in this decile
is positive. One should note, though, that the overall magnitude of welfare gains
and losses is limited. For the at rate combination, we nd a welfare gain of
approximately 0.5 per cent of overall income tax revenue whereas the progressive
combination yields a loss of the same magnitude.
3.2.5 Summary and conclusion
In this section, we have examined the e¤ects of tax simplication on the income
distribution, e¤ective marginal income tax rates, labour supply and welfare. All
e¤ects were simulated for each single simplication measure, for bundles A (de-
termination of earnings) and B (computation of taxable income) and for the com-
plete tax base adjustment package using FiFoSiM. The abolition of exemptions
and deductions increases tax revenue. Therefore our tax base adjustment was
combined with tax rate reforms to analyse the joint e¤ects on distribution while
controlling for revenue neutrality.
The main results are:
 Tax simplication concerning the determination of income for tax purposes
(cat. A) and the determination of taxable income (cat. B) reduces inequality
and polarisation.
 Simplication through the abolition of tax exemptions increases tax revenue.
A tax reform with overall revenue neutrality implies tax rate changes with
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separate distributional e¤ects. The adjustment of the current schedule to
the right slightly increases inequality and polarisation while a at tax leads
to a distinct increase of inequality and decreases polarisation.
 The combination of the tax base measures with a progressive tax rate ad-
justment reduces inequality and polarisation, because the highest incomes
su¤er most. The marginal income tax rate for middle income households is
also reduced.
 If the tax base adjustment is combined with a at rate tax, inequality in-
creases while polarisation decreases, as the upper middle class is particularly
a¤ected. Hence, the tax rate e¤ect is stronger than the simplication e¤ects
on distribution and labour supply incentives of middle income households.
 The progressive combination decreases labour supply, whereas the combina-
tion with a at tax increases labour supply. In both cases, the overall labour
supply e¤ects are rather small.
 The welfare e¤ects are negative for the progressive combination, but positive
for the at tax. In both cases, the magnitude of the e¤ects is approximately
0.5 per cent of overall income tax revenue.
Summing up, revenue neutral tax simplication can increase or decrease both
inequality and e¢ ciency depending on the form of rate schedule adjustment. Tax
base simplication in combination with a directly progressive tax rate schedule can
reduce inequality. If inequality is regarded as an indicator for fair taxation, more
fairness through tax simplication is possible. Furthermore, our results suggest
that at tax reforms combining tax base broadening with a single tax rate are
likely to increase inequality at the expense of the upper middle class. This might
be the reason for the limited success of at tax proposals in the political process
in Germany or other Western European countries. Hence, it seems advisable to
separate the tax base simplication objective from tax rate schedule issues. The
e¤ects of at tax reforms without base broadening will be analysed in the next
section 3.3.
However, income distribution is only one relevant aspect of tax reforms. If
a higher national income, more e¢ ciency or better incentives can be achieved
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through an income tax reform, higher inequality of income distribution might be
deemed acceptable. Our results suggest that the e¤ects of a (revenue-neutral) at
tax rate reform on e¢ ciency in terms of e¤ective marginal tax rates, labour supply
and household welfare are slightly positive. One may argue that a at rate tax
is also likely to reduce tax distortions in the corporate sector. This may lead to
further e¢ ciency gains due to higher investment and labour demand. These e¤ects
are beyond the analysis of this section but will be explored in section 3.4.
Our results have been derived using German micro data. Nevertheless, the
qualitative e¤ects should not di¤er very much from other (Western European)
countries with a similar socio-economic structure. To conclude, one can state that
whether tax simplication leads to more fairness in terms of higher after-tax income
equality and more e¢ ciency in terms of employment and welfare depends on the
way in which tax base simplication is combined with tax rate adjustments. The
tax base adjustment package considered here, combined with an adjusted direct
progressive tax rate (at tax rate) reduces (increases) inequality as well as labour
supply and welfare. Unfortunately, none of the reforms considered here are able
to overcome the trade-o¤ between equity and e¢ ciency objectives.
3.3 Flat rate tax
3.3.1 Introduction
Flat rate tax systems di¤er considerably in their design. Usually, a at rate per-
sonal income tax is regarded as an indirectly progressive tax schedule with a basic
tax allowance and a uniform marginal tax rate. In this section, we only consider re-
forms of the income tax schedule (tax rate(s) and basic allowance).16 We abstract
from reforms of the tax base which have been analysed in the previous section.17
For the selection of our reform scenarios and the choice of tax parameters we follow
the systematic approach developed by Davies and Hoy (2002), which is explained
16This section is based on Fuest, Peichl and Schaefer (2007b) and Fuest et al. (2007d).
17An earlier version of this analysis included various measures to broaden the tax base (see section
3.2 and Fuest et al. (2007d)). The results were qualitatively similar to the results derived here.
Furthermore, to be able to apply the approach of Davies and Hoy (2002), it is necessary for
the at tax to have the same tax base as the progressive rate schedule.
3.3. FLAT RATE TAX 125
in section 1.2.5. We focus on two at rate tax systems, which di¤er in the tax
rate and the basic allowance. Both are revenue neutral and the parameter values
are chosen as follows: The rst scenario (LL = low tax rate, low allowance) holds
constant the existing basic allowance (7,664 Euros) and therefore corresponds to
the lower bound tlF in terms of Davies and Hoy (2002). Revenue neutrality then
implies a tax rate of 26.9 per cent. The second at tax scenario (HH = high tax
rate, high allowance) is constructed such that the inequality of after tax incomes
as measured by the Gini coe¢ cient remains constant (corresponding to the critical
value tF ).
18 This requires a rather high tax rate (31.9 per cent) and, accordingly,
a large basic allowance (10,700 Euros).19 The premise of ex-ante revenue neut-
rality is chosen for a better comparability of the di¤erent scenarios.20 Table 3.3.1
presents the parameter values for the two scenarios.
tax schedule parameters
basic allowance marginal tax rate
2007 7,664 15-45
LL 7,664 26.9
HH 10,700 31.9
Table 3.3.1: Reform scenarios
The simulation analysis yields the following results. The low tax rate reform
does have positive e¢ ciency e¤ects, but these e¤ects are quite small. The welfare
gain equals 1.8 per cent of overall income tax revenue and employment increases
18It would also be possible to construct this scenario with any other measure of inequality
satisfying the Pigou-Dalton principle of transfers. Extensive sensitivity analyses with measures
of the Generalized Entropy family (including both Theil coe¢ cients) yield similar results in
qualitative terms with respect to the at tax parameters and therefore the economic e¤ects.
We choose the Gini coe¢ cient as it is probably the most popular inequality measure used in
the literature.
19We do not report the results for the upper bound here because such a scenario requires a
marginal rate of about 45%. Such a reform is not discussed under the heading of at tax
reforms, and it would give rise to negative e¤ects on welfare and employment while reducing
inequality per denition.
20If the scenarios were chosen to be revenue neutral ex-post, i.e. after labour supply reactions,
the marginal tax rates could be lower (higher) in case of increasing (decreasing) labour supply
but the underlying research question would be di¤erent. Our aim is to analyse scenarios that
are equal ex-ante and to reveal the ex-post di¤erences by analysing the economic e¤ects of the
scenarios in terms of equity and e¢ ciency.
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by 0.3 per cent. However, this rather modest e¢ ciency gain comes at the cost
of an increase in income inequality. In particular, the top income decile benets
while the upper middle class su¤ers losses. The number of losers exceeds the
number of winners. The second scenario, the high tax rate reform, by denition
avoids a change in (Gini) income inequality. But the higher tax rate reduces the
e¢ ciency gains. Employment remains constant and the aggregate welfare e¤ect
is also close to zero. Again, the households in the top income decile benet at
the cost of the upper middle class. A di¤erence to the low tax rate reform is
that households in the six lowest income deciles also benet, albeit not very much.
These results suggest that at tax reforms cannot avoid the fundamental equity
e¢ ciency trade-o¤ which dominates the tax policy debate.
The setup of this section is organised as follows: Subsection 3.3.2 illustrates
the distributional e¤ects in terms of inequality, polarisation, winners and losers.
Subsection 3.3.3 presents the e¢ ciency e¤ects in terms of e¤ective marginal tax
rates, labour supply reactions and welfare e¤ects. Subsection 3.3.4 concludes.
3.3.2 Distributional e¤ects
The introduction of a revenue neutral tax reform always yields winners as well as
losers. To analyse the distributional e¤ects of the two reform scenarios, we compute
di¤erent distributional measures based on equivalised disposable incomes21. The
main results are presented in table 3.3.2, which displays the changes of the mean
disposable income for each decile, the measures of inequality and polarisation22,
and the fractions of households winning or losing disposable income23 in per cent
for each scenario before and after labour supply reactions (LS).24
Without taking labour supply reactions into account (before LS), the highest
decile, which generates the largest part of the overall tax payments, gains in both
21We use the new OECD equivalence scale which weights the household head with a factor of 1,
household members over the age of 14 with 0.5, and under 14 with 0.3.
22Schmidt (2004) creates a polarisation index which in analogy to the Gini index (Lorenz curve)
is based on a polarisation curve for better comparability of the results and their interpretations.
23Households whose disposable income does not change more than 50 Euros in either direction
are regarded as unchanged.
24We have also computed various indicators of poverty and richness. These measures, however,
do not di¤er signicantly from the status quo values.
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before LS after LS
LL HH LL HH
Decile changes in per cent
disposable income
1 0.20 0.13 54.68 56.08
2 -0.03 -0.01 5.45 6.03
3 -0.50 0.37 -0.02 1.57
4 -1.15 0.89 -0.97 1.09
5 -1.63 0.56 -2.60 -0.45
6 -1.78 -0.02 -2.76 -1.50
7 -1.74 -0.51 -3.62 -2.76
8 -1.29 -0.82 -2.58 -2.67
9 -0.39 -0.96 0.03 -1.44
10 3.85 0.94 4.41 0.61
Inequality
Gini 2.11 0.00 3.41 0.47
Theil 5.58 1.14 7.28 1.21
Polarisation 0.62 -1.19 1.13 -1.81
Winners / Losers
Winners 10.93 23.00 9.66 20.92
unchanged 43.71 45.78 51.47 53.22
Losers 45.37 31.22 38.87 25.86
Table 3.3.2: Distributional e¤ects based on equivalised disposable incomes
Source: own calculations based on FiFoSiM
at tax scenarios. In case of a low basic allowance (LL), the tax burden on middle
income deciles increases strongly. Households in the lowest deciles seldom pay
taxes in the status quo. Overall, the LL reform leads to redistribution from poor
and middle income households to the rich: All other deciles nance the relief of
the 10% richest taxpayers. This result is reected in an increase of both the Gini
and the Theil coe¢ cient of disposable incomes.25 If a higher tax rate is combined
with a higher basic allowance, as in the HH scenario, the gains for the highest decile
decline while the upper middle class loses less. In this case, not only the highest
25The Gini coe¢ cient of the distribution of tax payments (not shown in the table) is decreasing
in both scenarios indicating less redistribution through the income tax system. This prediction
is conrmed when looking at more comprehensive measures of tax progressivity and redistribu-
tion. These measures report a decrease in both dimensions for both scenarios with the decrease
being larger in scenario LL than in HH.
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but also some of the lower deciles benet. The Gini coe¢ cient does not change by
construction of the reform, but the top sensitive Theil index still indicates a small
increase in inequality.
When taking labour supply reactions into account (after LS) without changing
the decile classication, the picture changes. Especially the lowest deciles gain
above average in relative terms in both scenarios. These high relative changes can
be explained by the low absolute values for disposable incomes in these deciles,
which consist mostly of transfers. If some of these persons start working, they
often earn a multiple of their previous income. Still, for low parameter values
(LL), the highest decile gains most in absolute terms. In contrast, in scenario
HH the highest decile remains almost unchanged after labour supply reactions.
Inequality is only slightly increased in this scenario, whereas the rst scenario
yields a strong increase in inequality.
The polarisation of the income distribution and therefore the gap between rich
and poor increases in scenario LL but decreases in HH before and after labour
supply reactions. Furthermore, the number of winners is higher and the number
of losers is lower with the higher tax rate (and basic allowance). Nevertheless, in
terms of disposable income, the number of losers exceeds the number of winners
in both scenarios.
3.3.3 E¢ ciency e¤ects
There are many ways in which a tax reform a¤ects the e¢ ciency of the tax system.
In this section, we analyse the e¤ects of the at tax reform scenarios on the e¤ective
marginal tax rates, the labour supply decision, and the welfare of households.
E¤ective marginal tax rates
The changes in e¤ective marginal income tax rates faced by di¤erent groups of tax-
payers are presented in table 3.3.3. The underlying idea is that the marginal income
tax rate a¤ects the labour supply and savings incentives. Therefore, changes in
e¤ective marginal income tax rates may be considered as rough indicators for the
distortions caused by the tax system.
The introduction of a at rate tax increases statutory marginal tax rates for
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Decile EMTR 2007 LL Di¤. HH Di¤.
1 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00
2 4.40 6.97 2.57 0.24 -4.16
3 17.25 19.98 2.73 18.09 0.84
4 22.09 22.47 0.38 24.14 2.05
5 24.58 24.09 -0.49 22.99 -1.59
6 25.69 25.37 -0.32 22.95 -2.74
7 26.88 26.17 -0.71 26.71 -0.17
8 28.37 26.56 -1.81 30.04 1.67
9 30.50 26.67 -3.83 31.23 0.73
10 36.36 26.68 -9.68 31.46 -4.90
Table 3.3.3: E¤ective Marginal Tax Rates (and changes in percentage points)
Source: own calculations based on FiFoSiM
the lowest deciles and decreases those of the highest deciles. Absolute and relative
changes of e¤ective marginal tax rates depend on the parameter combinations.
Scenario LL yields sharp increases in marginal tax rates for the lower deciles,
while the rates faced by the highest deciles decrease strongly. In scenario HH,
the magnitude of these e¤ects is smaller. The decrease in the e¤ective marginal
tax rate of the highest decile is not as strong as before, while the lower to middle
decilese¤ective rates increase less or even decline.
As a rst conclusion from this section, we can state that the ambivalent e¤ects
on e¤ective marginal tax rates do not allow for a clear evaluation of incentive
and e¢ ciency e¤ects of these scenarios. In particular, it is obvious that a at tax
reform does not improve incentives at all income levels.
Labour supply e¤ects
The results of our labour supply estimations are presented in Table 3.3.4, di¤er-
entiating between single and married men and women. The participation e¤ect
(extensive decision) and the working hours e¤ect (intensive decision) as well as the
total e¤ect are reported in full time equivalents.
The participation e¤ect in total does not signicantly di¤er from zero in both
scenarios. Nevertheless, the di¤erences between both scenarios for the di¤erent
groups are noteworthy. In scenario LL married men reduce their labour supply
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married male married female single male single female 
full time equivalents participation e¤ect
LL -31,401 21,130 -1,469 17,413 5,673
HH 2,480 -11,749 4,784 10,938 6,453
full time equivalents working hours e¤ect
LL 9,564 19,750 20,190 34,064 83,568
HH -4,477 -3,659 4,518 -2,921 -6,539
full time equivalents total e¤ect
LL -21,837 40,880 18,721 51,477 89,241
HH -1,997 -15,408 9,302 8,017 -86
Table 3.3.4: Labour supply e¤ects (fulltime equivalents)
Source: own calculations based on FiFoSiM
whereas married women increase it. This can be explained by the German system
of joint taxation which makes it unattractive for secondary earners to work as both
spouses face the same e¤ective marginal tax rate. Therefore, in many households
only the husband is employed (often even working overtime) whereas the wife does
not work (or more precisely: specialises in household production). Lowering the
statutory (and e¤ective) marginal tax rates decreases the incentives for this type of
employment division within a given household. As a consequence, women increase
their labour force participation whereas men decrease it. In scenario HH, where the
marginal tax rate is higher, the opposite occurs. Men increase their participation
even further whereas women decrease it.
The working hours e¤ect is signicantly positive for scenario LL and slightly
negative for scenario HH. It has to be emphasised that this larger intensive reac-
tion does not indicate higher intensive than extensive labour supply elasticities.
In line with recent empirical literature (see e.g. Immervoll et al. (2007)) we also
nd higher extensive elasticities (especially at the bottom of the income distribu-
tion). Nevertheless, the intensive reactions are stronger (especially at the top of
the distribution, see also Table 3.3.5) because of the higher absolute changes in
disposable income at the upper end of the distribution.
To sum up, the variant with a low basic allowance and marginal tax rate (LL)
increases total labour supply by approximately 90.000 full time equivalents or 0.3%,
while the total labour supply e¤ect of scenario HH (high allowance and marginal
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tax rate) is roughly equal to zero. These di¤erences are robust to parameter
specications in the sense that revenue neutral scenarios with higher tax parameter
values always yield lower labour supply e¤ects.
Welfare e¤ects
Table 3.3.5 presents the estimated aggregate welfare changes for the di¤erent scen-
arios. For a more comprehensive analysis, the distribution of the welfare changes
together with the changes in tax payments before (Tax0) and after (Tax1)26 the
labour supply e¤ects (LS) for the income deciles are presented. It is important
to distinguish between, on the one hand, the e¤ects of a reform on the welfare
of households in a given income decile as measured by the equivalent variation
(EV ), and, on the other hand, the overall welfare e¤ect generated by a given
decile (Welfare). The di¤erence is that households in a decile may be better o¤
because their tax payments decline. But this implies that they do not generate a
welfare gain for society as a whole because the tax revenue has to be generated
by other households. For instance, in the case of the low tax rate reform (LL),
the highest income decile experiences a utility gain which is equivalent to over 8
billion Euros. But part of this utility gain is a consequence of a decline in taxes
paid by these households. If this is taken into account, the welfare gain generated
in this decile is reduced to just over 3 billion Euros.
What are the overall welfare e¤ects of the two reforms? A low marginal tax rate
and basic allowance (LL) yields a welfare gain of 3.6 billion Euros. This is equal
to 1.8% of overall income tax revenue. This gain is achieved because the reform
slightly reduces the labour leisure distortions caused by the tax system. Table 3.3.5
shows that the welfare e¤ects generated in the di¤erent deciles correlate with the
employment e¤ects. The e¢ ciency gain goes along with considerable redistributive
e¤ects. Table 3.3.5 also demonstrates that the reform reduces the utility of all
deciles except the decile with the highest income, which gains as mentioned above.
The high tax rate scenario (HH) avoids this redistribution. Here, all households
26The scenarios are designed to be revenue neutral before labour supply reactions (sum of Tax0).
Therefore they are not revenue neutral when taking into account the labour supply reactions
(Tax1). Alternatively, the reforms could be designed to be revenue neutral after labour supply
reactions. The ex post scal and e¢ ciency e¤ects, however, would be similar for both scenarios.
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LL HH
Decile Tax0 Tax1 LS EV Welfare Tax0 Tax1 LS EV Welfare
1 -34 10 -3,326 -38 -28 -27 -13 2,625 38 25
2 14 58 -9,114 -136 -78 -11 -20 3,497 82 62
3 180 199 -15,773 -291 -92 -216 -189 10,522 232 43
4 566 537 -22,999 -638 -101 -560 -483 8,053 419 -64
5 1,149 885 -25,796 -946 -62 -673 -574 -4,686 429 -145
6 1,656 1,420 -18,876 -1,460 -40 -290 -396 -14,671 258 -137
7 2,262 1,854 -10,755 -1,880 -26 190 -50 -22,509 -80 -130
8 2,312 1,699 10,547 -1,608 92 1,017 377 -22,841 -508 -131
9 1,842 1,485 41,622 -840 646 1,902 1,135 -18,435 -1,155 -20
10 -10,286 -5,372 143,713 8,664 3,292 -1,489 -412 58,358 1,867 1,455
 0 2,775 89,243 827 3,602 0 -625 -87 1,582 957
Table 3.3.5: Distribution of labour supply (fulltime equivalents), tax payments and
welfare changes (in million e)
Source: own calculations based on FiFoSiM.
except for the deciles 6-9 experience utility gains on average (this does not, of
course, exclude heterogeneity within deciles), and the magnitudes of gains and
losses are smaller. However, this comes at the cost of vanishing aggregate welfare
gains. Aggregate labour supply is more or less una¤ected, and so is aggregate
e¢ ciency. Even if more income inequality is accepted, as in the case of the LL
reform, the e¢ ciency gain is not very large. It is a striking aspect of both variants
that the middle class seems to be the main loser of at tax reforms, not just in
terms of income but also in terms of their level of welfare.
3.3.4 Summary and conclusion
In this section, we have examined the economic e¤ects of di¤erent at tax reform
scenarios for Germany in terms of equity and e¢ ciency. The analysis is based on
micro data provided by a behavioural microsimulation model for the German tax
and benet system. In general, the e¤ects of a at tax reform di¤er considerably
with changes in the marginal tax rate and the basic tax allowance. Table 3.3.627
compares both scenarios after labour supply reactions.
27Distributional e¤ects in per cent, changes in e¤ective marginal tax rates in percentage points,
labour supply e¤ects in fulltime equivalents and welfare e¤ects in million e.
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LL HH
Decile Distribution EMTR LS Welfare Distribution EMTR LS Welfare
1 54.68 0.01 -3,326 -28 56.08 0.00 2,625 25
2 5.45 2.57 -9,114 -78 6.03 -4.16 3,497 62
3 -0.02 2.73 -15,773 -92 1.57 0.84 10,522 43
4 -0.97 0.38 -22,999 -101 1.09 2.05 8,053 -64
5 -2.60 -0.49 -25,796 -62 -0.45 -1.59 -4,686 -145
6 -2.76 -0.32 -18,876 -40 -1.50 -2.74 -14,671 -137
7 -3.62 -0.71 -10,755 -26 -2.76 -0.17 -22,509 -130
8 -2.58 -1.81 10,547 92 -2.67 1.67 -22,841 -131
9 0.03 -3.83 41,622 646 -1.44 0.73 -18,435 -20
10 4.41 -9.68 143,713 3,292 0.61 -4.90 58,358 1,455
mean/ 5.20 -1.12 89,243 3,602 5.66 -0.83 -87 957
Table 3.3.6: Summary of results
Source: own calculations based on FiFoSiM
The LL scenario, which combines a low tax rate (27 per cent) with the basic
allowance existing under the status quo (7,664 Euros), leads to an increase in
employment of 0.3% and an aggregate welfare gain equal to 1.8% of overall income
tax revenue. This goes along with redistributional e¤ects. The households of
the highest income decile gain whereas all other deciles lose. The second highest
income decile maintains the level of disposable income but can only do so by
working more. The two lowest income deciles increase their average income but
also lose in terms of utility (see Table 3.3.5). Overall, the LL variant of the at tax
reform achieves rather small e¢ ciency gains which come at the price of a signicant
increase in inequality.
The redistributional e¤ects are mitigated if a higher tax rate is chosen, as in
the HH scenario, which combines a tax rate of 32 per cent with a basic allowance of
10,700 Euros. This reform is constructed such that, before labour supply adjust-
ments, the Gini coe¢ cient of income inequality is the same as in the status quo.
This reform also implies that the highest income decile benets, whereas the tax
burden on middle income households increases. But the strength of these e¤ects is
much smaller than in the LL scenario. The HH scenario implies that labour sup-
ply in the highest income decile and in the four lowest deciles increases, whereas
labour supply in the middle income range declines. The overall employment e¤ect
134 CHAPTER 3. SIMPLIFICATION AND FLAT TAX IN GERMANY
does not di¤er signicantly from zero, and the e¤ect on aggregate welfare is also
negligible. It thus turns out that the redistributive e¤ects emerging in the LL
scenario can be avoided, but only at the cost of sacricing the modest e¢ ciency
gains.
Note that we limit our analysis to revenue-neutral scenarios. If we allowed
for a loss of tax revenue (which could be nanced through cuts in government
spending), the e¢ ciency gains would be larger but inequality would increase as
well.28 Another objection to our analysis could be that we do not take into account
the e¤ects of the at rate tax on investment and capital accumulation. However,
Germany and many other countries address this issue by introducing variants of
dual income tax systems.29
These results suggest that at rate tax reforms are unlikely to bring about
e¢ ciency gains which are large enough to convince the electorate that an increase
in inequality implied by this type of tax reform is justied. Although we have
derived our results for the case of Germany, we do think that similar patterns
would be observed in other countries of Western Europe. Of course, this remains
to be shown.30 If this proves to be correct, it will be hard for at tax reforms to
invade the grown-up welfare states of Old Europe.
3.4 Cash ow at tax and general equilibrium
3.4.1 Introduction
The most popular at rate tax proposal is the Flat Tax of Hall and Rabushka
(1985) (HR), which combines a cash ow taxation on corporate incomes with the
same single marginal tax rate on labour income.31 This proposal, however, has
28For example, a further simulation of the non-revenue neutral combination of high allowance
with low marginal rate results in a loss of revenue of about 26.4 billion euros, an increase in
labour supply of about 400,000 fulltime equivalents, a welfare gain of about 8 billion and an
increase of the Gini coe¢ cient of about 3.5%.
29Flat rate taxes for all types of income do not seem necessary to improve investment incentives,
although rate di¤erentiation for di¤erent types of income clearly has its own problems.
30The e¤ects of similar at tax reforms in other Western European countries are analysed in
chapter 5.
31This section is based on Peichl (2008).
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not been implemented in its pure form in any country yet. Previous reforms
considered a at rate personal income tax as an indirect progressive tax schedule
with a basic tax allowance and a uniform marginal tax rate. Reform concepts
proposing a at rate tax generally combine the introduction of a new tax schedule
with a broadening and simplication of the tax base to make the tax system
more transparent (tax rate cut cum base broadening). These kinds of reforms
have been analysed in the two previous sections especially with respect to the
immediate short-term e¤ects. We concluded that at rate tax reforms cannot
avoid the fundamental equity e¢ ciency trade-o¤. However, a HR-type at tax
may lead to further e¢ ciency gains due to more investment and labour demand
as it is also likely to reduce tax distortions in the corporate sector. These e¤ects,
however, can only be analysed using CGE models.
The introduction of a HR-type at tax reform has been analysed before, espe-
cially for the U.S.. Browning and Browning (1985) estimate an increase in labour
supply by 5%. Stokey and Rebelo (1995) compare and summarise di¤erent studies
for the U.S. and conclude that a at tax reform would have little e¤ect on the
growth rate. Gale, Houser and Scholz (1996) analyse the e¤ects of introducing a
HR at tax in the U.S.. They conclude that high income households prot most
while households with low incomes su¤er from a at tax reform. Ho and Stiroh
(1998) and Dunbar and Pogue (1998) show that high income households gain
whereas especially middle income households are burdened by a at tax reform for
the U.S.. Ventura (1999) nds an increase in capital accumulation and a redistri-
bution in working hours and income in favour of the top of the distribution. Altig
et al. (2001) nd that output, labour supply and wages increase and that the lowest
income households lose through a at tax. Cassou and Lansing (2004) nd that
a at tax reduces growth in the short run if revenue-neutrality is maintained, but
increases capital accumulation and therefore growth in the long run. Díaz Giménez
and Pijoan-Mas (2006) analyse two di¤erent at tax proposals for the U.S. and
nd that the reform with the lower (higher) marginal rate increases (decreases)
output and inequality, but decreases (increases) aggregate welfare. However, in
both scenarios the poor obtain signicant welfare gains. Nielsen, Frederiksen and
Lassen (1999) nd signicant e¢ ciency gains but negative distributional e¤ects for
a at tax in Denmark. Heer and Trede (2003) nd an increase in employment by
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2% in Germany using a macro model.
In this section, we analyse a cash ow at tax reform of the German corporate
and personal income tax system according to the proposal by Mitschke (2004),
which is closely related to the Hall-Rabushka proposal.32 Our focus lies on the ef-
fects on tax revenue, income distribution, employment and economic growth. To be
able to simulate distributional and growth e¤ects within the same framework, we
use the linked MSM-CGE module of FiFoSiM.33 Microsimulation models (MSM)
as well as Computable General Equilibrium models (CGE) have been widely used
to ex ante analyse scal reforms. CGE models consider various interdependencies
and facilitate simulating behavioural responses and adjustments on several mar-
kets. In contrast, microsimulation models consider only the household side of the
economy, which allows for more heterogeneity and a much more detailed mapping
of the complex tax benet system. Combining these two model types enables the
utilisation of the complementary advantages.
Applying the linked model to a not revenue neutral at tax proposal shows that
taking the general equilibrium e¤ects into account indeed increases the expected
e¢ ciency gains in the long-run. The overall employment e¤ects are larger than the
labour supply reactions because of reduced costs of labour and capital resulting
in increasing labour and investment demand. Therefore, a personal at income
tax can indeed overcome the fundamental equity-e¢ ciency trade-o¤. However,
combining this at tax with a at cash ow tax on business income still increases
inequality due to the large gains at the top of the distribution.
The setup of this section is as follows. Section 3.4.2 briey describes the reform
proposal which is analysed in section 3.4.3 using the linked model. Section 3.4.4
concludes.
3.4.2 Cash ow at tax proposal
The proposal of Mitschke (2004) in its original version combines an almost at
rate tax (two brackets with di¤erent marginal rates) on earned income with a S-
base cash ow tax, i.e. income which is invested in rms is tax exempt.Therefore,
32See Fuest et al. (2005a), Bergs, Fuest, Heilmann, Peichl and Schaefer (2006) and Fuest, Peichl
and Schaefer (2007a) for a detailed analysis of the Mitschke proposal.
33FiFoSiM is described in chapter 2.5, the general idea of linking MSM and CGE models in 2.2.4.
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the neutrality of the savings and investment decision is achieved through this S-
base cash ow tax. In e¤ect, this reform proposal is a switch from an income
based tax system to consumption taxation (concept of deferred taxation).34 In
principle, this proposal is close to the Flat Tax idea of Hall and Rabushka
(1985) which combines a R-base cash ow taxation on corporate income with the
same single marginal tax rate on labour income.35 Essentially, the HR at tax is
a consumption-type, origin-based VAT with a tax credit for labour income.36
In contrast to Mitschke (2004), who chooses a progressive tax schedule with two
brackets, we model a single marginal tax rate of 25% for all types of income with
a basic allowance of 7,500 Euros. The marginal rate is computed from micro data
as an average tax rate of taxpayers under the Mitschke proposal. The Mitschke
proposal further distinguishes between an introductory phase (personal income tax
reform) and a nal phase (personal income tax and cash ow corporate tax). In
the rst phase, only the personal income tax system is changed to a system with
a single marginal rate on all sources of income (including capital and business
income). In the nal phase, this modied personal income tax is combined with
a cash ow corporate income tax with the same marginal rate.37 Furthermore,
an imputed rent on owner occupied housing is also part of the tax base in this
phase. For both phases the long-term revenue, employment and growth e¤ects are
simulated as well as the distributional e¤ects.
3.4.3 Analysis
In the rst step, the scal e¤ects are analysed in the tax benet module without
taking into account the behavioural reactions of the economic agents (rst round
e¤ects). In the second step, we allow for behavioural reactions by estimating
the labour supply responses (second round e¤ects). In the third step, the labour
demand and wage changes (third round e¤ects) are computed in the CGE module.
34See also Auerbach (2006).
35See King (1987) and OECD (2007) for an review of the di¤erent concepts of corporate cash
ow taxes.
36See ?. The tax base is sales minus purchases with capital goods being excluded (R-base).
Further on, this origin-based VAT is a tax on domestic production that taxes exports but not
imports (in contrast to the destination-based form of VAT).
37Note that in contrast to HR, the VAT is not changed in the Mitschke proposal.
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In the fourth step, the micro data information is used to calibrate the representative
household in the CGE module for the computation of the overall employment and
growth e¤ects (general equilibrium). As we use static MSM and CGE models, the
behavioural adjustments are computed in the long-run, whereas the rst round
e¤ects represent the immediate short-run e¤ects the day after the reform.
We estimate the labour supply e¤ects by comparing the estimated labour sup-
ply in the current system and in the reform alternatives using the discrete choice
labour supply module of FiFoSiM. We nd considerable di¤erences in the labour
supply reactions between couples and singles as well as between men and women.
While married men increase their labour supply the strongest, single women even
slightly decrease their labour supply. For the employment and growth e¤ects we
link the tax benet module to the CGE model with a minimum wage to calibrate
the current unemployment level (11.5%). We use the microsimulation results to
calibrate the representative household in terms of income, labour supply and tax
payments. The main results are summarised in table 3.4.1.
Model Round E¤ect PIT PIT + CIT
MSM 1 Tax revenue -2 billion e -13 billion e
2 Labour supply +103,000 +251,000
CGE 3 Labour demand +370,000 +540,000
Link 4 Tax revenue after adj. +3 billion e -6 billion e
4 Employment +337,000 +471,000
4  GDP +1.1% +1.7%
Table 3.4.1: Summary of results for the HR type at tax reform
The Mitschke proposal includes measures to broaden the tax base, therefore it
is not clear ex ante if the tax revenue will be higher or lower than in the status
quo.38 The shift from the current German tax regime to the Mitschke proposal
would result in revenue losses amounting to e 2 billion in the introductory phase
(i.e. at personal income tax, PIT) respectively e 13 billion in the nal phase (i.e.
38It would have been possible to construct the scenarios revenue neutral like in the previous
sections. However, the HR idea as well as the Mitschke proposal are not designed to be
revenue neutral. Furthermore, allowing for a rst round loss in revenue might trigger stronger
e¢ ciency e¤ects than a revenue neutral scenario. Therefore, the analysis in this section allows
for a loss (or increase) in tax revenue.
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at personal income tax and cash ow at corporate income tax, CIT) without
taking the behavioural responses into account (rst round e¤ects). These short-
run e¤ects indicate that the (not revenue neutral) at tax reform scenario reduces
the average tax burden on labour. As a consequence of this lower tax wedge,
the net wage is likely to increase and the gross wage is likely to decrease. These
e¤ects imply increasing labour supply as well as increasing labour demand due
to reduced user costs of labour. These e¤ects will be simulated in the next step.
As mentioned before, the behavioural responses are expectations for the long-run
(partial or general) equilibrium as both models are static, i.e. not taking the
transition path into account.
Labour supply would increase by 103,000 [251,000] fulltime equivalents. By
including those second round e¤ects, revenue increases and revenue losses are
lowered. So far, these results are only based on the MSM. This information is
now used to calibrate the representative household of the CGE model to derive
the third round e¤ects: Labour demand would increase by 370,000 [540,000] due
to reduced costs of capital and labour. Taking these e¤ects on wages and prices
into account allows us to resolve both models until they converge. This leads to
the following results: employment would grow by 337,000 full-time jobs, and GDP
would increase by 1.1% in the introductory phase. The overall employment e¤ects
are larger than the labour supply reactions because of reduced costs of labour and
capital resulting in increasing labour and investment demand.39 This result in-
dicates the importance of taking general equilibrium e¤ects into account. For the
nal phase, we calculate a total of 471,000 new full-time jobs and a 1.7% increase
in GDP. These results show that a cash ow at tax leads to further e¢ ciency
gains due to more investment and labour demand as a consequence of reduced tax
distortions in the corporate sector.
Can such a reform overcome the fundamental equity e¢ ciency trade-o¤? The
distributional e¤ects before any and after the complete (general equilibrium) ad-
justment process are presented in Table 3.4.2.
Without taking any behavioural responses or adjustments into account (rst
39These results are in line with results from Aaberge et al. (2007) for Norway. They also derive
for a at personal income tax scenario that the general equilibrium e¤ects are larger than the
pure labour supply reactions.
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Short-run Long-run
PIT PIT+CIT PIT PIT+CIT
1 0,67 0,86 77,93 78,18
2 0,00 -0,28 11,68 11,41
3 -0,29 -1,71 6,33 4,70
4 -0,66 -2,54 3,30 1,47
5 -1,27 -2,64 0,73 -0,54
6 -1,89 -2,53 -0,54 -1,00
7 -2,31 -1,75 -2,03 -1,09
8 -2,56 -0,31 -3,35 -0,68
9 -2,27 0,73 -3,24 0,95
10 2,11 5,92 1,69 6,47
Gini 1,16 4,48 -2,75 1,28
Table 3.4.2: Changes in household disposable income (in percent)
round e¤ects) inequality increases in both phases. The main reason is the relief for
the top of the distribution. The small gains at the lower end cannot compensate the
higher burden in the middle income range and therefore inequality increases. These
e¤ects change, however, after the economy has fully equilibrated. The introduction
of the personal income at tax reduces inequality because of the strong behavioural
responses at the bottom of the distribution. When combining the personal income
at tax with the corporate cash-ow tax, however, inequality still increases but
less than without behavioural adjustment. This is due to the fact that especially
the high income households have corporate or business income.
To sum up, taking the general equilibrium e¤ects into account has important
implications for the evaluation of a tax reform. The analysis shows that a personal
income at tax can indeed overcome the fundamental equity e¢ ciency trade-o¤ in
the long-run while simultaneously increasing the tax revenue. However, this result
does not hold for a cash ow at tax combining a personal income at tax with a
corporate cash ow at tax, even when allowing for an ex-post loss in revenue.
3.4.4 Summary and conclusion
Applying the linked model to a at tax proposal shows that the overall employment
e¤ects are larger than the labour supply reactions because of reduced costs of la-
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bour and capital resulting in increasing labour and investment demand. Therefore,
it is important to take these general equilibrium e¤ects into account. In doing so,
the analysis shows that a personal income at tax can overcome the fundamental
equity e¢ ciency trade-o¤, but only in the long-run. The adverse immediate distri-
butional e¤ects still dominate in the short-run. However, combining this at tax
with a cash ow at tax on business income still increases inequality due to the
large gains at the top of the distribution.
A linked MSM-CGE model provides a powerful tool for the ex-ante evaluation
of tax benet reform proposals and is the most appropriate method for a compre-
hensive analysis of the distributional, employment and growth e¤ects of (at) tax
reforms. When interpreting these results and especially the e¢ ciency e¤ects, it
has to be taken into account that we have limited our analysis to static models.
Therefore, the e¤ects from our analysis only account for the new long-run equilib-
rium neglecting the transition path.40 However, regarding the political feasibility
of a at tax reform, the short-term e¤ects documented in the previous sections are
most likely to be decisive.
In addition, the question arises whether the scope of increasing growth and em-
ployment through personal income tax reforms is su¢ ciently large. The user costs
of labour and capital, which play an important role in determining the demand for
labour and investment, are rather determined by social security contributions and
corporate taxes than by the personal income tax. Including the CIT in the ana-
lysis does indeed lead to larger e¢ ciency e¤ects, but at the expense of increasing
inequality. Therefore, the main problem of implementing a at tax would be to
convince a majority of the population that an immediate redistribution in favour
of the highest income deciles is acceptable to achieve (uncertain) future e¢ ciency
gains. Furthermore, it is uncertain whether a tax system that abolishes a large
number of exemptions and tax reliefs is politically sustainable. The temptation
for politicians to serve special interest groups with special deductions will not eas-
ily disappear. Moreover, from a political economy perspective, a broad tax base
allows the government to increase revenue with small increases in tax rates. There-
fore, narrow tax bases might protect the taxpayers from excess taxation by the
40Flat taxes are also supposed to have positive dynamic e¢ ciency and growth e¤ects (see e.g.
Stokey and Rebelo (1995) or Cassou and Lansing (2004)).
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3.5 Conclusion
The success of the at rate income tax in Eastern Europe suggests that this concept
could also be a model for countries of Western Europe. In this chapter, we have
conducted a simulation analysis of the economic e¤ects of three di¤erent at tax
reforms for Germany.
In a rst step, we analysed the e¤ects of simplifying the tax base through a
broadening of the tax base by comparing a at tax scenario with a progressive
adjustment of the rate schedule. Our analysis revealed that the e¤ects of revenue
neutral tax base simplication depend on the type of rate schedule adjustment.
On the one hand, the combination with a at rate tax increases both inequality
and e¢ ciency. On the other hand, the combination with a directly progressive rate
schedule reduces inequality and e¢ ciency. Therefore, we conclude that the e¤ects
of tax base simplication mainly depend on the type of tax schedule adjustment.
Hence, it seems advisable to separate tax base simplication objectives from rate
schedule issues.
In a second step, we analysed the e¤ects of two revenue neutral at tax scen-
arios with di¤erent marginal tax rates without changing the tax base, i.e. we
analysed the role of atness itself. Our analysis showed that a at rate tax with
a low tax rate and a low basic allowance increases labour supply, static welfare
and simultaneously inequality. Combining a higher tax rate with a higher basic
allowance avoids the increase in inequality but the positive e¢ ciency e¤ects vanish
as well. Therefore, the e¤ects do not only depend on the type of rate schedule
adjustment (progressive vs. at) but also on the design of the at tax schedule.
Hence, atness of the tax schedule itself does not always yield the same e¤ects,
they also depend on the respective parameter details.
The rst two steps conrm the existence of a trade-o¤ between equity and
e¢ ciency. Note that we have limited our analysis to revenue-neutral scenarios.
If we allowed for a loss of tax revenue (which could be nanced through cuts in
41Cf. Brennan and Buchanan (1980).
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government spending), the e¢ ciency gains would be larger but inequality would
increase as well.42 Therefore, in the third step, we analysed the introduction of
a comprehensive cash ow at tax in the tradition of Hall and Rabushka (1985).
Moreover, using the linked MSM-CGE module, we are able to account for the long-
run general equilibrium e¤ects. The analysis showed that the overall employment
e¤ects are larger than the labour supply reactions because of reduced costs of
labour and capital resulting in increasing labour and investment demand. When
taking the general equilibrium e¤ects into account, a not revenue neutral personal
income at tax can indeed overcome the fundamental equity e¢ ciency trade-o¤
in the long-run. However, in the short-run, inequality still increases. This is also
true for the combination of this at personal income tax with a at cash ow tax
on business income with the same marginal rate.
An aspect that is neglected in our analysis is the impact of tax reforms on
training and human capital accumulation. The results in Jacobs et al. (2007)
suggest that at tax reforms may increase investment in skill formation and thus
change the composition of the labour force in the long term. But the question
arises whether the income tax is the best instrument to achieve this. Furthermore,
our analysis abstracts from e¤ects of the at tax reform on compliance. Flat
rate tax systems are widely expected to improve taxpayer compliance. The 2001
tax reform in Russia is widely thought to be an example for this e¤ect. Indeed,
tax compliance and revenue apparently improved by about one third after the
2001 tax reform (Ivanova et al. (2005)). However, it is not clear whether this
can be attributed solely to the at tax or to improved law enforcement and tax
administration which was also part of the 2001 reform (see also Gaddy and Gale
(2005) and Gorodnichenko et al. (2007)). Moreover, the case of Russia di¤ers from
Germany insofar as the latter has a long tradition of income taxation in a market
economy and a well established tax administration to ensure tax compliance. In
addition, since we do not change social insurance contributions, the marginal tax
rate on labour still remains high. This suggests that positive e¤ects of a at
tax reform on compliance are probably less important in Germany than in the
transition countries of Eastern Europe.
To sum up, our analysis shows that the selection of the schedule and tax base
42Cf. Diamond (2005) or Gale and Orszag (2002).
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parameters are crucial for the e¤ects of at tax reforms in terms of equity and
e¢ ciency. We conclude that, due to their limited e¢ ciency e¤ects and their prob-
lematic immediate distributional impact, at tax reforms are unlikely to spill over
to the grown-up democracies of Western Europe. Since our analysis focuses on Ger-
many, the question arises whether the main ndings are likely to apply to other
countries as well. Existing studies for other countries, mostly Western European
countries and the US, partly use di¤erent approaches and methods. The nding
that at rate reforms with low tax rates and low tax credits or allowances yield
gains in work incentives, employment and output, but only at the cost of signicant
redistribution in favour of the highest incomes, is in line with simulation studies for
the Netherlands (Jacobs et al. (2007)), the United Kingdom (Adam and Browne
(2006)), Belgium (Decoster and Orsini (2007)), Finland (Kuismanen (2000))43 and
Spain (González-Torrabadella and Pijoan-Mas (2006))44. Overall, these results are
broadly in line with our ndings and therefore suggest that the case of Germany
is to some extent representative for other Western European countries.
Although more (and especially comparative) country studies are required to
complete the picture, the pattern that emerges suggests that the at tax concept
cannot overcome the familiar equity e¢ ciency trade-o¤, at least not in the short
or medium term. Another robust result seems to be that at tax reforms will
increase the tax burden of the middle class. This is important from a political
economy perspective. A strong and politically powerful middle class is a typical
characteristic of most Western European countries. This suggests that it will be
hard for at tax reforms to invade the grown-up democracies of Old Europe. The
following chapters further investigate these issues. Chapter 4 compares European
welfare states with a special focus on the relevance of the middle class and chapter
5 conducts a cross-country analysis of similar at tax reforms.
43This study considers a reduction of the marginal tax rates in the two highest brackets from 44%
and 37% to 35%, while the rest of the tax schedule remains unchanged. This reform increases
labour supply by 4.5% and raises the after tax incomes of the three highest income deciles.
Since the reform is not revenue neutral (income tax revenue declines by 13%), the results are
not directly comparable to those derived in studies of revenue neutral reforms.
44The ndings in González-Torrabadella and Pijoan-Mas (2006) di¤er from the other country
studies in the magnitude of the simulated e¢ ciency gains. While most studies nd rather small
gains, their model predicts an increase in output by more than 5%. They argue that this is
driven mostly by an increase in capital formation, not in employment.
Chapter 4
Are European welfare states at?
4.1 Introduction
The outcome of a (at) tax reform depends on its design and the country in which
the reform will be implemented. Countries worldwide di¤er with respect to various
dimensions including the design of the welfare state, i.e. the tax benet system.1
Reasons for the fact that one system does not t all countries include, among
others, the specic socio-economic structure and the preferences of the society.
There have been several previous studies analysing the impact of hypothetical
at income tax reforms especially on equity and e¢ ciency.2 However, a question
neglected in this literature is to what extent existing tax and transfer systems
e¤ectively di¤er from a at tax system. Or to put in other words: How at
is the world?. The aim of this chapter is to answer this question. We use the
deviation of existing tax benet systems from linearity as a summary measure
that allows to compare the design of the welfare state across countries. In the rst
step of our analysis, we compare European countries regarding their institutional
background and the underlying pre-tax income distribution to be able to explain
why at tax reform results do, or do not, di¤er across countries. Following the
seminal contribution of Esping-Andersen (1990), several types of welfare states
have been classied in the political sciences literature with respect to its design:
1According to Samuelson and Nordhaus (2005), a welfare state is a system that protects indi-
viduals against possible contingencies and guarantees a minimum standard of living.
2See section 1.2.4.
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Anglo-Saxon, Continental, Nordic and Mediterranean countries. We analyse if
this typology can also be applied when analysing the outcome of the distribution
and redistribution of income through the tax benet system. For this analysis we
rely on several distributional measures described in chapter 2. In a second step,
to compare the tax benet systems using a single measure, we estimate a linear
tax benet schedule and analyse the deviation of the existing tax benet systems
from linearity. Our analysis integrates the income tax with other (direct) taxes,
social insurance contributions and benets. An example of this is a at tax with a
refundable tax credit. We use EUROMOD, a tax-benet microsimulation model
based on real micro data for the EU-15, to compare the results across countries in
a common framework.
Our analysis yields the following results. Although European countries di¤er
considerably in their design of tax benet systems, four rather homogeneous groups
of welfare states can be classied with respect to economic indicators resembling
the political sciences typology of Esping-Andersen (1990). Therefore, the expec-
ted outcome of a at tax reform should di¤er across heterogeneous countries but
be similar within homogeneous types of countries. Further on, a linear negative
income tax system is a good approximation of the existing tax benet systems in
many European countries. However, the goodness-of-t of the estimated at taxes
varies across the countries, implying that some countries have highly non-linear tax
benet systems. These results crucially depend on the country under observation.
The setup of the chapter is organised as follows: Section 4.2 introduces the ty-
pology of welfare states used for the analysis. In section 4.3, the di¤erent designs
of tax benet systems in the EU-15 countries are described. Section 4.4 analyses
the income distribution in these countries with respect to inequality, polarisation,
poverty and richness. In section 4.5, the redistribution of income, i.e. the pro-
gressivity of the tax benet system, is analysed. Section 4.6 answers the question
of how far existing tax benet systems deviate from linearity. Section 4.7 concludes
the analysis.
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4.2 Characteristics of European welfare states
Although all European countries have an individual design for their tax benet
system, it is possible to classify the EU-153 countries into di¤erent welfare state
regimes with similar institutional structures. The classical typology of welfare
states goes back to Esping-Andersen (1990) who di¤erentiates between three types
of welfare states: conservative (Continental Europe), social-democratic (Nordic
Europe) and liberal (Anglo-Saxon). Ferrera (1996) further adds a fourth category
(Southern or Mediterranean) to this typology.4 The main conceptional features of
these welfare state types are summarised in Table 4.2.1.
Liberal Conservative Social-Democratic Southern
Region Anglo-Saxon Continental Nordic Mediterranean
Countries IR, UK AT, BE, FR, GE, LU, NL DK, FI, SW GR, IT, PT, SP
Social security means-tested contribution based universal, equal benets contribution based
Social ex-
penditure
low high high low
Tax rates low high high low
Tax revenue middle high high low
SIC low (Beveridge) high (Bismarck) middle (Beveridge) middle (Bismarck)
Redistribution middle high high low
Participation
women
high low high low
Table 4.2.1: Typology of welfare states
Anglo-Saxon countries (liberal welfare states) provide a minimum level of
social protection (minimal subsistence level) based on universal, mean-tested be-
nets. People are encouraged to work (e.g. through the working families tax
credit) and labour force participation is high. Tax rates and social insurance con-
tributions are rather low. The state encourages private insurance systems through
tax exemptions. In this regime, market institutions are preferred to state inter-
3Austria (AT), Belgium (BE), Denmark (DK), Finland (FI), France (FR), Germany (GE), Greece
(GR), Ireland (IR), Italy (IT), Luxembourg (LU), the Netherlands (NL), Portugal (PT), Spain
(SP), Sweden (SW) and the United Kingdom (UK).
4See Arts and Gelissen (2002). In Esping-Andersen (1990), these countries are treated as imma-
ture conservative welfare states. Due to the EU enlargement, one could also add a fth category
of Eastern European states. They are, however, not part of the analysis in this book.
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ventions. Continental countries (conservativeor corporatistwelfare states)5
use benets that depend on the history of paid contributions (rather than on the
actual need for the benet) and aim at replicating the former income of employ-
ees (Bismarckian system). These generous schemes are nanced through rather
high compulsory contributions. Further on, high taxes ensure a rather high level of
redistribution through various other public instruments. Nordic countries (social-
democraticwelfare states) apply even higher taxes but lower contributions for a
similarly high level of redistribution. However, they use universal benets with
equal amounts for every citizen, i.e. not depending on the contribution history
(Beveridgean system). These systems aim at providing a high level of social pro-
tection while simultaneously encouraging a high labour force participation through
various instruments of active labour market policies and the provision of extensive
child care. Mediterranean countries (Southernwelfare states) provide a rather
low level of social security (comparable to the Anglo-Saxon countries) based on
low levels of taxes and redistribution. However, they also use contribution-based
Bismarckian social insurance systems providing benets depending on the level of
previously earned income (like the Continental countries).
This typology stems from the political and social sciences literature and is based
on the conceptional design of the welfare state. Furthermore, it is possible to apply
this typology to economics, as well. In the following sections, the outcome of the
welfare state in the EU-15 countries is analysed with respect to several economic
indicators.
4.3 Tax benet systems
European countries di¤er in the design of their system of social protection and
redistribution. In each country, direct and indirect taxes as well as social insur-
ance contributions are used to nance the welfare state (see Table 4.3.1 for an
overview). The weight in the tax mix of these components depends on the struc-
tural design of the tax benet system in each country. Denmark, for example,
relies almost exclusively on taxes for the nancing of the welfare state, whereas
5The conservativemodel origins from the inuence of the Catholic Church and is further on
characterised by the fostering of traditional family structures.
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in most Continental countries social insurance contributions are much higher than
income taxes. In Mediterranean countries, indirect taxes play the most important
role. The level of social protection (in terms of expenditures as % of GDP) is high
in Nordic and Continental countries and low in Anglo-Saxon and Mediterranean
countries.
Ind irect Taxes D irect Taxes So cia l Contributions So cia l exp enditures
1998 2001 2003 1998 2001 2003 1998 2001 2003 1998 2001 2003
AT 15.49 15.00 14.98 13.62 15.06 13.63 14.92 14.61 14.53 28.90 28.6 29.5
BE 13.55 13.29 13.38 17.73 17.75 17.19 14.22 14.16 14.30 28.70 27.3 29.1
DK 18.35 17.39 17.40 30.10 29.48 29.55 1.02 1.72 1.20 32.50 29.2 30.7
FI 14.49 13.39 14.21 19.02 19.18 18.02 12.56 12.00 11.75 33.80 24.9 26.5
FR 16.42 15.39 15.28 11.79 12.64 11.38 16.06 16.11 16.30 30.20 29.6 30.9
GE 12.04 12.23 12.20 11.43 11.03 10.61 17.42 16.73 16.88 27.70 29.3 30.2
GR 15.06 15.19 13.72 9.80 9.72 8.85 11.49 11.65 12.98 22.10 26.7 26.0
IR 13.77 12.49 12.68 13.81 12.79 11.99 4.13 4.53 4.47 19.70 15.0 16.5
IT 15.62 14.69 14.29 14.65 14.82 14.73 12.19 11.95 12.31 26.00 24.9 25.8
LU 13.11 13.56 12.70 16.12 15.27 14.91 10.16 10.93 10.87 22.90 20.8 22.2
NL 12.27 12.93 12.68 12.20 11.73 10.96 14.97 13.68 13.80 31.70 26.5 28.3
PT 14.26 13.99 15.20 8.94 9.45 8.77 9.95 10.49 11.13 21.30 22.7 24.2
SP 11.52 11.51 11.86 10.33 10.38 10.47 11.88 12.17 12.20 22.80 19.5 19.9
SW 17.59 16.83 17.36 21.35 19.90 18.69 13.79 14.63 14.11 36.80 31.3 33.3
UK 13.87 13.79 13.57 16.68 17.22 15.55 6.16 6.33 6.44 28.60 27.5 26.4
Table 4.3.1: Tax benet mix (as % of GDP)
Sources: European Commission (2007a), Eurostat (2006)
A perhaps trivial but still interesting observation from Table 4.3.1 is that the
level of social expenditures is correlated with the level of taxes and contributions.
Figure 4.3.1 plots these expenditures against the sum of all taxes and contributions
and reveals an increasing trend (i.e. a positive correlation), as expected.
The existing income tax systems in the 15 countries under consideration o¤er
considerable variety. As of 2003, all have graduated rate schedules with a number
of brackets ranging from 2 (Ireland) to 16 (Luxembourg) and the highest marginal
tax rate from 38% (Luxembourg) to about 60% (Denmark). All schedules are
piecewise linear except that of Germany which has a unique continuous function for
tax rates at some income levels. Most countries have a general personal allowance,
often integrated into the tax schedule. Italy, the Netherlands and Portugal apply
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Figure 4.3.1: Correlation between social expenditures and government revenue
general (wastable, i.e. non-refundable) tax credits and Austria uses both elements.
About half of the countries tax capital (and property) income together with other
income sources, whereas the second half applies a at rate on capital income (dual
income taxation), in Belgium this is optional.
The countries also di¤er in the unit of assessment. Again, half of them allow
only individual taxation, ve countries apply either optional or compulsory joint
taxation, France has a family splitting system, whereas Belgium and Denmark
provide limited income sharing for married couples. Nevertheless, even systems
based on individual taxation often have elements assessed at family level (e.g.
family or child allowances) or allow the sharing of non-labour income or household
expenditures (e.g. property income, mortgage payments). See Table 4.3.2 for a
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No of
brackets
Lowest (pos)
rate
Highest rate Form of the main tax
relief
Capital taxation Tax unit
AT 4 21% 50% 0% bracket, credit at tax (25%) individual
BE 5 25% 50% tax allowance optional at tax (15%) some sharing
DK 3 32.6% 59.8 tax allowance dual progr. schedule some sharing
FI 5 state 12%,
local 15%
state 35%,
local 19.75%
0% tax bracket (state),
tax allowance (local)
at tax (29%) individual
FR 4 5.5% 40% 0% tax bracket integrated family splitting
GE Formula 19.9% 48.5% 0% tax bracket integrated optional joint
GR 3 15% 40% 0% tax bracket integrated individual
IR 2 20% 41% tax allowance at tax (20%) individual
IT 5 23% 43% tax credit at tax (12.5%) optional joint
LU 16 8% 38% 0% tax bracket integrated joint
NL 4 1.7% 52% tax credit at tax (30%) individual
PT 6 12% 40% tax credit at tax (20%) joint
SP 5 15% 45% tax allowance integrated optional joint
SW 2 state 20%,
local 31.6%
state 25%,
local 31.6%
tax allowance at tax (30%) individual
UK 3 10% 40% tax allowance one bracket reduced individual
Table 4.3.2: Income tax systems, 2003
Sources: European Commission (2007a), European Commission (2007b)
summary of these characteristics.
Overall, although there are few countries with relatively simple income tax
systems (e.g. UK), most of them can be characterised as rather complex systems
combining many di¤erent components and varying tax units. Specic elements can
have xed amounts or either be decreasing or increasing with the level of taxable
income. Additional examples of complexities include progression adjustments in
Austria and Germany, income taxation both at the state and the local level in
Finland and Sweden, and an integrated schedule of social insurance contributions
and income tax in the Netherlands.
The e¤ective marginal tax rate (EMTR) shows at which rate an additional
unit of income is taxed. We compute EMTRs using the appropriate modules
provided by EUROMOD. We calculate this for the working age population (those
aged 18-64) with positive employment or self-employment income, by increasing
earnings of each individual in the household in turn by 3% while the change in
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all taxes and benets (including social insurance contributions) is observed at the
household level. We use the following formula: EMTRi = 1  Yjdi , where di is the
income increment for individual i and Yj disposable income of household j where
this individual belongs to.
1998 2001 2003
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
AT 0.426 0.417 0.425 0.416 0.428 0.414
BE 0.508 0.510 0.528 0.510 0.543 0.524
DK 0.553 0.516 0.548 0.516
FI 0.436 0.471 0.422 0.456 0.404 0.440
FR 0.310 0.336 0.399 0.337
GE 0.504 0.507 0.467 0.489 0.475 0.496
GR 0.251 0.270 0.261 0.278 0.239 0.237
IR 0.387 0.362 0.348 0.358
IT 0.385 0.390 0.381 0.390
LU 0.355 0.368 0.374 0.395 0.354 0.371
NL 0.437 0.426 0.409 0.444 0.406 0.449
PT 0.304 0.260 0.257 0.235 0.269 0.241
SP 0.257 0.276 0.257 0.280 0.262 0.281
SW 0.453 0.415 0.410 0.399
UK 0.341 0.314 0.344 0.304 0.365 0.320
Table 4.3.3: EMTRs (in per cent) EU-15
Sources: own calculation using EUROMOD version D1.
Note: EMTR dened as [1 (change in hh disposable income) / (increase in individual
earnings)] and includes individuals aged 18-64 with positive earnings.
Table 4.3.3 presents the results. Again, there are distinct di¤erences between
the countries. EMTRs are rather high in Nordic and Continental countries but
low in Anglo-Saxon and Mediterranean countries.
4.4 Income Distribution
We compute a number of distributional measures to cover several aspects of distri-
bution: inequality, polarisation, poverty and richness. They are based on equival-
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ised household market income or equivalised household disposable income (DPI).6
4.4.1 Inequality
Table 4.4.1 presents the Gini coe¢ cients for market and disposable incomes. In
1998, inequality based on market income (i.e. pre-government income) has been
rather high in the Anglo-Saxon and Southern European countries (except Greece)
and Sweden, rather low in Austria, Belgium, Denmark and the Netherlands, and
medium in Finland, France, Germany, Greece and Luxembourg. Market income
inequality has been reduced in most countries in the following years. In 2001 and
2003 only Portugal has a Gini coe¢ cient of greater than 0.5. The reduction was
largest in Sweden, Ireland and Spain.
1998 2001 2003  1998 - 2001  2001 - 2003
Market DPI Market DPI Market DPI Market DPI Market DPI
AT 0.441 0.235 0.441 0.230 0.451 0.239 0.00 -2.13 2.27 3.91
BE 0.462 0.250 0.492 0.247 0.491 0.247 6.49 -1.20 -0.20 0.00
DK 0.457 0.235 0.457 0.232 0.00 -1.28
FI 0.482 0.246 0.485 0.265 0.484 0.269 0.62 7.72 -0.21 1.51
FR 0.486 0.289 0.487 0.260 0.21 -10.03
GE 0.470 0.251 0.469 0.253 0.494 0.268 -0.21 0.80 5.33 5.93
GR 0.484 0.336 0.487 0.329 0.502 0.322 0.62 -2.08 3.08 -2.13
IR 0.516 0.324 0.459 0.309 -11.05 -4.63
IT 0.497 0.352 0.498 0.348 0.20 -1.14
LU 0.481 0.256 0.472 0.240 0.472 0.243 -1.87 -6.25 0.00 1.25
NL 0.412 0.250 0.386 0.247 0.386 0.247 -6.31 -1.20 0.00 0.00
PT 0.514 0.358 0.507 0.362 0.507 0.361 -1.36 1.12 0.00 -0.28
SP 0.520 0.327 0.469 0.310 0.469 0.311 -9.81 -5.20 0.00 0.32
SW 0.498 0.295 0.437 0.243 -12.25 -17.63
UK 0.502 0.313 0.496 0.311 0.496 0.307 -1.20 -0.64 0.00 -1.29
Table 4.4.1: Gini coe¢ cients and changes (in per cent) EU-15
Sources: own calculation using EUROMOD version D1.
In terms of disposable income, similar groups become visible. First of all, it
6We use the modied OECD equivalence scale which weights the household head with a factor of
1, household members aged 14 and older with 0.5, and under 14 with 0.3. The households net
income is divided by the sum of the individual weights of each member (=equivalence factor)
to compute the equivalence weighted household income.
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should be noted that post-government inequality is signicantly lower than pre-
government inequality indicating some substantial degree of redistribution in every
country. In all three years, post-government inequality is rather high in the Anglo-
Saxon and Southern European countries, whereas it is rather low in Continental
and Nordic Europe.
When looking at the development of inequality at the three observed points in
time, it turns out that changes in market income inequality do not (exclusively)
determine changes in post-government inequality. Therefore, changes in the redis-
tribution schemes are the most likely causes for di¤ering developments. In France,
for example, market income inequality remained constant between 1998 and 2001
but disposable income inequality was reduced by about 10%.
To further decompose the inequality with respect to countries and welfare state
groups, we use the Theil index which is additively decomposable as all measures of
the generalized entropy family.7 Consider a population of persons (or households),
i = 1; :::; n; with income xi, and weight wi. The arithmetic mean income is x.
Suppose there is an exhaustive partition of the population into mutually-exclusive
subgroups k = 1; :::; K. The Generalized Entropy class of inequality indices IcGE(F )
is given by
IcGE =
1
c(c  1)
nX
i=1
[
wiP
iwi
(
xi
x
)c   1];  1 < c < +1; c 6= 0; 1:
I0GE = I
1
Theil =
nX
i=1
wiP
iwi
log(
x
xi
); c = 0
I1GE = I
0
Theil =
nX
i=1
wiP
iwi
xi
x
log
xi
x
; c = 1
The constant c is a sensitivity parameter, which may be interpreted as a parameter
of inequality aversion. Each IcGE index can be additively decomposed as
IcGE = I
c
GE_W + I
c
GE_B
where IcGE_W is within-group inequality and I
c
GE_B is between-group inequal-
7Cf. Shorrocks (1980) and Shorrocks (1984). See also section 2.3.
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ity and IcGE_W =
P
i
 
Nk
N
1 c
skI
c
GE (k) ; where
 
Nk
N

is the number of persons (i.e.
the sum of the weights) in subgroup k divided by the total number of persons (i.e.
the total sum of weights), i.e.
 
Nk
N

is the subgroup population share and sk is
the share of total income held by ks members (subgroup income share). IcGE (k)
denotes the inequality for subgroup k and is calculated as if the subgroup was
a separate population. IcGE_B is derived assuming every person within a given
subgroup k received ks mean income, xk.
1998 2001 2003
EU-15 0.199 0.194 0.190
within countries 0.167 0.162 0.162
between countries 0.032 0.031 0.027
within welfare states 0.175 0.168 0.165
between welfare states 0.023 0.025 0.025
Table 4.4.2: I1Theil index decomposed into within and between inequality
Sources: own calculation using EUROMOD version D1.
The results of the decomposition using the I0GE = I
1
Theil index based on equi-
valised disposable income are presented in Table 4.4.2.8 The overall inequality in
the EU-15 is reduced between 1998 and 2003 by about 4.5%. About 85% of overall
inequality can be attributed to within country inequality. The reduction between
1998 and 2001 can be mainly attributed to within country inequality, whereas from
2001 to 2003 the between countries component declined. To further decompose the
results, the Theil indices for each country along with the population share
 
Nk
N

,
the income share sk (i.e. the economic weight) and the inequality share (i.e. the
contribution to within country inequality dened as qk =
skI
c
GE(k)
IcGE_W
) of each country
are presented in Table 4.4.3.
The results in terms of inequality across countries for the top sensitive Theil
index are in line with the results for the middle sensitive Gini index. Inequal-
ity is high in Anglo-Saxon and Mediterranean countries, and low in Nordic and
Continental welfare states. The di¤erent countries contribute in di¤erent ways
to the within country inequality. When comparing the inequality share with the
income share (inequality weight vs. economic weight) and the population share,
8Using the I1GE = I
0
Theil or the I
2
GE index yields the same results in qualitative terms.
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1998 2001 2003
I0GE
Nk
N
sk qk I
0
GE
Nk
N
sk qk I
0
GE
Nk
N
sk qk
AT 0.093 0.022 0.025 0.014 0.091 0.021 0.022 0.013 0.102 0.035 0.038 0.024
BE 0.118 0.028 0.033 0.023 0.114 0.026 0.028 0.020 0.123 0.040 0.043 0.033
DK 0.114 0.016 0.022 0.015 0.114 0.016 0.020 0.014 . . . .
F I 0 .119 0.014 0.015 0.011 0.139 0.014 0.015 0.013 0.140 0.022 0.025 0.021
FR 0.153 0.151 0.179 0.164 0.128 0.155 0.151 0.119 . . . .
GE 0.115 0.221 0.247 0.170 0.117 0.218 0.236 0.170 0.131 0.335 0.356 0.287
GR 0.233 0.028 0.015 0.020 0.230 0.028 0.014 0.020 0.208 0.044 0.026 0.033
IR 0.179 0.009 0.009 0.010 0.163 0.010 0.013 0.013 . . . .
IT 0.228 0.158 0.135 0.185 0.226 0.156 0.129 0.180 . . . .
LU 0.119 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.107 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.110 0.002 0.003 0.002
NL 0.118 0.041 0.045 0.032 0.128 0.041 0.046 0.036 0.127 0.064 0.073 0.057
PT 0.212 0.027 0.013 0.016 0.216 0.028 0.014 0.018 0.214 0.043 0.023 0.030
SP 0.241 0.107 0.064 0.092 0.231 0.107 0.071 0.101 0.231 0.169 0.120 0.170
SW 0.155 0.023 0.025 0.024 0.108 0.023 0.024 0.016 . . . .
UK 0.165 0.154 0.172 0.170 0.171 0.157 0.214 0.225 0.167 0.246 0.294 0.304
EU-15 0.199 1.000 1.000 0.840 0.194 1.000 1.000 0.839 0.190 1.000 1.000 0.857
Anglo-Saxon 0.167 0.163 0.181 0.180 0.171 0.167 0.227 0.238 0.167 0.246 0.294 0.304
Continental 0 .127 0.463 0.531 0.405 0.122 0.462 0.485 0.364 0.128 0.476 0.513 0.405
Nord ic 0 .139 0.053 0.062 0.052 0.122 0.052 0.060 0.045 0.140 0.022 0.025 0.021
M editerranean 0.255 0.321 0.226 0.346 0.242 0.318 0.228 0.341 0.231 0.255 0.168 0.239
Table 4.4.3: Theil inequality decomposition
Sources: own calculation using EUROMOD version D1.
Note: I0GE : I
1
Theil index of inequality,
Nk
N
population share, sk income share, qk
inequality share.
it reveals that for (most) Nordic and Continental countries their contribution to
within country inequality is smaller than their population weight which again is
smaller than their economic weight. In the Anglo-Saxon countries, the economic
weight equals approximately the inequality share which is larger than the popula-
tion share, whereas for the Southern countries the population share is largest and
the contribution to inequality is larger than their economic weight. These relations
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can be summarised as follows:
qk <
Nk
N
< sk; if k 2 fContinental, Nordicg
Nk
N
< qk = sk; if k 2 fAnglo-Saxong
sk < qk <
Nk
N
; if k 2 fMediterraneang
When comparing the values of within and between inequalities for the clustering
according to countries and that according to the welfare state typology, a result
which is surprising at rst glance can be observed: Between country inequality is
larger than between welfare state type inequality implying that inequality is smaller
within countries than within welfare state types. Therefore, the clustering of
countries to welfare states does not lead to four groups that are more homogeneous
than the countries themselves. This, however, is not surprising at all, taking
into account that clustering into more groups always yields clusters that are less
heterogeneous than before.
4.4.2 Polarisation
Generally speaking, polarisation is the occurrence of two antipodes. A rising in-
come polarisation describes the phenomenon of a declining middle class resulting
in an increasing gap between rich and poor. The proportion of middle income
households is declining while the shares of the poor and the rich are both rising.
To compare the countries with respect to polarisation, we calculate the polarisation
index by Schmidt (2004). The results are presented in Table 4.4.4.
When analysing polarisation, the same two groups as for inequality become vis-
ible: Anglo-Saxon and Southern countries have a high polarisation of disposable
income distribution, whereas Nordic and Continental countries have lower polar-
isation and stronger middle classes. The development of polarisation over time,
however, di¤ers within and between the types of welfare states. For Germany (and
Finland), for example, polarisation increased from 1998 to 2001 and again to 2003,
whereas for Greece it decreased.
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1998 2001 2003
AT 0.215 0.213 0.224
BE 0.235 0.242 0.241
DK 0.220 0.221 .
FI 0.232 0.240 0.242
FR 0.288 0.259 .
GE 0.241 0.247 0.269
GR 0.337 0.335 0.323
IR 0.313 0.275 .
IT 0.338 0.336 .
LU 0.260 0.253 0.256
NL 0.248 0.245 0.247
PT 0.307 0.310 0.309
SP 0.338 0.306 0.306
SW 0.248 0.222 .
UK 0.296 0.300 0.296
Table 4.4.4: Polarisation EU-15
Sources: own calculation using EUROMOD version D1.
4.4.3 Poverty and richness
To analyse poverty, we compute the measures of Foster et al. (1984) with poverty
aversion parameters  = 0 (headcount index),  = 1 and  = 2 based on the
poverty line taken from the baseline scenario. We compute the poverty lines as
60% of median equivalent income for each country. Measuring richness is a much
less considered eld in the literature than poverty. We compute the headcount
index and the measures of Peichl et al. (2006) which are analogously dened to
the FGT indices of poverty. The richness line is computed as 200% of median
equivalent income. The results are presented in Tables 4.4.5 (poverty) and 4.4.6
(richness).
Again, there are already distinct di¤erences between the analysed countries in
the baseline. The same two groups of countries can be distinguished when looking
at the headcount ratios (FGT0, HCR): poverty and richness (like inequality and
polarisation) is rather high in Anglo-Saxon and Southern European countries, and
it is rather low in Continental and Nordic Europe.
However, when using more sophisticated measures of poverty and richness,
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1998 2001 2003
FGT0 FGT1 FGT2 FGT0 FGT1 FGT2 FGT0 FGT1 FGT2
AT 11.498 3.351 1.740 11.810 3.330 1.727 12.149 3.203 1.468
BE 11.109 3.477 1.947 14.547 4.275 2.080 13.642 5.293 3.714
DK 13.270 3.774 1.806 13.074 3.809 1.933 . . .
FI 14.678 3.267 1.142 14.597 3.538 1.329 15.410 3.850 1.470
FR 16.237 4.562 2.213 14.068 3.867 1.966 . . .
GE 13.244 3.747 1.803 14.073 3.931 1.871 16.244 4.529 2.164
GR 21.980 9.579 6.301 21.555 9.308 6.079 21.300 8.698 5.704
IR 22.026 5.343 2.043 20.729 6.250 2.760 . . .
IT 22.838 8.909 5.737 22.452 8.928 5.814 . . .
LU 13.593 3.699 2.048 12.246 3.563 2.007 12.370 3.407 1.935
NL 15.968 4.921 3.338 15.686 4.712 2.642 15.784 4.719 2.661
PT 20.001 6.566 3.281 19.842 6.137 3.121 19.734 6.146 3.109
SP 21.671 9.203 5.889 19.759 7.916 4.946 19.643 7.916 4.947
SW 9.392 3.941 3.591 13.200 3.680 2.961 . . .
UK 19.533 5.330 2.300 20.577 5.921 2.748 20.207 5.766 2.660
Table 4.4.5: Poverty EU-15
Sources: own calculation using EUROMOD version D1.
Note: FGT: Foster et al. (1984) poverty measure.
that take both the dimension of changes and the number of people beyond a
given poverty/richness line into account, this picture changes slightly, at least for
the Anglo-Saxon countries. However, poverty and richness are still the highest
in the Mediterranean countries. These results indicate that in those countries
many people have incomes way below (above) the poverty (richness) line. This is
conrmed by the measure of polarisation as Southern countries are those with the
highest polarisation of the income distribution. In contrast, in the Anglo-Saxon
countries, many people are just below (above) the poverty (richness) line but not
as far away as in the Southern countries.
For the development of poverty and richness no clear pattern across countries
can be observed. Poverty is increasing with respect to all measures in Germany
only. It is decreasing in Greece for 2001 and 2003. Between 1998 and 2001, poverty
is uniformly decreasing in France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal and
Spain, between 2001 and 2003 in the UK. However, it is increasing in the UK
between 1998 and 2001 such that poverty in 2003 is still higher than in 2001.
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1998 2001 2003
HCR R1 R2 HCR R1 R2 HCR R1 R2
AT 3.850 0.662 0.196 3.579 0.625 0.184 4.211 0.879 0.307
BE 5.144 1.190 0.474 3.464 0.755 0.286 3.551 0.789 0.306
DK 2.812 0.746 0.328 2.759 0.711 0.306 . . .
FI 4.351 0.963 0.396 4.821 1.169 0.512 4.860 1.153 0.499
FR 8.693 2.093 0.786 6.865 1.549 0.542 . . .
GE 5.905 0.967 0.288 6.102 1.035 0.293 6.995 1.220 0.361
GR 13.160 2.978 1.028 13.130 2.999 1.043 10.482 2.495 0.948
IR 8.487 2.079 0.849 5.872 1.341 0.539 . . .
IT 11.186 2.921 1.219 11.031 2.826 1.167 . . .
LU 6.590 1.299 0.443 6.403 1.078 0.343 7.127 1.192 0.382
NL 4.316 0.776 0.253 3.986 0.736 0.233 4.198 0.759 0.239
PT 13.400 3.744 1.503 12.650 3.743 1.656 12.496 3.673 1.622
SP 13.271 3.242 1.191 9.783 2.104 0.757 9.745 2.063 0.751
SW 4.423 1.124 0.514 3.649 0.746 0.278 . . .
UK 8.763 1.820 0.624 8.623 1.860 0.652 8.452 1.811 0.637
Table 4.4.6: Richness EU-15
Sources: own calculation using EUROMOD version D1.
Note: R: Peichl et al. (2006) richness measure.
Richness is also only increasing according to all measures in Germany in both
periods. It is also increasing in Belgium and the UK (1998-2001), as well as in
Finland (2001-2003). On the other hand, richness is decreasing in more countries
than poverty does: from 1998-2001 in Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, Italy,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Spain and Sweden and between 2001 and 2003 in
Greece, Portugal and Spain. For the other country-year combinations the di¤erent
measures do not indicate the same tendency implying a change in the structure of
the top (bottom) of the income distribution, i.e. a change in the composition of
the rich (poor) subpopulation.
4.5 Redistribution of income
To analyse the redistributive e¤ects of the tax benet system we compute several
measures of tax progression. We compute the measure of e¤ective progression by
Musgrave and Thin (1948) (PMT ), the index of disproportionality by Suits (1977)
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(PS) and the index of redistribution by Reynolds and Smolensky (1977) (PRS).
Table 4.5.1 presents the values for the various indices.
1998 2001 2003
PMT PRS PS PMT PRS PS PMT PRS PS
AT 1.098 0.058 0.215 1.098 0.058 0.231 1.111 0.067 0.251
BE 1.087 0.052 0.168 1.088 0.055 0.192 1.089 0.055 0.182
DK 1.173 0.100 0.208 1.182 0.105 0.225 . . .
F I 1 .105 0.062 0.204 1.102 0.059 0.199 1.101 0.059 0.206
FR 1.064 0.036 0.221 1.091 0.053 0.340 . . .
GE 1.103 0.060 0.183 1.098 0.057 0.190 1.113 0.063 0.197
GR 1.062 0.034 0.187 1.073 0.039 0.219 1.077 0.044 0.214
IR 1.134 0.071 0.372 1.127 0.072 0.422 . . .
IT 1.085 0.048 0.179 1.087 0.050 0.186 . . .
LU 1.103 0.060 0.302 1.100 0.061 0.278 1.095 0.057 0.296
NL 1.101 0.058 0.177 1.088 0.052 0.169 1.082 0.049 0.155
PT 1.093 0.048 0.264 1.094 0.050 0.296 1.096 0.051 0.299
SP 1.087 0.044 0.252 1.084 0.041 0.250 1.086 0.043 0.252
SW 1.109 0.066 0.200 1.083 0.052 0.156 . . .
UK 1.152 0.078 0.387 1.138 0.075 0.355 1.143 0.077 0.345
Table 4.5.1: Progressivity of the income tax system (including SIC)
Sources: own calculation using EUROMOD version D1.
In terms of progression and the di¤erent concepts of measurement the cluster-
ing into the welfare state typology is not working as perfectly as for inequality,
polarisation, poverty and richness. The Anglo-Saxon and Nordic countries have
the highest progressivity of the tax benet system as a whole. Redistribution is
medium to high in most continental countries (except France), whereas it is rather
low in Southern European countries. The results for the Anglo-Saxon countries
contradict the implication of the (political sciences) welfare state typology which
predicted a low to medium level of redistribution for these countries.
The development over time is, again, not uniform across countries. Austria
and Portugal are the only two countries where the progressivity increases in both
periods for all measures, the Netherlands is the only one where they decrease.
Figure 4.5.1 plots the Suits index of progression against the level of direct
taxes plus social insurance contributions. It shows that the level of redistribution
is negatively correlated with the level of taxes, i.e. the higher the progressivity
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Figure 4.5.1: Correlation between progressivity and direct taxes
of the tax system (including SIC) the lower is the revenue. This result implies a
trade-o¤ between the aim to redistribute and the potential to raise revenue for the
government. On the one hand, the revenue raising potential is c.p. the higher the
broader the tax base. Broader tax bases mostly go along with lower tax rates.9
This, however, reduces the redistributive e¤ects of the tax system. On the other
hand, c.p. high tax rates with a high redistributive potential are mostly levied on
narrow tax bases, reducing the revenue collecting possibilities.
9This is reected in the recent tax reform trend of tax rate cut cum base broadening.
4.6. HOW FLAT IS EUROPE? 163
4.6 How at is Europe?
4.6.1 How do existing tax benet systems di¤er from at-
ness?
Analysing the redistributive e¤ects of the tax benet systems in Europe shows
that these systems embed some degree of progressivity (see section 4.5). How-
ever, the absolute values of these indices are closer to zero (i.e. linearity) than to
absolute progression.10 Tax benet systems in Europe evolved to quite complex
entities embedding various linear and non-linear elements. For instance, income
tax systems are generally non-linear with various exemptions, allowances and dif-
ferent tax rates for di¤erent levels of income. But, in some countries some income
components (like capital income in dual income tax systems) are taxed at a pro-
portional rate. Social insurance contributions, though, are often proportional to
income capped at a certain ceiling resulting in a regressive system.11 Furthermore,
many benets have a proportional withdrawal rate above a certain threshold. The
combination of all these measures could result in a system being close to linearity.
Therefore, this section asks the question of How at is Europe?, i.e. to what
extent existing tax benet systems e¤ectively di¤er from a at tax system. We use
the estimated parameters and the derived deviation from linearity as a summary
measure to compare the welfare state designs in di¤erent countries.
Figure 4.6.1 plots the net level of taxes paid minus transfers received against
the gross income of households in the EU-15 in 2001.12 At rst glance, in some
countries the tax benet systems are rather close to linearity (e.g. Denmark,
Germany, the Netherlands and the UK), whereas in other countries (Finland, Italy,
Sweden) the deviation seems to be larger. In the following section, this deviation
will be analysed even further.
10Note that the incidence of at tax systems in practice is not proportional but (indirect) pro-
gressive to income due to the basic allowance.
11See e.g. Peichl and Schaefer (2008).
12Similar results can be obtained for 1998 and 2003.
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Figure 4.6.1: Are tax benet systems at?
4.6.2 Empirical Approach
To assess the deviation of the existing tax benet system from linearity, we estimate
a linear system and evaluate the fraction of the total variance in the data which is
explained by this estimated system. To be able to estimate a linear system some
denition of concepts are needed: Gross income X equals market income MI plus
replacement income RI.
X =MI +RI
Government action G equals taxes T plus social insurance contributions S
minus benets B, i.e. if G is positive, the individual is a net tax payer and if G is
negative the individual is a net benet receiver.
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G = T + S  B
Disposable income Y equals gross income minus government action G.
Y = X  G
We estimate the following tax benet function, i.e. a negative income tax (basic
income):
G = FTR X   FTA (4.6.1)
Government action is regressed on gross income X and a constant term, which
is interpreted as the at tax allowance (respectively a refundable tax credit) FTA
and expected to be positive, i.e. it is deducted. The coe¢ cient of gross income
is taken as the at marginal tax rate FTR and should be positive. Equation
4.6.1 is estimated using OLS and securing revenue neutrality of the government
budget. The estimation results are presented in Table 4.6.1. The deviation of
existing tax benet systems from linearity can be seen as a summary measure that
allows to compare the design of the welfare state across countries. The amount of
the basic allowance can be regarded as a measure of the level of social protection,
i.e. the subsistence level, whereas the marginal tax rate can be interpreted as a
measure of incentives. Both parameters are interdependent (because of the revenue
constraint) and can be used in combination as a measure of redistribution.
The estimated (revenue neutral) tax rate and allowance combinations vary
signicantly across countries. The absolute parameter values are high in Austria,
Belgium, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden (2001), medium in
Finland, France, Luxembourg, the UK and Ireland (2001), whereas they are rather
low in Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain, as well as Ireland and Sweden in 1998.13
However, when looking at the at tax allowance in relation to median income
(column FTA (%)) this picture changes. A high marginal rate does not necessarily
imply a high allowance and vice versa. For instance, the relative value is highest in
Spain 1998, whereas the absolute value is among the lowest. In general, the values
13The NIT results for Sweden 1998 are not statistically signicant. Therefore, the low parameter
values as well as the small R2 should be treated with caution.
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1998 2001 2003
FTR FTA FTA (% ) R2 FTR FTA FTA (% ) R2 FTR FTA FTA (% ) R2
AT 0.440 379.5 34.5 0.699 0.433 401.4 34.6 0.693 0.459 485.7 39.6 0.772
BE 0.464 360.1 32.9 0.857 0.440 376.7 32.1 0.821 0.433 348.5 28.7 0.821
DK 0.583 546.9 41.4 0.969 0.589 626.2 42.8 0.963 . . .
F I 0 .389 313.6 30.8 0.787 0.334 270.6 22.8 0.741 0.334 300.0 23.4 0.752
FR 0.369 359.9 35.4 0.652 0.380 358.6 34.9 0.606 . . .
GE 0.454 344.0 32.9 0.811 0.431 360.5 31.1 0.799 0.438 369.4 32.3 0.816
GR 0.320 102.6 33.5 0.710 0.319 123.0 34.2 0.713 0.344 170.0 30.4 0.700
IR 0.297 212.9 38.7 0.868 0.386 412.1 38.4 0.923 . . .
IT 0.325 165.3 26.9 0.697 0.334 196.4 28.2 0.703 . . .
LU 0.378 509.7 36.7 0.754 0.383 558.2 33.6 0.728 0.358 590.4 32.8 0.695
NL 0.458 340.7 34.0 0.875 0.405 339.8 28.3 0.873 0.406 351.9 27.8 0.875
PT 0.322 100.6 30.5 0.670 0.325 128.9 30.4 0.650 0.329 140.0 30.5 0.663
SP 0.327 132.6 46.6 0.717 0.304 141.1 29.1 0.504 0.303 157.9 28.7 0.472
SW (-0.222) (-70.1) (-6 .7) (-0 .439) 0.464 416.9 33.8 0.815 . . .
UK 0.370 324.9 35.0 0.840 0.377 447.5 33.9 0.898 0.386 409.2 33.7 0.900
Table 4.6.1: Estimation results negative income tax
are around one third of the respective mean income in each country. As expected,
the value is higher in Denmark and lower in most Southern countries. Striking
results are the rather high value of Ireland and the rather low value of Finland,
which, to some extent, contradicts the prediction of the welfare state typology.
To evaluate the deviation of the existing systems from linearity, we estimate
the R2-measure which can be interpreted as the fraction of variation in the data
explained by the estimated model. A rather crude interpretation of this measure
would be to say that, for example, the value of 0.969 for Denmark in 1998 implies
that the Danish system was at to a degree of 96.9%. Nevertheless, a larger value
of R2 implies an existing system that is closer to the estimated at tax system.
This goodness of t measure is large in Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Finland,
Ireland, the Netherlands, and the UK indicating that these systems are indeed
close to linearity.
The estimated values of the basic allowance around one third of median income
are below the usual denition of the poverty line, i.e. 60% of median income.
Therefore, in a second estimation, the at tax allowance is constrained to a higher
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value corresponding to this poverty line denition. This system is estimated us-
ing constrained linear regression techniques with OLS and allows to analyse the
sensitivity of the results with respect to a di¤erent at tax design. This second
estimation corresponds to a more generous basic income scheme (BIC), whereas
the rst estimation can be seen as a negative income tax system (NIT).14 The
estimation results are presented in Table 4.6.2.
1998 2001 2003
FTR FTA R2 FTR FTA R2 FTR FTA R2
AT 0.646 659.5 0.681 0.640 697.0 0.670 0.624 735.9 0.752
BE 0.661 656.5 0.862 0.654 703.8 0.828 0.669 728.4 0.828
DK 0.705 792.3 0.971 0.704 877.9 0.965 . . .
FI 0.618 610.2 0.824 0.619 711.2 0.792 0.620 770.1 0.800
FR 0.562 610.6 0.629 0.588 616.6 0.602 . . .
GE 0.646 628.2 0.783 0.635 696.3 0.784 0.623 685.6 0.806
GR 0.462 183.7 0.736 0.460 215.6 0.737 0.557 335.2 0.688
IR 0.414 330.5 0.865 0.540 643.1 0.886 . . .
IT 0.545 368.4 0.713 0.548 418.4 0.720 . . .
LU 0.551 834.1 0.754 0.589 996.8 0.706 0.574 1080.3 0.673
NL 0.641 600.4 0.880 0.631 720.2 0.874 0.635 760.7 0.876
PT 0.518 197.6 0.604 0.533 254.7 0.534 0.536 275.8 0.550
SP 0.389 170.6 0.707 0.490 290.7 0.480 0.495 330.5 0.450
SW 0.619 632.4 0.468 0.661 740.9 0.706 . . .
UK 0.552 557.1 0.837 0.565 792.6 0.885 0.574 729.0 0.886
Table 4.6.2: Estimation results basic income
When looking at the basic income schemes, it is rst of all noteworthy that all
tax rates (and allowances) are, as expected, higher than for the negative income
tax systems. The parameter values are rather high in Austria, Belgium, Denmark,
Germany, Finland, the Netherlands and Sweden, medium in France, Italy, Luxem-
bourg, Portugal and the UK, whereas they are rather low in Greece, Ireland and
Spain. However, these (revenue neutral) basic income rates are rather high, e.g.
above 70% in Denmark. This implies large disincentives e¤ects.15
14For more on the di¤erences of these two concepts, see e.g. Atkinson (1995).
15These results are in line with the literature on basic income schemes which predicts that these
concepts can either not be nanced or result in large disincentives e¤ects (see e.g. Burtless
(1983) or more recently Fuest and Peichl (2007)).
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The goodness-of-t measures are slightly higher for some but lower for other
countries in comparison to the NIT. The general message, however, is the same.
The systems in Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Finland, Ireland, the Netherlands,
and the UK have rather large values for R2 which reinforces the theses that such
systems are close to linearity. However, using this summary measure of linearity
does not allow clustering the countries according to the welfare state typology as
when using several distributional measures.
4.6.3 Simulation Results
Introducing a revenue neutral tax reform always yields winners and losers. How
would such a linear tax benet system a¤ect the income distribution? Table 4.6.3
reports the changes in Gini coe¢ cients with respect to the baseline values.16
1998 2001 2003
NIT BIC NIT BIC NIT BIC
AT 5.70 -29.60 7.00 -28.50 3.30 -24.50
BE 8.50 -28.60 13.70 -26.60 14.80 -29.70
DK 4.10 -22.20 2.90 -21.60 0.00 0.00
FI 19.40 -20.50 22.20 -25.10 20.20 -26.40
FR -1.30 -29.90 4.00 -28.60 0.00 0.00
GE 8.60 -26.70 8.90 -27.10 8.00 -25.00
GR -2.50 -22.90 -2.50 -22.40 -4.30 -34.50
IR 12.70 -6.20 -5.30 -27.90 0.00 0.00
IT -0.50 -32.60 -1.40 -32.60 0.00 0.00
LU 7.00 -22.10 8.00 -27.90 8.30 -27.90
NL 1.90 -29.30 2.40 -33.90 2.70 -34.10
PT -0.30 -28.80 -5.80 -34.80 -5.30 -34.40
SP -2.20 -11.00 0.00 -26.50 0.00 -27.10
SW (45.90) -19.80 5.30 -27.20 0.00 0.00
UK 4.90 -23.60 2.60 -26.60 2.90 -26.80
Table 4.6.3: Changes in Gini coe¢ cient at tax systems
The basic income scheme decreases inequality in all countries, whereas the
negative income tax does not yield unambiguous e¤ects. Inequality increases in
16Again, the NIT value for Sweden 1998 is not statistically signicant.
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most countries, but decreases in the Southern countries, as well as in France (1998)
and Ireland (2001). On the one hand, from a political economy point of view,
a basic income scheme seems more likely to gain majority support as it would
improve the equity of the tax benet system. However, the high marginal tax
rates imply large disincentives e¤ects. Therefore, the political success of such a
reform seems unlikely. On the other hand, a less generous negative income tax
results in some countries in marginal tax rates which are below the EMTRs (e.g.
Belgium, Finland, Germany, Ireland) implying some positive incentives e¤ects. To
sum up, Ireland is the only country with decreasing inequality at the NIT proposal,
positive incentives e¤ects and a high linearity of the existing tax benet system.
Therefore, such a at tax reform is most likely to happen there.
4.7 Summary
European countries di¤er with regard to the existing distribution of income and
the amount of redistribution. Nevertheless, four homogenous groups could be iden-
tied. The main results are summarised in Table 4.7.1, which ranks the countries,
that have been clustered according to the welfare state typology, with respect to
various indicators.17 Although this (political and social sciences) typology is based
on the conceptional design of the welfare state, it can be applied to analyse the
economic performance of a tax benet system, as well. In principle, the clustering
works very well and conrms the prediction of the welfare state typology as there
are indeed correlations between the structure of the tax benet system and the
category that a country is assigned to.
When looking at the elements of government revenue, it can be observed that
Social insurance contributions are high in continental Europe and rather low in
Anglo-Saxon countries. Direct taxes are highest in the Nordic countries and rather
low in Mediterranean welfare states. The two Anglo-Saxon countries are in the
bottom third for total tax revenue and tax rates. However, there are some im-
perfections. For example, the ranking in social expenditures of Ireland ts the
typology, but the 6th place of the UK does not. The values of the distributional
17A higher rank (i.e. a smaller number) represents a higher value of the respective coe¢ cient.
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Tax b enet system D istribution and red istribution
Ind ir D ir SIC total EXP EMTR Market DPI Pols FGT1 Ra1 Prog.
Anglo- IR 13 9 14 15 15 11 11 6 6 4 7 3
Saxon UK 8 5 13 11 6 12 3 4 5 6 5 2
AT 5 7 4 4 5 4 13 15 15 15 15 6
BE 11 4 5 3 7 2 4 10 11 8 11 8
Continental FR 3 10 2 6 2 8 5 8 7 10 6 9
GE 14 12 1 8 3 3 9 9 9 9 10 7
LU 9 6 11 9 13 10 8 13 8 13 9 4
NL 12 11 6 10 9 7 15 10 10 7 13 10
DK 1 1 15 2 4 1 12 14 14 11 14 1
Nord ic FI 10 3 8 5 10 5 7 7 12 14 8 5
SW 2 2 3 1 1 6 14 12 13 12 12 10
GR 4 14 10 12 8 13 5 3 2 1 2 15
IT 6 8 9 7 10 9 2 2 1 2 3 12
Southern PT 7 15 12 14 12 14 1 1 3 5 1 14
SP 15 13 7 13 14 14 9 5 4 3 4 10
Table 4.7.1: Ranking of countries according to various indicators, 2001
Notes: Indir: indirect taxes, Dir: direct taxes, SIC: social insurance contributions, total= Indir+Dir+SIC, EXP:
social expenditure, Market (DPI): Gini coe¢ cient market (disposable) income, FGT1 (R1): poverty (richness)
measure, Progr.: R-S progressivity measure.
indicators for these two countries are between 4 and 7, i.e. implying a rather low
level of equity. The values for progression, however, are among the highest, which
is surprising at a rst glance and, to some extent, contradicting to the prediction
of the welfare state typology. The six Continental countries are ranked in the rst
and second third (except Luxembourg) with respect to revenue and expenditures.
In terms of distributions, these countries are ranked in the two bottom thirds, im-
plying a rather high equity level. The three Nordic countries have the highest total
revenues and expenditures (except Finland). Therefore, Denmark and Sweden are
in the bottom third, Finland in the middle third with respect to the equity ranking.
The four Mediterranean countries have medium to low values of revenue and ex-
penditures which lead to high values of the distributional indicators and signaling
the lowest level of equity.
In terms of distributional measures two groups can be di¤erentiated: inequal-
ity, polarisation, (relative) poverty and richness are rather high in Anglo-Saxon
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and Southern European countries, whereas they are medium to low in Continental
and Nordic Europe. In terms of redistribution three di¤erent groups become vis-
ible: progression is rather low in Southern Europe, medium in Continental Europe,
whereas it is rather high in the Anglo-Saxon and Nordic countries. When looking
at both dimensions a matrix with 9 elds emerges (see Table 4.7.2). Distribu-
tion and redistribution are indicators of the outcome, i.e. the performance, of the
welfare state. The (political and social sciences) welfare state typology is based
on the design, i.e the input. Nonetheless, the European countries can also be
clustered according to the aforementioned economic criteria into four groups re-
sembling the modied typology of Esping-Andersen: Mediterranean countries with
high inequality and low progression (top right corner), Anglo-Saxon (or liberal)
with high inequality and high progression (bottom right), Continental European
(or conservative) with low to medium inequality and medium progression (in the
middle) and Nordic (or social-democratic) countries with low inequality and high
progression (bottom left).
Inequality/Poverty/Richness
low medium high
low SP GR, IT, PT
(Mediterranean)
Redistribution medium AT SW, BE, FR, GE, NL
(Conservative)
high LU, DK FI, IR UK
(Social-democratic) (Liberal)
Table 4.7.2: Classication of countries based on the existing tax-benet systems
Note: high: ranks 1-5, medium: 6-10 and low: 11-15.
To sum up, there are already distinct di¤erences between the countries of the
EU-15. Therefore, di¤erent outcomes of (similar) at tax reforms should be ex-
pected for di¤erent countries. Nevertheless, it is possible to classify these hetero-
geneous countries into four rather homogeneous groups. The new ndings from
the economic perspective are in line with the predictions from the social and polit-
ical sciences literature on types of welfare states. Therefore, similar outcomes of
similar at tax reforms should be expected for countries within the same cluster.
When estimating linear negative income tax systems and analysing the devi-
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ation to the existing systems, one may argue that the world is not at but it is
getting atter. The systems in Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Finland, Ireland,
the Netherlands, and the UK have rather large values for R2 implying that these
systems are close to linearity. However, the other side of the coin implies that the
other countries have highly non-linear tax benet systems. Such a fundamental
at tax reform is most likely to happen in Ireland which is the only country that
has a high degree of linearity in the existing system and where inequality and
marginal tax rates decrease in the reform scenario.
The values of this goodness-of-t measure are slightly increasing over time,
therefore a trend towards more linear systems might be observed. However, further
research on this topic with more time series data and other goodness of t measures
is necessary.
Using the deviation from linearity as a summary measure for the welfare state
design does, however, not allow clustering the countries according to the welfare
state typology. This implies that there are more ways to skin a cat, i.e. several
designs within a welfare state cluster yield similar outcomes in terms of distribu-
tion and redistribution, whereas linearity of the tax benet system is just one out
of several design options. This shall be investigated further in future research. Fur-
thermore, we have analysed tax benet systems as a whole entity in this chapter.
The analysis of specic structural elements (e.g. taxes, contributions, benets)
and the composition of welfare states is beyond the scope of this analysis and we
leave this subject to further research.
Chapter 5
Flat tax reforms in Western
Europe
5.1 Introduction
As mentioned before, the at income tax idea has become increasingly popular
recently, yet its implementation has been mainly limited to countries in Eastern
Europe. Due to its distributional e¤ects, we argue that a at tax receives less
political support in countries with a well-established middle class (see chapter 3).
The aim of this chapter is to analyse the impact of country-specic elements like
income distribution and welfare state design on the e¤ects of at tax reforms.
Among others, we study the e¤ect of polarisation, which can be interpreted as an
indicator of the strength of the middle class, on the results.
We undertake a systematic approach for choosing at tax parameters, i.e. at
rate and basic allowance, which seemed to be rather arbitrary in previous stud-
ies, for a comparative analysis of di¤erent at tax designs for selected Western
European countries. Davies and Hoy (2002) show that in the case of revenue neut-
ral at tax reforms there are two sets of critical parameter values: a lower bound of
at tax rates below which inequality is always higher compared to a given gradu-
ated rate tax and an upper bound above which inequality is always lower. We rely
on these theoretical insights to systematically construct hypothetical at tax re-
forms and analyse the distributional and incentive e¤ects of their implementation
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in European countries.
We use EUROMOD, a tax-benet microsimulation model for the EU-15, to
compare the results across countries in a common framework. We analyse which
population subgroups gain and which lose from the introduction of at taxes. We
also ask whether di¤erent combinations of tax rates and allowances always have an
adverse e¤ect on the middle class and if there are indeed positive incentive e¤ects.
Furthermore, we concentrate on the short-term static e¤ects assuming that these
decide the political feasibility of a tax reform although there are possibly important
long-term e¤ects as well.1
Our analysis yields the following results. Flat tax rates required to attain
revenue neutrality with existing personal allowances (lower boundary) improve
labour supply incentives. However, they benet mainly those with high incomes
at the expense of low and middle income households, resulting in more inequality,
poverty and polarisation of the income distribution. On the other hand, revenue
neutral at rates necessary to keep the inequality levels unchanged are rather high
and lead to ambiguous incentive e¤ects. In general, a revenue neutral at tax
reform cannot overcome the fundamental equity e¢ ciency trade-o¤, but in some
cases an increase in equality and incentives is possible. We show that the di¤erent
underlying income distributions and compositions of welfare state regimes play a
key role for the results in terms of both equity and e¢ ciency. Overall, our ndings
could contribute to explaining why at taxes have not been politically successful in
Western Europe so far. Our results also suggest that Mediterranean countries with
a rather small middle class due to high polarisation are most likely to implement
such a reform.
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows: Section 5.2 describes our reform
scenarios. Section 5.3 illustrates the distributional e¤ects in terms of inequality,
poverty and richness, polarisation, winners and losers as well as the incentive e¤ects
in terms of e¤ective marginal and average tax rates. Section 5.4 concludes.
1People tend to asymmetrically judge future losses and gains (see e.g. the prospect theory by
Kahneman and Tversky (1979)). Starting from a reference point (status quo) and given the
same variation in absolute values, there is a bigger impact of losses than of gains (loss aversion).
Furthermore, people prefer the status quo over uncertain outcomes in the future (status-quo-
bias, see Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler (1991)). Therefore, short-term losses in comparison
to the status quo can have a much stronger impact than (possible) future gains. Hence, the
short term e¤ects presented here could be decisive.
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5.2 Reform scenarios
In our at tax reform simulations we aim at replacing all existing personal income
tax deductions, allowances and credits with a single personal allowance (which is
equivalent to a wastable (i.e. non-refundable) tax credit under a at tax rate),
and the graduated rate schedule with a single at rate. We only keep refundable
tax credits on the basis that these are equivalent to benets.2 The same rate is
also applied on capital income where it was taxed separately before. Therefore,
our reform scenarios have a good potential to simplify the systems (due to fewer
specic deductions) and make them more transparent.3
In the current chapter, we do not make an attempt to harmonise tax bases
across countries. We limit ourselves to income taxes and do not modify existing
social insurance contribution schemes4 or consider benets (e.g. basic income at
tax). One could also carry out an exercise of simply attening tax rate schedules,
but this would result in higher at tax rates due to retained exceptions, therefore,
limiting gains in terms of incentives.
We simulate the following three at income tax scenarios for each country:
 a at rate with a basic allowance in the existing (or equivalent) amount (S1),
 a 10 percentage points higher at rate compared to the rst scenario and an
increased tax allowance to preserve revenue neutrality (S2),
 a 20 percentage points higher at rate compared to the rst scenario and an
increased tax allowance to preserve revenue neutrality (S3).
All scenarios are revenue neutral with the total income tax revenue within
0.1% limits of its baseline value. In terms of Davies and Hoy (2002) approach,
2Examples include the lone parent tax credit in Austria, the tax credit for families with school
children in Greece, the working mother tax credit in Spain, and the working tax credit and the
child credit in the UK.
3See Table 4.3.2 in Chapter 4 for a summary of the characteristics of current income tax systems.
Further on, abolishing specic deductions and allowances (that may have di¤erent values for
di¤erent persons or income levels) and replacing them with one general allowance leads to a
(slightly) broader tax base.
4The use of social insurance contributions di¤ers considerably across European countries. There-
fore, a reform of these would raise further conceptual questions, e.g. if mandatory contributions
should be interpreted as taxes or insurance premiums.
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which is explained in section 1.2.5, our rst scenario should roughly correspond to
the lower bound. The 10 and 20 percentage point higher tax rate under the second
and the third scenario are chosen to explore the e¤ect on inequality potentially
around the upper bound. Because of additional complexities discussed in section
1.2.5 exact critical at tax rates can be identied only by trial and error.
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Figure 5.2.1: Existing lowest and highest marginal rates and simulated at rates
Figure 5.2.1 plots the at tax rate under each scenario and the lowest and
highest (positive) tax rate of the existing tax rate schedules. Because of revenue
neutrality the tax allowance is not independent of the tax rate. There is notable
variation in the at tax rate under the rst scenario (11.6-33.9%). This variation
results from the combination of the underlying pre-tax income distribution and
average e¤ective tax burden under the existing system. This also a¤ects the other
two scenarios. However, it turns out that for most countries the range of at tax
rates under three scenarios roughly matches the range of existing tax rates. A
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notable exception is the Netherlands with a very wide range of tax rates.5
As expected, at tax rates under the rst scenario are above the lowest existing
rates with only Portugal being slightly lower. Again, this is possible due to the
elimination of additional tax allowances. Flat tax rates under the third scenario
are around the previous highest marginal rates for six countries and below that
for the rest.
5.3 Simulation results
In this section we present the results of our analysis. First, we consider distri-
butional e¤ects in terms of inequality, poverty and richness. This is followed by
the presentation of the distribution of tax payments and disposable income, and
then summarised by the share of winners and losers. Finally, we demonstrate how
e¤ective average and marginal tax rates change according to the simulated reform
scenarios.6
5.3.1 Inequality, poverty and richness
We compute a number of distributional measures to cover several aspects of dis-
tribution: inequality, polarisation, poverty and richness. These are based on equi-
valised household disposable incomes.7 To analyse income inequality we use the
Gini Coe¢ cient and the Generalised Entropy Indices with sensitivity parameters
 = 0 (Mean Log Deviation),  = 1 (Theil index) and  = 2. We also calculate
the polarisation index of Schmidt (2004) to assess the importance of the middle
5The integrated schedule of social insurance contributions and income tax in the Netherlands
results in rather low income tax rates for the brackets where full contributions to the Peoples
Pensions Insurancehave to be paid and rather high rates above the SIC threshold.
6When interpreting the results one has to be aware of the fact that revenue neutrality in terms
of (overall) tax payments does not necessarily imply a constant mean disposable income. This
mainly depends on mean-tested benets which are calculated on the basis of after-tax net
income. In fact the pre- and post-reform mean disposable income varies between +0.4% and
-1.4% in the revenue neutral scenarios modelled here.
7We use the modied OECD equivalence scale which weights the household head with a factor of
1, household members aged 14 and older with 0.5, and under 14 with 0.3. The households net
income is divided by the sum of the individual weights of each member (=equivalence factor)
to compute the equivalence weighted household income.
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class. Figure 5.3.1 presents the Gini coe¢ cient for each scenario, other measures
are presented in Table 5.5.2 (Appendix 5.5.1).
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Figure 5.3.1: Income inequality by Gini coe¢ cient
First of all, it is noteworthy that there are already distinct di¤erences between
the analysed countries in terms of inequality in the baseline scenario. Two groups
become visible: inequality is rather high in Southern European countries (Greece,
Portugal and Spain) and the UK, whereas it is rather low in Continental Europe
(Austria, Belgium Germany, Luxembourg) and Finland.8
Introducing a revenue neutral at tax increases inequality unambiguously only
under the rst scenario (S1). In the second scenario (S2) inequality decreases rel-
ative to the baseline for Finland and the UK (depending on the inequality measure
8This classication of countries corresponds to the modied typology by Esping-Andersen (1990):
conservative (Continental Europe), social-democratic (Nordic Europe), liberal (Anglo-Saxon)
and Mediterranean (cf. chapter 4.2).
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for the latter) and in the third scenario (S3) also for Belgium, Germany, Greece
and Portugal.9 These di¤erences between countries can be explained to some ex-
tent by di¤erent tax systems and the resulting distribution of tax payments. The
latter is rather narrow in Belgium, Finland and UK (where inequality decreases)
with a spread of the e¤ective average tax rate in the baseline between the lowest
and highest decile of less than 20 percentage points whereas this spread in most
other countries is around or well above 30 percentage points.10
The scenarios can be ranked according to the level of inequality as follows:
I(S1) > I(S2) > I(S3).11 The increases in inequality, however, are similar in
absolute terms for most countries with FI and UK being slightly lower. The
fact that inequality levels under the third scenario are below or close to those
in the baseline scenario show that they correspond approximately to the upper
boundary.12
To analyse the e¤ects of at taxes on poverty we compute the headcount index
and the measures of Foster et al. (1984) based on the poverty line taken from the
baseline scenario.13 We compute the poverty lines as 60% of median equivalent
income for each country. Measuring richness is a much less considered eld in the
literature than poverty. We compute the headcount index and the measures of
Peichl et al. (2006) which are analogously dened to the FGT indices of poverty.
The richness line is computed as 200% of median equivalent income. The results
for the headcount ratios are plotted in Figure 5.3.2 (poverty) and 5.3.3 (richness).14
9These derived results are in line with comparable scenarios from single country studies. Fuest
et al. (2007d), for example, nd a similar increase in inequality for scenario S1 and one close to
S2 for Germany.
10This spread, however, is largest for Greece although a similar development can be observed as
for low-spread countries. But when taking a closer look at the distribution of tax payments it
can be seen that it is right-skewed and the spread between deciles one and nine is below 20
pp. See subsection 5.3.2 for further information.
11This ordering is stable when using any inequality index presented in Table 5.5.2 (Appendix
5.5.1).
12Inequality under S3 is lower for those countries where at tax rate under S3 is close or exceeds
previous highest rate (LU, GR, UK, GE, BE, FI), except LU and additionally for PT.
13We x the poverty and richness lines at the baseline level to account for (possible) changes in
median income. Otherwise, if we would allow for changing poverty (richness) lines an increasing
measure of poverty (or a decreasing index of richness) would not necessarily indicate a worse
situation for people with low (high) incomes as a result of the changing poverty (richness) line.
14The full results for all measures of poverty and richness are presented in Table 5.5.1 (Appendix
5.5.1).
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Figure 5.3.2: Poverty rates by headcount ratio (with constant poverty line), %
Again, there are already distinct di¤erences between the analysed countries in
the baseline. The same two groups of countries can be distinguished: poverty and
richness (like inequality) is rather high in Southern European countries (Greece,
Portugal and Spain) and the UK, and it is rather low in Continental Europe
(Austria, Belgium Germany, Luxembourg) and Finland.
Poverty increases in terms of all measures in all scenarios compared to the
baseline, except for the Netherlands in S3 and Finland and the UK in S2 and S3.
When analysing poverty, one has to take into account that the lowest deciles of the
income distribution seldom pay income taxes. Therefore, a reduction in income
poverty through reduced marginal tax rates is naturally restricted. The pattern
of changes in richness measures matches closely the inequality measures, i.e. in-
creasing richness in the rst scenario for all countries and measures, decreasing
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Figure 5.3.3: Richness rates by headcount ratio (with constant richness line), %
richness for Finland and the UK in the second scenario relative to the baseline and
additionally for Belgium and Germany in the third scenario. These e¤ects di¤er
slightly when using more sophisticated richness measures (R) that also account
for changes in the dimension of richness and not only the number of people above
a richness line. Richness is then also decreasing for Portugal and Greece in S3.
The polarisation of the income distribution is also high in Southern countries
and the UK and low in Continental Europe and Finland. A high income polarisa-
tion describes the phenomenon of a declining middle class resulting in an increasing
gap between rich and poor. Therefore, the middle class is of less importance in
the Southern countries and the UK. And indeed, in these countries, which have
high baseline values of inequality, inequality decreases in scenario S3 (and S2 in
the UK). The polarisation increases in most countries and scenarios (except for
Finland and the UK in S2 and S3) implying a further declining middle class (see
Table 5.5.2 in Appendix 5.5.1). This measure is therefore summarising the e¤ects
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on poverty and richness.
5.3.2 Redistribution
To analyse the impact of at tax reforms on the redistributive e¤ects of the tax
system we compute several measures of tax progression.15 Figure 5.3.4 presents
the values for the Kakwani index. In terms of progression the di¤erences between
the analysed countries in the baseline scenario are rather small. Therefore it is
not that easy to distinguish homogeneous groups and they are di¤erent compared
to the previous clustering. Progression is rather low in the Netherlands, Belgium,
Luxembourg and Finland, average in Austria, Greece and Spain whereas it is
rather high in the UK, Portugal and Germany. Tax progression decreases under
scenario S1 with a low tax rate in all countries in comparison to the baseline
scenario. The values for scenario S2 and S3 depend on the country. Nevertheless
the scenarios can be ranked in terms of all indices of progression in the following
way: IPR(S1) < IPR(S2) < IPR(S3):
Overall, the introduction of a revenue neutral tax reform always yields winners
as well as losers. Di¤erent groups of taxpayers are di¤erently a¤ected by tax
schedule attening and tax base broadening.16 In the rst scenario with the lowest
tax rates the gains are solely concentrated in the top 1-2 deciles (only in Belgium
also involving 7th and 8th decile). In the second scenario some 9th deciles start
losing instead of gaining; in the case of Finland and the UK the top decile is
losing as well while the bottom and middle deciles start gaining. In the third
scenario only three countries are left with gains for the top decile (Luxembourg,
the Netherlands and Spain). In addition to Finland and the UK, Greece, the
Netherlands, Portugal and Spain also show gains for the lowest deciles. Germany
under the third scenario is an exceptional case as only the middle income deciles
15We compute the measure of e¤ective progression by Musgrave and Thin (1948) (PMT = 1 GY1 GX ),
the indices of disproportionality by Kakwani (1977) (PK = CT  GX) and Suits (1977) (PS) as
well as the redistributive e¤ect (of taxes) by Reynolds and Smolensky (1977) (PRS = GX CY )
(with Y disposable income, X gross income, T taxes, G Gini coe¢ cient and C coe¢ cient of
concentration). See Table 5.5.4 in Appendix 5.5.2 for the detailed results
16See Table 5.5.3 in Appendix 5.5.2 for the e¤ect in terms of changes in mean disposable income
by deciles. The range of changes is somewhat higher for the rst (from -9.7% to +12.1%) and
the third scenario (-13.1% to 8.0%) compared with the second scenario (-5.5% to 6.2%).
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Figure 5.3.4: Tax progression by Kakwani index
gain. Although in a number of cases the gains are quite widespread and involve
the middle income groups, the resulting at tax rates are very high (40-55%). The
only plausible cases are Portugal in S3 and the UK in S2 resulting in eight deciles
gaining in disposable income with 31.6% and 32.5% at rate tax respectively. This
is similar to Iceland which currently has the highest at tax (33%).
The changes in mean disposable income are increasing (decreasing) with at
tax parameters (i.e. marginal tax rate and basic allowance) for low (high) income
households. In other words, the lower (higher) the at tax parameters the higher
(lower) are the gains (losses) for high (low) income households. In most countries
the relative losses in terms of disposable income remain high (or are even highest)
for middle income households. These groups, however, usually play an important
role in the political process of a mature welfare state. Thus, these e¤ects might
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explain why a at tax is not very popular in Western Europe.17
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
AT BE FI GE GR LU NL PT SP UK
 S1  S2  S3
0
-10
-20
-30
-40
-50
-60
-70
-80
Figure 5.3.5: Share of winners and losers, %
Figure 5.3.5 summarises gainers and losers18 by presenting the exact shares for
each, which di¤er considerably between countries and scenarios. There are more
losers than winners in every country under the rst scenario. Belgium, Finland
and Germany show about the same share of winners and losers under the second
scenario, while Greece, Portugal and the UK have most of the people with un-
changed income. In the third scenario, only Austria and Luxembourg have still
more losers; Germany, the Netherlands and Portugal have again roughly the same
17Fuest et al. (2007d) for Germany and Caminada and Goudswaard (2001) for the Netherlands
nd similar results for comparable scenarios.
18Households whose disposable income does not change more than 10 Euros per month in either
direction are regarded as unchanged. See also Table 5.5.4 in Appendix 5.5.2.
5.3. SIMULATION RESULTS 185
share of those gaining and losing and most people in Greece remain still in the
no-changecategory. The highest fraction of winners appears in Belgium and Fin-
land for all scenarios and it is increasing over scenarios for most countries (except
for Austria, Germany and Greece). If disposable income was chosen as the only
criterion for an election decision, only the third at tax scenario would have a
majority (in the sense of more winners than losers) in the population for most
countries.
5.3.3 E¢ ciency: e¤ective average and marginal tax rates
In this section, we analyse the e¤ects of at tax reforms on the e¤ective marginal
(EMTR) and average (EATR) income tax rates faced by di¤erent groups of tax-
payers as a measure for e¢ ciency e¤ects. The underlying idea is that average and
marginal income tax rates a¤ect labour supply and savings incentives. Therefore,
changes in e¤ective income tax rates may be considered as rough indicators for
distortions caused by the tax system. Changes in e¤ective average tax rates are of
special interest for the extensive labour supply margin which seems to be more im-
portant for particular subgroups at the bottom of the income distribution than the
intensive margin which is a¤ected by the e¤ective marginal tax rate (see Heckman
(1993) and Immervoll et al. (2007)).
E¤ective marginal tax rates show at which rate an additional unit of income
is taxed. We calculate this for the working age population (those aged 18-64)
with positive employment or self-employment income, increasing earnings of each
individual in the household in turn by 3% while the change in all taxes and benets
(including social insurance contributions) is observed at the household level. We
use the following formula: EMTRi = 1  Yjdi , where di is the income increment for
individual i and Yj disposable income of household j where this individual belongs
to. E¤ective average tax rate is also calculated for the working age population
but further limited to those with employment income but no self-employment or
replacement incomes (e.g. pensions, unemployment or maternity benets). We
compute this at the individual level as a proportion of total taxes (including SICs)
to market income: EATRi = TiXi , where Ti is total tax payments andXi the market
income of individual i.
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Figure 5.3.6: E¤ective marginal tax rates (mean), %
Figures 5.3.6 and 5.3.7 present EMTRs and EATRs for the at tax scenarios.19
Both measures already di¤er distinctively in the baseline scenario across countries.
This can be attributed to several factors like, for example, the overall size of the
government (and therefore the demand for public funds) and the general tax mix
(i.e. the importance of the income tax) as well as economic di¤erences between
the countries. Mediterranean countries with the lowest EMTRs and EATRs have
rather low income levels as well as the lowest relative levels of income taxation and
social insurance contributions resulting in high inequality and polarisation of the
income distribution. Finland and the UKwhich have average ETRs attribute much
more importance to the income tax whereas social insurance contributions are
relatively low. These social insurance contributions, however, play an important
role in nancing the Continental European welfare states where SIC are almost as
19See Tables 5.5.6 and 5.5.7 in the appendix for the detailed results.
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high as income taxes.20
The e¤ective marginal tax burden is rather low in Mediterranean countries
like Greece, Spain and Portugal; average in Luxembourg, UK, Finland and the
Netherlands, and rather high in Austria, Germany and Belgium. The scenarios
can be ranked in the following (for most countries): EMTR(S1) < EMTR(S2) <
EMTR(S3): Therefore, e¤ective marginal rates are increasing with statutory rates
although revenue is kept constant. In scenario S1 the EMTRs decrease in all
countries in comparison to the baseline, scenarios S2 and S3 depend on the country.
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Figure 5.3.7: E¤ective average tax rates (mean)
The e¤ective average tax burden is rather low in Spain, Portugal, Greece,
and Luxembourg, average in UK, the Netherlands, and Austria and rather high
in Finland, Belgium and Germany. The scenarios can be ranked in the follow-
ing: EATR(S1) > EATR(S2) > EATR(S3): Therefore, increasing the allowance
20See Table 4.3.1 in for further information.
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dominates the increase in (statutory) marginal rate and leads to decreasing EATRs
although the revenue is kept constant. In scenario S1 the EATRs increase in all
countries (except BE) in comparison to the baseline, scenario S3 is always lower
and S2 depends on the country.
To sum up, at tax rates required to attain revenue neutrality with existing
personal allowances (the rst scenario) decrease EMTRs in all countries leading
to increasing labour supply incentives.21 On the other hand, (revenue neutral)
at rates necessary to keep the inequality levels close to their baseline values (the
third scenario) lead to ambiguous e¤ects. Incentives improve in Mediterranean
and most Continental countries but worsen in other countries.
5.3.4 Summary of results
The e¤ects of the di¤erent scenarios di¤er considerably between countries and are
summarised in Table 5.3.1. Di¤erent groups can be classied according to the wel-
fare state typology. In the Nordic and Anglo-Saxon countries inequality increases
(and progression decreases) only in scenario S1. In the Southern European coun-
tries inequality increases in scenarios S1 and S2 whereas progression decreases in
S1 (and S2 in Spain). In Continental Europe inequality increases (and progression
decreases) in all three scenarios (except Germany). In general, the e¤ects of a
at tax reform also di¤er with changes in the marginal tax rate and the basic tax
allowance. Incentives increase in all countries for scenarios S1 and S2 (except FI,
UK) as well as for Mediterranean and Continental countries in scenario S3.
Our analysis shows that the selection of the schedule and tax base parameters
is crucial for the e¤ects of at tax reforms in terms of equity and e¢ ciency. Low
parameter values that attain revenue neutrality with existing personal allowances
decrease EMTRs and therefore increase labour supply incentives. This, however,
leads to more inequality, poverty and polarisation as low rates benet mainly those
with high incomes at the expense of low and middle income households. On the
21One should note, however, that higher incentives do not necessarily lead to higher labour supply
and welfare depending on the directions of the income and substitution e¤ects based on the
respective labour supply elasticities. However, recent studies for the Netherlands by Jacobs
et al. (2007) and Germany by Fuest et al. (2007d) are comparable with our scenarios S1 and
S2. In summary, these studies nd and increase in labour supply (and inequality) for scenario
S1, whereas in scenario S2 inequality is held constant resulting in negligible e¢ ciency e¤ects.
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Inequality Progression Poverty Richness EMTRs
S1 S2 S3 S1 S2 S3 S1 S2 S3 S1 S2 S3 S1 S2 S3
AT + + + - - (-) + + + + + (+) - - +
BE + + (~) - (-) (-) + + + + + - - - +
FI + - - - + + (+) - - + - - - + +
GE + + (-) - (-) + + + + + + - - - -
GR + + - - - (+) + (~) (~) + + (~) (~) (~) (~)
LU + + + - - (-) + + + + + + - - -
NL + + + - - (~) + (+) - + + (+) - - -
PT + + - - - + + + (+) + + + - - -
SP + + (~) - - (-) + + + + + (-) - - (~)
UK + - - - + + + - - + - - - + +
Table 5.3.1: Summary of simulation results
Note: the symbols have the following meanings: + / - : signicant increase (decrease)
in all measures considered, (+) / (-): signicant increase (decrease) in most measures,
(~): ambiguous results or no signicant changes.
other hand, higher at rates keep the inequality levels unchanged. However, this
does not necessarily imply strong disincentive e¤ects for all countries. In fact, for
some countries the EMTRs decrease in all three scenarios resulting in increasing
incentives even in for scenario S3 with a high marginal rate.22
5.4 Conclusion
Flat income taxes have become increasingly popular recently, especially in Eastern
Europe. However, this popularity has not yet reached Western European countries
with well-established middle classes. Using EUROMOD we provide a microsimu-
lation analysis of di¤erent at tax designs for selected Western European countries
in a common framework. Overall, our analysis could contribute to explaining why
at taxes have not been politically successful in Western Europe so far. This also
suggests which countries would most likely introduce such reforms next.
In general, a revenue neutral at tax reform cannot overcome the fundamental
22Our results are in line with recent ndings by others: e.g. similar to our scenario S1 for UK by
Adam and Browne (2006), Belgium by Decoster and Orsini (2007) and for Spain by González-
Torrabadella and Pijoan-Mas (2006); analyses for the Netherlands by Jacobs et al. (2007) and
Germany by Fuest et al. (2007d) are also comparable with our scenarios S1 and S2.
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equity e¢ ciency trade-o¤, i.e. equality and incentives move into di¤erent direc-
tions. However, in some cases an increase in both equity and incentives is possible
(e.g. Greece, Portugal and Spain). These countries have the Southern welfare state
regime in common which is characterised by high inequality, poverty, richness and
polarisation of the income distribution. These distributional characteristics imply
a lack of a well-established middle class. Therefore, the distributional e¤ects are
less adverse than in countries with a more equal income distribution. Switching
to a at tax regime in this setting can reduce inequality and increase e¢ ciency in
terms of labour supply incentives.
When interpreting these results, one has to be aware of the fact that we limit our
analysis to static models. However, at rate taxes are also supposed to have posit-
ive dynamic e¢ ciency and growth e¤ects.23 As a result of these positive e¢ ciency
e¤ects increasing inequality might be acceptable. Nevertheless, the question arises
whether a personal income tax reform is the best instrument to increase growth
and employment. The user costs of labour and capital play an important role in
determining the demand for labour and investment. These user costs, however,
are rather determined by social security contributions and corporate taxes than
by personal income tax.
Nevertheless, the immediate and short-term distributional e¤ects analysed in
this paper are most likely to be decisive for the political feasibility of a at tax
reform. The main problem of implementing a at rate tax could be to convince
a majority of the population that redistribution in favour of the highest income
decile is acceptable. These distributional e¤ects at the expense of the middle class
help to explain why at rate taxes have not been successful in the political process
in Western Europe. However, our analysis shows that for some Mediterranean
countries with a highly polarised income distribution a at tax can increase both
equity and e¢ ciency. Therefore, an implementation of a at tax regime seems
most likely in these and other countries with similar income distributions (i.e. high
polarisation) and institutional structures (i.e. Southern welfare state regime).
23Cf. Stokey and Rebelo (1995) or Cassou and Lansing (2004).
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5.5 Appendix
5.5.1 Inequality, poverty and richness
PL FGT0 (HCR) FGT1 FGT2
Base S1 S2 S3 Base S1 S2 S3 Base S1 S2 S3
AT 859.22 11.06 16.19 13.70 12.61 1.93 2.97 2.45 2.25 0.58 0.87 0.73 0.69
BE 809.52 10.00 14.68 11.97 10.94 3.39 4.10 3.74 3.63 1.99 2.25 2.16 2.14
FI 838.33 12.24 12.76 9.95 9.64 2.17 2.17 1.75 1.74 0.63 0.60 0.52 0.52
GE 801.56 13.04 15.06 13.88 13.38 2.74 3.00 2.84 2.81 0.97 1.02 1.00 1.00
GR 437.40 19.48 20.54 19.51 19.50 6.36 6.50 6.37 6.36 3.34 3.37 3.34 3.34
LU 1,274.24 9.31 14.64 11.83 10.72 1.10 2.09 1.46 1.30 0.25 0.46 0.31 0.28
NL 871.00 11.87 14.87 12.93 11.41 2.37 2.82 2.42 2.28 1.20 1.30 1.19 1.16
PT 347.43 20.89 23.65 21.22 21.44 4.75 5.59 4.78 4.71 1.40 1.71 1.40 1.38
SP 548.13 19.18 22.89 20.26 19.21 5.40 6.78 5.75 5.41 2.47 3.03 2.58 2.47
UK 575.07 16.17 17.16 15.38 15.08 3.00 3.13 2.90 2.88 1.05 1.08 1.03 1.03
RL R0 (HCR) R1 R2
Base S1 S2 S3 Base S1 S2 S3 Base S1 S2 S3
AT 2,864.06 5.19 7.68 6.12 5.08 1.02 1.83 1.40 1.03 0.35 0.70 0.51 0.36
BE 2,698.39 3.72 6,67 5.17 3.61 0.78 1.37 0.97 0.72 0.32 0.51 0.37 0.28
FI 2,794.42 5.06 5.88 4.65 3.43 1.23 1.52 1.12 0.79 0.53 0.65 0.47 0.33
GE 2,671.85 7.79 9.79 8.03 7.07 1.48 2.16 1.66 1.29 0.46 0.76 0.55 0.39
GR 1,458.00 9.81 10.82 10.21 10.00 2.24 2.77 2.46 2.23 0.82 1.13 0.95 0.80
LU 4,247.46 6.41 10.72 8.71 7.88 1.22 2.37 1.86 1.51 0.38 0.86 0.63 0.47
NL 2,905.09 5.46 7.20 6.36 5.18 0.96 1.63 1.28 1.01 0.29 0.59 0.44 0.34
PT 1,158.09 13.51 15.36 13.44 14.12 4.16 5.31 4.34 4.00 1.83 2.59 1.98 1.69
SP 1,827.09 10.18 12.57 11.42 9.99 2.12 3.26 2.60 2.11 0.70 1.25 0.93 0.71
UK 1,921.48 10.51 11.19 9.73 8.30 2.40 2.86 2.23 1.76 0.87 1.12 0.83 0.61
Table 5.5.1: Poverty and richness lines and rates
Sources: own calculation using EUROMOD version C13.
Note: PL: poverty line, FGT: Foster et al. (1984) poverty measure.
RL: richness line, R: Peichl et al. (2006) richness measure.
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5.5.2 Distribution of tax payments and disposable income
AT BE FI GE GR
S1 S2 S3 S1 S2 S3 S1 S2 S3 S1 S2 S3 S1 S2 S3
1 -8 .01 -4 .44 -2 .79 -7 .05 -3 .68 -2 .46 0.70 5.27 5.83 -1 .18 -0 .54 -0 .51 -0 .13 0.01 0.01
2 -9 .70 -5 .51 -2 .73 -8 .19 -4 .09 -1 .34 -1 .47 4.80 7.98 -3 .62 -1 .19 -0 .05 -1 .29 -0 .04 0.08
3 -8 .22 -4 .76 -1 .73 -9 .01 -5 .07 -1 .15 -1 .51 3.96 7.72 -5 .14 -1 .40 0.97 -1 .90 -0 .40 0.22
4 -7 .51 -4 .44 -1 .68 -6 .48 -2 .98 0.21 -1 .72 2.54 6.17 -4 .76 -1 .46 1.05 -2 .66 -0 .66 0.47
5 -6 .04 -3 .53 -1 .24 -4 .38 -1 .19 1.59 -1 .90 0.51 3.07 -4 .32 -1 .84 0.53 -2 .65 -0 .95 0.22
6 -4 .73 -3 .04 -0 .99 -1 .59 -0 .30 1.22 -1 .90 -0 .71 1.01 -3 .49 -1 .12 1.20 -2 .89 -1 .43 -0 .26
7 -3 .42 -2 .57 -1 .47 0.27 0.79 1.75 -1 .35 -1 .36 -0 .67 -2 .64 -1 .27 0.31 -2 .90 -1 .39 -0 .21
8 -1 .70 -1 .85 -1 .27 2.26 1.31 0.81 -1 .13 -2 .26 -2 .56 -1 .59 -1 .14 -0 .34 -2 .01 -0 .96 0.11
9 1.21 -0 .45 -1 .19 4.24 2.28 1.00 0.07 -2 .58 -4 .41 0.70 -0 .88 -1 .88 -1 .71 -0 .94 0.38
10 11.57 5.16 -0 .52 9.26 2.63 -3 .49 3.62 -5 .01 -13.13 7.38 2.02 -2 .68 6.88 2.51 -0 .89
LU NL PT SP UK
S1 S2 S3 S1 S2 S3 S1 S2 S3 S1 S2 S3 S1 S2 S3
1 -8 .08 -2 .64 -1 .13 -3 .41 0.14 1.29 -3 .66 0.10 0.21 -7 .59 -0 .82 0.26 -0 .58 0.54 0.66
2 -9 .15 -4 .36 -2 .11 -4 .34 -1 .05 0.70 -5 .38 -0 .34 0.42 -9 .22 -2 .89 0.05 -1 .32 1.44 2.54
3 -8 .16 -3 .99 -1 .54 -5 .09 -1 .66 0.11 -6 .42 -1 .69 -0 .30 -8 .08 -3 .05 0.15 -1 .99 1.43 3.23
4 -8 .75 -5 .23 -2 .94 -4 .60 -2 .16 -0 .43 -6 .45 -0 .35 0.89 -7 .51 -3 .43 -0 .84 -2 .24 1.80 4.27
5 -7 .92 -5 .30 -3 .51 -3 .86 -2 .08 -0 .53 -6 .08 -0 .69 1.30 -5 .76 -2 .36 0.41 -2 .45 1.15 4.21
6 -6 .10 -4 .61 -2 .79 -2 .50 -1 .59 -0 .41 -6 .57 -0 .88 1.78 -5 .30 -2 .53 -0 .12 -2 .40 0.50 3.17
7 -4 .58 -4 .42 -3 .73 -2 .53 -2 .08 -1 .10 -5 .82 -1 .02 1.77 -2 .65 -1 .34 0.28 -2 .15 -0 .07 2.45
8 -2 .65 -2 .97 -2 .51 -0 .88 -1 .21 -1 .03 -4 .07 -1 .60 1.84 -0 .81 -1 .20 -0 .69 -1 .42 -0 .85 0.31
9 2.63 0.45 -0 .46 1.37 -0 .10 -0 .73 0.06 -1 .08 0.95 1.76 -0 .16 -0 .67 -0 .48 -1 .60 -1 .61
10 12.05 6.16 1.51 9.75 4.91 0.95 11.24 2.59 -2 .99 11.79 5.19 0.05 6.23 -0 .26 -5 .77
Table 5.5.3: Changes in disposable income by income decile, %
Sources: own calculation using EUROMOD version C13.
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S1 S2 S3
W 0 L W 0 L W 0 L
AT 20.52 4.67 74.81 14.62 9.56 75.81 27.14 14.87 57.99
BE 36.04 12.18 51.78 43.67 16.46 39.87 46.04 17.86 36.10
FI 26.78 18.77 54.44 41.06 16.14 42.79 48.72 11.22 40.06
GE 15.58 30.84 53.58 33.08 34.55 32.38 32.54 34.20 33.26
GR 10.44 41.87 47.69 9.71 67.51 22.78 21.46 63.26 15.28
LU 20.46 2.62 76.92 30.69 10.43 58.88 40.29 12.69 47.03
NL 24.26 7.85 67.89 25.79 21.61 52.60 38.55 22.39 39.06
PT 15.08 13.97 70.95 20.26 50.19 29.55 35.88 47.64 16.48
SP 19.40 7.79 72.81 24.91 30.07 45.02 34.88 33.02 32.10
UK 9.79 27.37 62.85 31.71 37.66 30.63 42.08 30.14 27.78
Table 5.5.5: Share of winners and losers, %
Note: category 0refers to disposable income changes less than 10 euros per month.
Sources: own calculation using EUROMOD version C13.
5.5.3 E¢ ciency: e¤ective average and marginal tax rate
AT BE FI GE GR LU NL PT SP UK
Base median 26.56 33.39 27.41 33.70 19.45 17.73 26.55 13.92 13.62 24.71
mean 24.56 29.55 27.00 31.27 18.41 19.86 22.23 16.49 13.65 22.18
S1 median 31.61 32.87 30.01 36.87 21.56 22.44 28.78 19.85 18.80 26.10
mean 28.69 29.20 27.67 32.21 20.15 22.43 24.13 19.73 16.67 23.36
S2 median 29.55 32.48 29.89 31.92 19.45 20.90 29.13 13.52 15.21 23.82
mean 26.54 28.33 27.46 30.25 18.99 20.42 22.85 16.20 14.39 21.05
S3 median 26.02 31.37 28.81 26.56 19.45 17.74 26.76 11.00 8.60 19.23
mean 25.03 27.52 26.83 28.85 18.21 19.66 22.02 14.92 12.53 19.39
Table 5.5.6: E¤ective average tax rates at the individual level
Sources: own calculation using EUROMOD version C13.
Note: EATR dened as (Income tax + SIC) / (market income). Includes individuals
aged 18-64 with employment income but no self-employment and replacement incomes
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AT BE FI GE GR LU NL PT SP UK
Base m edian 41.04 51.02 43.40 50.01 19.45 35.46 45.36 23.00 28.83 31.40
m ean 40.16 59.90 38.07 45.20 21.87 34.76 38.45 25.72 24.11 35.30
< 0 0.00 0.16 0.36 0.25 0.00 0.03 2.76 0.01 0.04 0.00
[0-0 .1) 6 .33 0.50 11.97 8.48 24.17 0.58 5.46 8.86 21.26 4.42
[0 .1-0 .2) 11.51 1.93 5.77 1.34 32.39 21.30 0.46 28.84 4.62 1.55
[0 .2-0 .3) 0 .88 0.90 7.55 7.93 10.31 18.18 10.80 29.47 44.37 9.47
[0 .3-0 .4) 12.51 4.47 13.99 11.70 11.04 25.55 10.38 17.61 25.75 61.61
[0 .4-0 .5) 59.94 25.54 41.56 20.24 21.26 29.59 56.96 11.49 3.59 12.13
[0 .5-0 .6) 6 .05 57.85 16.10 40.88 0.82 1.40 8.45 0.38 0.03 1.07
[0 .6-0 .7) 0 .10 0.63 0.58 6.02 0.00 0.03 0.78 0.02 0.06 4.23
[0 .7-0 .8) 0 .06 0.43 0.64 1.87 0.00 0.14 0.55 0.16 0.02 3.01
[0 .8-0 .9) 0 .06 0.50 0.16 0.14 0.00 0.00 0.57 1.42 0.02 1.03
[0 .9-1) 0 .04 0.75 0.09 0.02 0.00 0.24 0.29 1.46 0.01 0.39
> 1 2.52 6.34 1.23 1.12 0.02 2.95 2.56 0.27 0.23 1.09
S1 median 35.37 40.54 39.62 45.98 21.40 26.85 33.26 21.32 22.88 31.90
m ean 35.59 50.76 35.60 39.66 22.02 27.84 32.76 23.92 19.43 34.17
< 0 0.00 0.09 0.02 0.25 0.00 0.00 2.71 0.01 0.04 0.00
[0-0 .1) 3 .98 0.98 14.64 12.02 19.94 0.52 4.77 3.54 7.92 4.36
[0 .1-0 .2) 0 .39 2.38 0.68 0.69 16.40 16.72 15.43 15.97 37.82 0.13
[0 .2-0 .3) 10.71 0.11 0.91 21.71 25.30 76.18 23.34 57.33 53.90 18.77
[0 .3-0 .4) 78.28 28.80 76.78 6.11 37.69 3.31 16.70 19.44 0.01 64.96
[0 .4-0 .5) 3 .31 57.60 3.19 47.02 0.65 0.00 7.72 0.13 0.01 1.04
[0 .5-0 .6) 0 .05 0.49 0.48 6.76 0.00 0.11 24.28 0.24 0.03 0.30
[0 .6-0 .7) 0 .00 0.60 0.86 1.29 0.00 0.05 0.81 0.00 0.00 4.25
[0 .7-0 .8) 0 .07 0.53 0.84 2.80 0.00 0.05 0.69 0.07 0.05 3.53
[0 .8-0 .9) 0 .09 0.26 0.37 0.14 0.00 0.08 0.44 1.27 0.01 1.05
[0 .9-1) 0 .22 1.39 0.06 0.01 0.00 0.56 0.50 0.87 0.02 0.51
> 1 2.91 6.78 1.16 1.19 0.02 2.42 2.61 1.12 0.20 1.10
S2 median 43.62 49.23 49.16 49.87 19.45 35.94 32.27 21.60 27.65 41.90
m ean 39.52 55.57 40.19 42.85 21.89 31.29 35.78 25.08 23.76 38.65
< 0 0.00 0.09 0.02 0.10 0.00 0.00 2.71 0.01 0.04 0.00
[0-0 .1) 6 .24 1.82 20.58 14.39 25.90 0.66 5.23 4.72 24.35 10.95
[0 .1-0 .2) 10.22 6.79 0.92 0.97 31.22 26.48 0.26 37.69 0.30 3.85
[0 .2-0 .3) 0 .77 0.10 0.74 13.47 1.03 9.93 27.07 10.62 28.67 0.98
[0 .3-0 .4) 10.40 0.25 1.01 17.58 18.63 56.85 31.91 32.82 46.34 17.96
[0 .4-0 .5) 69.77 74.16 71.52 5.15 22.72 2.92 2.35 10.57 0.00 57.70
[0 .5-0 .6) 0 .00 8.40 2.44 29.49 0.47 0.05 25.39 0.07 0.03 0.78
[0 .6-0 .7) 0 .06 0.29 0.52 15.66 0.00 0.00 0.84 0.16 0.05 0.49
[0 .7-0 .8) 0 .06 0.46 0.59 1.08 0.00 0.09 0.80 0.16 0.00 3.16
[0 .8-0 .9) 0 .08 0.61 0.56 0.90 0.00 0.09 0.48 1.40 0.00 2.57
[0 .9-1) 0 .03 0.57 0.12 0.08 0.00 0.24 0.36 1.45 0.04 0.48
> 1 2.37 6.46 0.99 1.13 0.02 2.69 2.60 0.33 0.18 1.07
S3 median 51.66 57.93 58.70 49.59 19.45 38.52 39.00 11.00 37.65 49.20
m ean 42.49 60.42 44.41 44.85 21.62 32.70 37.64 22.74 24.11 40.18
< 0 0.00 0.09 0.03 0.06 0.00 0.00 2.73 0.01 0.04 0.00
[0-0 .1) 6 .42 1.87 25.08 15.44 28.59 0.72 5.46 8.04 43.05 20.26
[0 .1-0 .2) 20.17 11.39 1.12 2.19 38.88 40.92 0.22 58.13 0.49 6.70
[0 .2-0 .3) 1 .60 0.31 0.72 20.40 1.67 1.45 12.52 0.39 0.43 1.10
[0 .3-0 .4) 0 .29 0.28 1.10 1.34 0.37 9.48 36.99 23.66 23.87 1.19
[0 .4-0 .5) 11.30 0.35 1.23 16.88 16.29 42.23 22.32 0.55 31.85 21.11
[0 .5-0 .6) 57.69 71.99 66.93 2.36 14.18 2.10 3.79 0.04 0.00 43.76
[0 .6-0 .7) 0 .03 5.98 1.91 28.68 0.00 0.00 11.98 5.92 0.06 0.99
[0 .7-0 .8) 0 .04 0.54 0.38 10.82 0.00 0.09 0.72 0.20 0.02 0.09
[0 .8-0 .9) 0 .00 0.82 0.35 0.22 0.00 0.02 0.41 1.36 0.00 2.61
[0 .9-1) 0 .09 0.51 0.29 0.49 0.00 0.22 0.34 1.44 0.01 1.11
> 1 2.37 5.87 0.84 1.12 0.02 2.78 2.52 0.26 0.18 1.07
Table 5.5.7: Distribution of e¤ective marginal tax rates by intervals (%)
Sources: own calculation using EUROMOD version C13. Note: EMTR dened as [1 
(change in hh disposable income) / (increase in individual earnings)] and includes
individuals aged 18-64 with positive earnings.
Chapter 6
Concluding remarks
European welfare states are under pressure because of population ageing and glob-
alisation. The former increases the need for public funds, whereas the latter leads
to more elastic tax bases (i.e. the sources of public funds) and tends to increase
unemployment especially of low-skilled workers, which in turn increases the need
for public funds again. In the ongoing political debate, the complex tax benet
systems of grown-up welfare states are frequently seen as inappropriate to meet
the economic challenges ahead. Therefore, fundamental reforms of the tax systems
including the simple at tax idea are often proposed. As a matter of fact, the at
tax idea has been remarkably successful recently. However, its implementation has
not yet spilled over from Eastern to Western Europe.
The aim of this book was to answer several fundamental at tax reform ques-
tions and to identify hereby the driving forces behind the economic e¤ects of such
a reform. The introduction elaborated on the fact that in practice at taxes are
not a clearly cut dened concept but several di¤erent tax systems exist that are
labelled as at. Chapter 2 introduced the methodology for the analysis by re-
viewing and extending the literature on simulation models and their capability to
ex-ante estimate equity and e¢ ciency e¤ects of scal reforms. Chapter 3 analysed
the role of the at tax design for the e¤ects of three di¤erent hypothetical at tax
reforms in Germany. Chapter 4 compared the institutional background and the
underlying income distribution in Western European countries. In chapter 5, the
role of those country specic aspects and their relevance for the outcome of at tax
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reforms were investigated by conducting a cross-country comparison of di¤erent
at tax scenarios. Our main ndings and the resulting policy implications can be
summarised in the following three results:
1. How at is the world?
The tax benet systems in some European countries including Germany are
close to linearity, whereas in other countries the systems are highly non-linear
(see chapter 4). Therefore, the world (or at least Europe) is not at, but a
tendency towards atter systems can be observed.
Result 1: Europe is not at, but it is getting atter.
2. What e¤ects can be expected from a at tax reform?
There is no universal answer to this question other than: It depends. The
outcome of a at tax reform crucially depends on two dimensions: the at
tax design and the country-specic environment.
(a) What is the role of the at tax design?
This question has been analysed with respect to tax base simplication,
tax schedule parameters, revenue neutrality and the combination with
a cash ow corporate income tax (see chapter 3). First, the e¤ects of
revenue neutral tax base simplication on after tax income inequality
and tax distortions mainly depend on the type of tax schedule adjust-
ment. Second, we nd that a at rate tax with a low tax rate and basic
allowance yields positive static e¢ ciency e¤ects but increases inequal-
ity, poverty and polarisation. The increase in inequality can be avoided
by combining a higher tax rate with a higher basic allowance. But, in
this case, the e¢ ciency gains vanish. Third, an ex-ante not revenue
neutral at tax reform can overcome the fundamental equity-e¢ ciency
trade-o¤. This, however, is true only in the long-run when taking the
general equilibrium e¤ects into account, whereas the immediate distri-
butional e¤ects still increase inequality. Fourth, combining a personal
income at tax with a cash ow at tax on business income increases
inequality due to the large gains at the top of the distribution.
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(b) Do the results di¤er across European countries?
The results di¤er considerably across (groups of) countries. At the same
time, they depend on the at tax design (see chapters 4 and 5). On
the one hand, labour supply incentives increase for low marginal rates
(and allowances) in all countries, whereas for high values they increase
only in Mediterranean and Continental countries. On the other hand,
inequality increases for low tax rates in all countries, whereas for high
parameter values it decreases in all but the Continental countries. These
results indicate that there is some scope for at taxes to overcome the
fundamental equity e¢ ciency trade-o¤. Therefore, the at tax idea is
most likely to have success in countries with a high existing polarisation
of the income distribution, i.e. a large gap between rich and poor,
whereas it will be hard to invade countries with a well established middle
class.
To sum up, there is not a unique at tax e¤ect, i.e. the design and the
type of welfare state determine the outcome of a at tax reform. Improved
incentives and decreased inequality are jointly possible, but only with specic
details and in specic environments.
Result 2: Flat taxes polarise, but polarisation facilitates at taxes.
3. Could or should the world be at?
Introducing a at tax gives scope for the improvement of the e¢ ciency, equity
and simplicity of the tax benet system. However, these e¤ects crucially
depend on the details of the reform. Furthermore, at least some of the
gains could be made simply by modifying the existing system.1 Flatness of
the rate schedule itself can reduce some distortions, e.g. tax arbitrage, but is
unlikely to yield signicant e¢ ciency gains. Lowering tax rates will increase
labour supply incentives. The size of the e¤ects depend on the respective
elasticities. In general, the labour supply elasticities are higher at the bottom
of the distribution than at the top. Therefore, a progressive rate schedule
would be optimal.2 Tax base broadening and simplication have positive
1Gale (1999), p. 157.
2See e.g. Aaberge and Colombino (2006).
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e¤ects but this does not necessarily have to be combined with a at rate
schedule. The same is true for a cash ow at tax, which can also have
positive e¤ects.
To sum up, evidence suggest that the world could be at, i.e. the introduction
of a at tax is conceivable, but no compelling reasons that the world should
be at can be found.
Result 3: A at world is feasible, but not necessarily desirable.
Note that there are limitations to our analysis. We model revenue neutral
at income tax reforms. If a at tax reform allows for high losses in revenue,
everybodys after-tax income could increase. However, a loss in revenue implies
always a cut in government spending or the use of other nancing sources. As a
consequence, it is impossible to make everybody better-o¤, at least in the short-
run. Furthermore, the personal income tax is only part of the tax mix as there
are other taxes and contributions, as well. In particular, we leave social security
contributions unchanged, which represent an additional tax on labour. Moreover,
we do not consider e¤ects on investment and capital accumulation, nor on human
capital accumulation or on compliance costs. However, the income tax might not
be the best instrument to address these issues. Even if it would be, there is no
need for a at tax reform. Other measures (within the income tax system) can be
used to reduce the tax burden on capital, as well as tax evasion or avoidance.
At last, what can be learnt from our analysis is that the atness of the tax
schedule itself is not a key feature of the economic success of a tax reform. Other
elements (simplication, increased compliance, corporate taxation) play a more
important role. However, a at tax reform can indeed overcome the fundamental
equity e¢ ciency trade-o¤. This is only true in two specic cases: rst, for Mediter-
ranean countries with highly polarised income distributions, and second, for Ger-
many in the long-run if accounting for general equilibrium e¤ects. Therefore, due
to its adverse short-term distributional e¤ects, the chances that the at tax idea
will invade the grown-up democracies of Western Europe are rather low. However,
a further movement towards lower (marginal) tax rates with broader and simpler
tax bases shall be observed. This, however, could eventually lead to tax benet
systems moving closer to linearity, albeit without an actual at tax schedule.
Bibliography
Aaberge, R. and Colombino, U. (2006). Designing Optimal Taxes with a Microe-
conometric Model of Household Labour Supply, IZA Discussion Paper No.
2468.
Aaberge, R., Colombino, U., Holmøy, E., Strøm, B. and Wennemo, T. (2007).
Population Ageing and Fiscal Sustainability: Integrating Detailed Labour
Supply Models with CGE Models, in A. Harding and A. Gupta (eds), Model-
ling Our Future: Social Security and Taxation, Vol. I, Elsevier, Amsterdam,
pp. 259290.
Aaberge, R., Colombino, U. and Strøm, S. (1999). Labor Supply in Italy: An
Empirical Analysis of Joint Household Decisions, with Taxes and Quantity
Constraints, Journal of Applied Econometrics 14: 403422.
Aaberge, R., Colombino, U. and Strøm, S. (2000). Labor Supply Responses and
Welfare E¤ects from Replacing Current Tax Rules by a Flat Tax: Empirical
Evidence from Italy, Norway and Sweden, Journal of Population Economics
13: 595621.
Aaberge, R., Dagsvik, J. and Strøm, S. (1995). Labor Supply Responses and
Welfare E¤ects of Tax Reforms, Scandinavian Journal of Economics 97: 635
659.
Adam, S. and Browne, J. (2006). Options for a UK at tax: some simple simula-
tions, IFS Brieng Note No. 72.
201
202 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Altig, D., Auerbach, A., Kotliko¤, L., Smetters, K. and Walliser, J. (2001). Sim-
ulating fundamental tax reform in the U. S., American Economic Review
91(3): 574595.
Anderson, J. M. (1990). Micro-Macro Linkages in Economic Models, inG. H. Lewis
and R. C. Michel (eds), Microsimulation Techniques for Tax and Transfer
Analysis, Urban Institute Press.
Armington, P. (1969). A Theory of Demand for Products distinguished by Place
of Production, IMF Sta¤ Papers 16: 159176.
Arntz, M., Boeters, S. and Gürtzgen, N. (2006). Alternative Approaches to Dis-
crete Working Time Choice in an AGE Framework, Economic Modelling
23: 10081032.
Arntz, M., Boeters, S., Gürtzgen, N. and Schubert, S. (2006). Analysing Welfare
Reform in a Microsimulation-AGEModel: The Value of Disaggregation, ZEW
Discussion Paper No. 06-076.
Arntz, M., Clauss, M., Kraus, M., Schnabel, R., Spermann, A. and Wiemers,
J. (2007). Arbeitsangebotse¤ekte und Verteilungswirkungen der Hartz-IV-
Reform, IAB-Forschungsbericht No. 10.
Arts, W. A. and Gelissen, J. (2002). Three worlds of welfare capitalism or more?
A state-of-the-art report, Journal of European Social Policy 12(2): 137158.
Atkinson, A. B. (1970). On the measurement of inequality, Journal of Economic
Theory 2: 244263.
Atkinson, A. B. (1995). Public Economics in Action: The Basic Income/Flat Tax
Proposal, Oxford University Press.
Auerbach, A. J. (1985). The Theory of Excess Burden and optimal Taxation,
Vol. 1 of Handbooks in Economics, North-Holland, Amsterdam, chapter 2,
pp. 61127.
Auerbach, A. J. (2006). The Choice Between Income and Consumption Taxes: A
Primer, NBER Working Paper No. 12307.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 203
Auerbach, A. J. and Hines, J. R. (2002). Taxation and Economic E¢ ciency,
Vol. 3 of Handbooks in Economics, North-Holland, Amsterdam, chapter 21,
pp. 13471421.
Auerbach, A. and Kotliko¤, L. (1987). Dynamic Fiscal Policy, Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, Cambridge.
Auerbach, A., Kotliko¤, L. and Skinner, J. (1983). The E¢ ciency Gains from
Dynamic Tax Reform, International Economic Review 24: 97 130.
Bach, S. (2005). Grundlegende Reform der Einkommenbesteuerung: Inwieweit
kann die Bemessungsgrundlage verbreitert und das Steuerrecht vereinfacht
werden?, DIW Wochenbericht 72: 523527.
Bach, S. and Schulz, E. (2003). Fortschreibungs- und Hochrechnungsrahmen für
ein Einkommensteuer- Simulationsmodell. Projektbericht 1 zur Forschungsko-
operation Mikrosimulation mit dem Bundesministerium der Finanzen, Mater-
ialien des DIW Berlin, Nr. 26.
Ballard, C. (1990). Marginal welfare cost calculations: Di¤erential analysis vs.
balanced-budget analysis, Journal of Public Economics 41(2): 26376.
Ballard, C. and Fullerton, D. (1992). Distortionary Taxes and the Provision of
Public Goods, The Journal of Economic Perspectives 6(3): 117131.
Ballard, C., Fullerton, D., Shoven, J. and Whalley, J. (1985). A General Equilib-
rium Model for Tax Policy Evaluation, University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
Bergman, L. (2005). CGE Modeling of Environmental Policy and Resource Man-
agement, in K. G. Mäler and J. R. Vincent (eds), Handbook of Environmental
Economics, North-Holland, Amsterdam, chapter 24, pp. 12731306.
Bergs, C., Fuest, C., Heilmann, S., Peichl, A. and Schaefer, T. (2006).
Aufkommens-, Beschäftigungs- und Wachstumswirkungen einer Reform des
Steuer- und Transfersystems nach dem Bürgergeld-Vorschlag von Joachim
Mitschke, FiFo-Bericht 08-2006.
204 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Bergs, C. and Peichl, A. (2006). Numerische Gleichgewichtsmodelle - Grundlagen
und Anwendungsgebiete, Finanzwissenschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge Nr. 06-
2.
Bergs, C. and Peichl, A. (2008). Numerische Gleichgewichtsmodelle zur Analyse
von Politikreformen, Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftspolitik 57 (1): 126.
Betson, D. (1990). How Reliable are Conclusions Derived from Microsimulation
Models?, in J. Brunner and H.-G. Petersen (eds), Simulation Models in Tax
and Transfer Policy: Proceedings of an International Symposium, Campus
Verlag, Frankfurt am Main, pp. 423446.
Blackorby, C. and Donaldson, D. (1980). A Theoretical Treatment of Measures of
Absolute Inequality, International Economic Review 21: 107136.
Blanchard, O. (1985). Debt, Decits, and Finite Horizons, Journal of Political
Economy 93(2): 223247.
Blundell, R. and MaCurdy, T. (1999). Labor Supply: A Review of Alternative Ap-
proaches, in O. Ashenfelter and D. Card (eds), Handbook of Labor Economics,
Vol. 3A, Elsevier, Amsterdam, pp. 15591695.
Boeters, S., Böhringer, C., Büttner, T. and Kraus, M. (2006). Economic E¤ects
of VAT Reform in Germany, ZEW Discussion Paper No. 06-030.
Boeters, S., Feil, M. and Gürtzgen, N. (2005). Discrete Working Time Choice in an
Applied General Equilibrium Model, Computational Economics 26: 183211.
Boeters, S., Gürtzgen, N. and Schnabel, R. (2006). Reforming Social Welfare
in Germany - An Applied General Equilibrium Analysis, German Economic
Review 7: 363388.
Böhringer, C., Boeters, S. and Feil, M. (2005). Taxation and Unemployment: An
Applied General Equilibrium Approach, Economic Modelling 22: 81108.
Böhringer, C. and Rutherford, T. (2006). Combining Top-Down and Bottom-up in
Energy Policy Analysis: A Decomposition Approach, ZEW Discussion Paper
No. 06-007.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 205
Bork, C. (2000). Steuern, Transfers und private Haushalte. Eine mikroanalytische
Simulationsstudie der Aufkommens- und Verteilungswirkungen, Peter Lang,
Frankfurt am Main.
Bourguignon, F., Robilliard, A.-S. and Robinson, S. (2003). Representative versus
Real Households in the Macro-Economic Modelling of Inequality, DIAL Doc-
ument de Travail DT/2003-10.
Bourguignon, F. and Spadaro, A. (2006). Microsimulation as a tool for evaluating
redistribution policies, Journal of Economic Inequality 4(1): 77106.
Bovenberg, L. (2003). Tax Policy and Labor Market Performance, CESifo Working
Paper No. 1035.
Brennan, G. and Buchanan, J. (1977). Towards a tax constitution for the Le-
viathan, Journal of Public Economics 8: 32553273.
Brennan, G. and Buchanan, J. (1980). The Power to Tax: Analytical Foundations
of a Fiscal Constitution, Cambridge University Press, New York.
Brenneisen, F. and Peichl, A. (2007a). Dokumentation des Wohlfahrtsmoduls von
FiFoSiM, CPE Discussion Paper 07-4, University of Cologne.
Brenneisen, F. and Peichl, A. (2007b). Empirische Wohlfahrtsmessung von Steuer-
reformen, CPE Discussion Paper 07-5, University of Cologne.
Brook, A.-M. and Leibfritz, W. (2005). Slovakias introduction of a at tax as part
of wider economic reforms, OECD Economics Department Working Paper No.
448.
Brooke, A., Kendrick, D., Meeraus, A. and Raman, R. (1998). GAMS - A Users
Guide.
Browning, E. and Browning, J. (1985). Why Not a True Flat Rate Tax, Cato
Journal 5: 127143.
Browning, M., Chiappori, P. and Lechene, V. (2006). Collective and Unitary
Models: A Clarication, Review of Economics of the Household 4(1): 514.
206 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Buhmann, B., Rainwater, L., Schmaus, G. and Smeeding, T. (1988). Equivalence
scales, well-being, inequality and poverty: Sensitivity estimates across ten
countries using the luxembourg incomes study database, Review of Income
and Wealth 34: 115142.
Burman, L. E. and Gale, W. G. (2001). A golden opportunity to simplify the tax
system, The Brookings Institution Policy Brief, Washington.
Burtless, G. und Greenberg, D. (1983). Measuring the Impact of NIT Experiments
on Work E¤ort, Industrial and Labor Relations Review 36: 592605.
Cajner, T., Grobovsek, J. and Kozamernik, D. (2006). Welfare and E¢ ciency
E¤ects of Alternative Tax Reforms in Slovenia, IB Revija (IB Review)XXXX
(1-2): 125136.
Caminada, K. and Goudswaard, K. (2001). Does a Flat Rate Individual Income
Tax Reduce Tax Progressivity? A Simulation for the Netherlands, Public
Finance and Management 1 (4): 471499.
Cassou, S. P. and Lansing, K. J. (2004). Growth E¤ects of Shifting from a
Graduated-rate Tax System to a Flat Tax, Economic Inquiry 42(2): 194
213.
Chakravarty, S. and Muliere, P. (2004a). Welfare Indicators: A Review and New
Perspectives - 1. Measurement of Inequality, Metron-International Journal of
Statistics LXI (3): 457497.
Chakravarty, S. and Muliere, P. (2004b). Welfare Indicators: A Review and New
Perspectives - 2. Measurement of Poverty, Metron-International Journal of
Statistics LXII (2): 247281.
Chakravarty, S. R. (1983). A new index of poverty, Mathematical Social Sciences
6: 307313.
Chakravarty, S. R. (1988). Extended Gini Indices of Inequality, International
Economic Review 29: 147156.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 207
Champernowne, D. (1974). A comparison of measures of inequality of income
distribution, Economic Journal 84: 787816.
Chipman, J. S. (1974). Homothetic Preferences and Aggregation, Journal of Eco-
nomic Theory 8(1): 2638.
Chipman, J. S. and Moore, J. C. (1980). Compensating Variation, Consumers
Surplus and Welfare, The American Economic Review 70(5): 933949.
Chirinko, R. S., Fazzari, S. M. and Meyer, A. P. (2004). That Elusive Elasti-
city: A Long-Panel Approach to Estimating the Capital-Labor Substitution
Elasticity, CESifo-Working Paper No. 1240.
Christensen, L., Jorgenson, D. and Lau, L. (1971). Conjugate Duality and the
Transcedental Logarithmic Function, Econometrica 39: 255256.
Clark, S., Hemming, R. and Ulph, D. (1981). On indices for the measurement of
poverty, Economic Journal 91: 515526.
Cogan, J. (1981). Fixed costs and labor supply, Econometrica 49: 945963.
Cogneau, D. and Robilliard, A.-S. (2000). Growth, Distribution and Poverty in
Madagascar: Learning from a Microsimulation Model in a General Equilib-
rium Framework, International Food Policy Research Institute TMD Discus-
sion Paper 61.
Cohen, M. L. (1991). Statistical matching and microsimulation models, in C. F.
Citro and E. A. Hanushek (eds), Improving information for social policy de-
cisions: the uses of microsimulation modelling, Vol II Technical Papers, Na-
tional Academy Press, Washington D.C., pp. 6285.
Conrad, K. (1991). Intertemporal General Equilibrium Modelling of German Tax
Reform Proposals, Finanzarchiv 48 (2): 194221.
Cororaton, C. B., Cockburn, J. and Corong, E. (2005). Doha Scenarios, Trade
Reforms, and Poverty in the Philippines: A Computable General Equilibrium
Analysis, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3738.
208 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Creedy, J. (2000). Measuring Welfare Changes and the Excess Burden of Taxation,
Bulletin of Economic Research 52(1): 148.
Creedy, J., Duncan, A., Harris, M. and Scutella, R. (2002). Microsimulation
Modelling of Taxation and the Labour Market: the Melbourne Institute Tax
and Transfer Simulator, Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham.
Creedy, J., Herault, N. and Kalb, G. (2008). Comparing Welfare Change Measures
with Income Change Measures in Behavioural Policy Simulations, The Uni-
versity of Melbourne, Department of Economics, Research Paper No. 1030.
Creedy, J. and Kalb, G. (2006). Labour supply and microsimulation: the evaluation
of tax policy reforms, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham.
Dagsvik, J. (1994). Discrete and Continuous Choice, Max-Stable Processes, and
Independence from Irrelevant Attributes, Econometrica 62: 11791205.
Dagsvik, J. K. and Karlstrom, A. (2005). Compensating Variation and Hicksian
Choice Probabilities in Random Utility Models that are Nonlinear in Income,
Review of Economic Studies 72: 5776.
Dalton, H. (1920). The measurement of inequality of incomes, Economic Journal
20: 348361.
Davies, J. (2004). Microsimulation, CGE and Macro Modelling for Transition and
Developing Economies, Mimeo, University of Western Ontario.
Davies, J. B. and Hoy, M. (2002). Flat rate taxes and inequality measurement,
Journal of Public Economics 84: 3346.
Debreu, G. (1951). The Coe¢ cient of Resource Utilization, Econometrica
19(3): 273292.
Decoster, A. and Orsini, K. (2007). Verdient een vlaktaks zichzelf terug?,
Leuvense Economische Standpunten, K.U. Leuven, Centrum voor Economis-
che Studiën.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 209
Diamond, J. (2005). Dynamic E¤ects of Extending the 2001 and 2003 Income Tax
Cuts, International Tax and Public Finance 12(2): 165192.
Diamond, P. (1998). Optimal income taxation: an example with a U-shaped
pattern of marginal tax rates, American Economic Review 88: 8395.
Diamond, P. A. and McFadden, D. L. (1974). Some Uses of the Expenditure
Function in Public Finance, Journal of Public Economics 21(3): 421.
DIHK (2004). Analyse verschiedener Modelle für eine große Steuerreform, DIHK,
Berlin.
DOrazio, M., DiZio, M. and Scanu, M. (2006). Statistical Matching: Theory and
Practice, Wiley, New York.
Duclos, J.-Y., Esteban, J. and Ray, D. (2004). Polarization: Concepts, measure-
ment, estimation, Econometrica 72(6): 17371772.
Dunbar, A. and Pogue, T. (1998). Estimating Flat Tax Incidence and Yield: A
Sensitivity Analysis, National Tax Journal 51: 303324.
Dupuit, A. J. É. J. (1844). De la Mesure de lUtilité des travaux Publics, Annales
des Ponts et Chaussées, 2nd series 8: 255 283. Translated by R. H. Bar-
back (1952). On the measurement of the utility of public works, International
Economic Papers 2: 83 111.
Díaz Giménez, J. and Pijoan-Mas, J. (2006). Flat Tax Reforms in the US: A Boon
for the Income Poor, CEPR Discussion Paper No. 5812.
Eissa, N. and Liebman, J. (1996). Labor supply response to the earned income
tax credit, Quarterly Journal of Economics 111: 605637.
Esping-Andersen, G. (1990). The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism, Princeton
University Press.
Esteban, J., Gradín, C. and Ray, D. (1999). Extensions of a Measure of Polarization
with an Application to the Income Distribution of ve OECD Countries,
Working Paper No. 218 .
210 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Esteban, J. and Ray, D. (1994). On the Measurement of Polarization, Economet-
rica 62(4): 819851.
European Commission (2007a). Taxation trends in the European Union, European
Commission, Luxembourg.
European Commission (2007b). Taxes in Europe Database, European Commission,
Luxembourg.
Eurostat (2006). Structures of the taxation systems in the European Union (Data
1995-2004), European Commission, Luxembourg.
Eurostat (2007). Taxation trends in the European Union: Data for the EU Member
States and Norway, European Commission, Luxembourg.
Fehr, H. and Wiegard, W. (1996). Numerische Gleichgewichtsmodelle:
Grundstruktur, Anwendungen und Erkenntnisgehalt, Jahrbuch 13: Experi-
mente in der Ökonomie, Ökonomie und Gesellschaft, Frankfurt, pp. 296339.
Fehr, H. and Wiegard, W. (1998). German Income Tax Reforms: Separating
E¢ ciency from Redistribution, in A. Fossati and J. Hutton (eds), Policy
Simulations in the European Union, Routledge, London, pp. 235263.
Ferrera, M. (1996). The Southern Modelof Welfare in Social Europe, Journal of
European Social Policy 6 (1): 1737.
Fortin, B. and Lacroix, G. (1994). Labour supply, tax evasion and the marginal
cost of public funds an empirical investigation, Journal of Public Economics
55(3): 407431.
Foster, J., Greer, J. and Thorbecke, E. (1984). A class of decomposable poverty
measures, Econometrica 52: 761766.
Foster, J. and Shorrocks, A. (1991). Subgroup consistent poverty indices, Econo-
metrica 59: 687709.
Franz, W., Gürtzgen, N., Schubert, S. and Clauss, M. (2007). Reformen
im Niedriglohnsektor - Eine integrierte CGE-Mikrosimulationsstudie der
BIBLIOGRAPHY 211
Arbeitsangebots- und Beschäftigungse¤ekte, ZEW Discussion Paper No. 07-
085.
Friedman, T. L. (2005). The World Is Flat: A Brief History of the Twenty-First
Century, Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
Fuest, C. and Peichl, A. (2007). Grundeinkommen vs. Kombilohn: Beschäftigungs-
und Finanzierungswirkungen und Unterschiede im Empfängerkreis, CPE Dis-
cussion paper 07-9, University of Cologne.
Fuest, C., Peichl, A. and Schaefer, T. (2005a). Aufkommens-, Beschäftigungs- und
Wachstumswirkungen einer Steuerreform nach dem Vorschlag von Mitschke,
FiFo-Bericht 05-2005.
Fuest, C., Peichl, A. and Schaefer, T. (2005b). Dokumentation FiFoSiM: In-
tegriertes Steuer-Transfer-Mikrosimulations- und CGE-Modell, Finanzwis-
senschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge Nr. 05 - 03.
Fuest, C., Peichl, A. and Schaefer, T. (2007a). Aufkommens-, Beschäftigungs- und
Wachstumswirkungen einer Steuerreform nach dem Vorschlag von Mitschke,
Nomos, Baden-Baden.
Fuest, C., Peichl, A. and Schaefer, T. (2007b). Die Flat Tax: Wer gewinnt? Wer
verliert? Eine empirische Analyse für Deutschland., Steuer und Wirtschaft
pp. 2229.
Fuest, C., Peichl, A. and Schaefer, T. (2007c). Führt Steuervereinfachung zu einer
gerechteren Einkommensverteilung? Eine empirische Analyse für Deutsch-
land, Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik 8(1): 2037.
Fuest, C., Peichl, A. and Schaefer, T. (2007d). Is a Flat Tax politically feasible in a
grown-up Welfare State?, CPE discussion paper 07-6, University of Cologne.
Fuest, C., Peichl, A. and Schaefer, T. (2008). Does Tax Simplication yield more
Equity and E¢ ciency? An empirical analysis for Germany, CESifo Economic
Studies forthcoming.
212 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Fullerton, D. (1991). Reconciling Recent Estimates of the Marginal Welfare Cost
of Taxation, The American Economic Review 81(1): 302308.
Gaddy, C. G. and Gale, W. G. (2005). Demythologizing the Russian Flat Tax,
Tax Notes International 43: 983988.
Gale, W. (2001). Tax Simplication: Issues and Options, mimeo.
Gale, W. G. (1998). The Flat Tax: Simple, E¢ cient, Fair: Or is it?, The Brookings
Review 16 (3): 4045.
Gale, W. G. (1999). Flat Tax, in J. Cordes, R. D. Ebel and J. G. Gravelle (eds), The
Encyclopedia of Taxation and Tax Policy, Urban Institute Press, Washington,
D.C., pp. 155158.
Gale, W. G., Houser, S. and Scholz, J. K. (1996). Distributional E¤ects of Funda-
mental Tax Reform, in H. J. Aaron and W. G. Gale (eds), Economic E¤ects
of Fundamental Tax Reform, The Brookings Institution, Washington, D. C.,
pp. 281320.
Gale, W. G. and Orszag, P. R. (2002). The Economic E¤ects of Long-Term Fiscal
Discipline, Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center Discussion Paper.
Gale, W. and Rohaly, J. (2003). E¤ects of Tax Simplication Options on Equity,
E¢ ciency, and Simplicity: A Quantitative Analysis, Mimeo, Brookings Insti-
tution.
Gaube, T. (2000). When do distortionary taxes reduce the optimal supply of public
goods?, Journal of Public Economics 76(2): 151180.
Gini, C. (1914). Di una misura della dissomiglianza tra due gruppi di quantita e
delle sue applicazioni allo studio delle relazioni statistiche, Atti R. I. Veneto
74: 185312.
González-Torrabadella, M. and Pijoan-Mas, J. (2006). Flat tax reforms: a general
equilibrium evaluation for Spain, Investigaciones EconómicasXXX (2): 317
351.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 213
Gorodnichenko, Y., Martinez-Vazquez, J. and Peter, K. S. (2007). Myth and
Reality of Flat Tax Reform: Micro Estimates of Tax Evasion Response and
Welfare E¤ects in Russia, IZA Discussion Paper No. 3267.
Graaand, J., de Mooij, R. and Nibbelink, A. (2001). MIMICing Tax Policies and
the Labour Market, Elsevier, Amsterdam.
Greene, W. (2003). Econometric Analysis, Prentice Hall, New Jersey.
Gupta, A. and Kapur, V. (2000). Microsimulation in Government Policy and
Forecasting, North-Holland, Amsterdam.
Haan, P. (2007). The E¤ects of Personal Income Taxation on Labor Supply, Em-
ployment and Welfare, Masters thesis, FU Berlin.
Haan, P. and Steiner, V. (2005). Distributional E¤ects of the German Tax Re-
form 2000 - A Behavioral Microsimulation Analysis, Schmollers Jahrbuch 125
(1): 3949.
Haisken De-New, J. and Frick, J. (2003). DTC - Desktop Compendium to The
German Socio- Economic Panel Study (GSOEP).
Hakonsen, L. (1998). An Investigation into Alternative Representations of the Mar-
ginal Costof Public Funds, International Tax and Public Finance 5(3): 329
343.
Hall, R. E. and Rabushka, A. (1983). Low tax, simple tax, at tax, McGrwa-Hill,
New York.
Hall, R. E. and Rabushka, A. (1985). The Flat Tax, Hoover Institution Press,
Stanford.
Hall, R. E. and Rabushka, A. (2007). The Flat Tax, 3rd edn, Hoover Institution
Press, Stanford.
Harberger, A. C. (1971). Three Basic Postulates for Applied Welfare Economics:
An Interpretive Essay, Journal of Economic Literature 9(3): 785797.
214 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Harding, A. (1996). Microsimulation and public policy, North-Holland, Elsevier,
Amsterdam.
Harris, R. (1984). Applied General Equilibrium Analysis of Small Open Econom-
ies with Scale Economies and Imperfect Competition, American Economic
Review 74: 10171032.
Hausman, J. (1985). Taxes and Labor Supply, in A. Auerbach and M. Feldstein
(eds), Handbook of Public Economics, North-Holland, Amsterdam, pp. 213
263.
Heckman, J. (1976). The Common Structure of Statistical Models of Truncation,
Sample Selection and Limited Dependent Variables and a Simple Estimator
for Such Models, Annals of Economic and Social Measurement 5: 475492.
Heckman, J. (1979). Sample Selection Bias as a Specication Error, Econometrica
47: 153161.
Heckman, J. (1993). What has been learned about labor supply in the past twenty
years?, American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings 85: 116121.
Heer, B. and Trede, M. (2003). E¢ ciency and distribution e¤ects of a revenue-
neutral income tax reform, Journal of Macroeconomics 25: 87107.
Heilemann, U. and Wolters, J. (1998). Gesamtwirtschaftliche Modelle in der
Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Erfahrungen und Perspektiven, Duncker und
Humblot, Berlin.
Hettich, W. andWiner, S. (1999). Democratic Choice and Taxation - A Theoretical
and Empirical Analysis, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Hicks, J. (1942). Consumers surplus and index numbers, Review of Economic
Studies 9: 126137.
Hicks, J. (1946). Value and capital, Clarendon Press Oxford.
Hines, J. R. (1999). Three Sides of Harberger Triangels, Journal of Economic
Perspecitves 13(2): 167188.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 215
Ho, M. and Stiroh, K. (1998). Revenue, Progressivity and the Flat Tax, Contem-
porary Economic Policy XVI: 8597.
Hotelling, H. (1938). The General Welfare in Relation to Problems of Taxation
and of Railway and Utility Rates, Econometrica 6: 242269.
Hutton, J. and Ruocco, A. (1999). Tax Reform and Employment in Europe,
International Tax and Public Finance 6: 263287.
Hérault, N. (2005). Building and Linking a Microsimulation Model to a CGE
Model : the South African Microsimulation Model, Documents de travail 114,
Centre dEconomie du Développement de lUniversité Montesquieu Bordeaux
IV.
Immervoll, H., Kleven, H., Kreiner, C. and Saez, E. (2007). Welfare Reform in
European Countries: A Micro-Simulation Analysis, The Economic Journal
117 (516): 144.
Ivanova, A., Keen, M. and Klemm, A. (2005). Russias at tax, Economic Policy
July: 397444.
Jacobs, B., de Mooij, R. A. and Folmer, K. (2007). Analyzing a at income tax in
the Netherlands, Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 2007-029/3.
James, S., Sawyer, A. and Wallschutzky, I. (1997). Tax Simplications: A Tale
of Three Countries, Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation 51: 493
503.
Johansen, L. (1960). A Multi-sectoral Study of Economic Growth, North-Holland,
Amsterdam.
Johnson, H. G. (1960). The Cost of Protection and the Scientic Tari¤, The
Journal of Political Economy 68(4): 327345.
Kahneman, D., Knetsch, J. L. and Thaler, R. H. (1991). Anomalies: The endow-
ment e¤ect, loss aversion, and status quo bias, Journal of Economic Perspect-
ives 5: 193206.
216 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Kahneman, D. and Tversky, A. (1979). Prospect theory: An analysis of decision
under risk, Econometrica 47: 263291.
Kakwani, N. C. (1977). Measurement of Tax Progressivity: An International
Comparison, Economic Journal 87: 7180.
Kakwani, N. C. (1980). On a Class of Poverty Measures, Econometrica 48: 437
446.
Kay, J. A. (1980). The Deadweight Loss from a Tax System, Journal of Public
Economics 13: 111119.
Kehoe, P. and Kehoe, T. (1994). A Primer on Static Applied General Equilibrium
Models, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quaterly Review 18(1).
Kehoe, T. (1998). Social Accounting Matrices and Applied General Equilibrium
Models, Applied Economics and Public Policy pp. 5987.
Kehoe, T. and Prescott, E. (1995). Introduction to the Symposium: The Discipline
of Applied General Equilibrium, Economic Theory 6: 111.
Keuschnigg, C. and Dietz, M. (2003). Unternehmenssteuerreform II - quantitative
Auswirkungen auf Wachstum und Verteilung, Paul Haupt, Bern.
King, M. (1981). Welfare e¤ects of tax reforms using household data, Journal of
Public Economics 21: 183 ½U 214.
King, M. (1987). The Cash Flow Corporate Income Tax, in M. Feldstein (ed.),
The E¤ects of Taxation on Capital Accumulation, University of Chicago Press,
Chicago.
Kirchhof, P. (2003). Einkommensteuergesetzbuch - Ein Vorschlag Zur Reform der
Einkommen- und Körperschaftsteuer, C.F. Müller Verlag, Heidelberg.
Kirchhof, P., Altehoefer, K., Arndt, H.-W., Bareis, P., Eckmann, G., Freuden-
berg, R., Hahnemann, M., Kopei, D., Lang, F., Lückhardt, J. and Schutter,
E. (2001). Karlsruher Entwurf zur Reform des Einkommensteuergesetzes,
http://www.uni-heidelberg.de/institute/fak2/kirchhof/estg-entwurf.pdf.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 217
Kleven, H. J. and Kreiner, C. (2003). The Marginal Cost of Public Funds in OECD
Countries: Hours of Work versus Labor Force Participation, CESifo Working
Paper Series No. 935.
Kolm, S.-C. (1976). Unequal Inequalities II, Journal of Economic Theory 13: 82
111.
Kuismanen, M. (2000). Labour supply and income tax changes: A simulation
study for Finland, Bank of Finland Discussion Paper 5/2000.
Lambert, P. (1994). Measuring Progressivity with Di¤erences in Tax Treatment, in
J. Creddy (ed.), Taxation, Poverty and Income Distribution, Edward Elgar,
Aldershot, pp. 1727.
Lambert, P. J. (2001). The Distribution and Redistribution of Income, 3 edn,
Manchester University Press, Manchester and New York.
Lau, L. (1984). Comments on Mansur and Whalley (1984), in H. Scarf and J. B.
Shoven (eds), Applied General Equilibrium Analysis, Cambridge University
Press, New York, pp. 127137.
Leach, J. (2004). A Course in Public Economics, Cambrige University Press, New
York and Port Melburn and Cape Town.
Lietz, C. and Mantovani, D. (2006). Lessons from building and using EUROMOD,
Euromod working paper EM5/06.
Little, R. and Rubin, D. (1987). Statistical Analysis with Missing Data, John
Wiley & Sons, New York.
Liu, L. and Rettenmaier, A. (2005). A Graphical Exposition of the Link between
Two Representations of the Excess Burden of Taxation, Journal of Economic
Education 36(4): 369379.
Lundholm, M. (2004). Duality and the denition of marginal cost of public funds,
Working Paper.
218 BIBLIOGRAPHY
MaCurdy, T., Green, D. and Paarsch, H. (1990). Assessing Empirical Ap-
proaches for Analyzing Taxes and Labor Supply, Journal of Human Resources
25(3): 415490.
Mahalanobis, P. (1936). On the generalised distance in statistics, Proceedings of
the National Institute of Science of India 12: 4955.
Mansur, A. and Whalley, J. (1984). Numerical Specication of Applied General
Equilibrium Models: Estimation, Calibration and Data, in H. Scarf and J. B.
Shoven (eds), Applied General Equilibrium Analysis, Cambridge University
Press, New York, pp. 69127.
Marx, K. and Engels, F. (1848). Manifest der Kommunistischen Partei, Bildungs-
Gesellschaft für Arbeiter, London.
Mas-Colell, A., Whinston, M. and Green, J. (1995). Microeconomic theory, Oxford
University Press New York.
McDonald, J. and Mo¢ tt, R. (1980). The Use of Tobit Analysis, Review of Eco-
nomics and Statistics 62: 318321.
McFadden, D. (1973). Conditional Logit Analysis of Qualitative Choice Behaviour,
in P. Zarembka (ed.), Frontiers in Econometrics, Academic Press, New York,
pp. 105142.
McFadden, D. (1981). Econometric Models of Probabilistic Choice, in C. Manski
and D. McFadden (eds), Structural Analysis of Discrete Data and Economet-
ric Applications, The MIT Press, Cambridge, pp. 198272.
McFadden, D. (1985). Econometric Analysis of Qualitative Response Models, in
Z. Griliches and M. Intrilligator (eds), Handbook of Econometrics, Elsevier,
Amsterdam, pp. 13961456.
McKenzie, G. and Pearce, I. (1973). Exact Measures of Welfare and the Cost of
Living, Review of Economic Studies 43(3): 465468.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 219
Medeiros, M. (2006). Poverty, inequality and redistribution: A methodolgy
to dene the rich, United Nations Development Programme, International
Poverty Center, Working Paper no. 18, Brasilia.
Merz, J., Stolze, H. and Imme, S. (2001). ADJUST FORWINDOWS - A Program
Package to Adjust Microdata by the Minimum Information Loss Principle,
FFB-Dokumentation No. 9, Department of Economics and Social Sciences,
University of Lüneburg, Lüneburg.
Merz, J., Stolze, H. and Zwick, M. (2002). Professions, entrepreneurs, employees
and the new German tax (cut) reform 2000. A MICSIM microsimulation
analysis of distributional impacts, FFB-Diskussionspapier Nr. 35, Universität
Lüneburg.
Merz, J., Vorgrimler, D. and Zwick, M. (2005). De facto anonymised microdata
le on income tax statistics 1998, FDZ-Arbeitspapier Nr. 5.
Merz, J. and Zwick, M. (2002). Verteilungswirkungen der Steuerreform 2000/2005
im Vergleich zum Karlsruher Entwurf. Auswirkungen auf die Einkommens-
verteilung bei Selbständigen, Wirtschaft und Statistik 8: 729740.
Meyer, B. and Rosenbaum, D. (2001). Welfare, the earned income tax credit,
and the labor supply of single mothers, Quarterly Journal of Economics
116: 10631114.
Mirrlees, J. A. (1971). An exploration in the theory of optimum income taxation,
Review of Economic Studies 38: 175208.
Mitchell, D. (2007). Flat world, at taxes, http://www.american.com, April 27.
Mitschke, J. (2004). Erneuerung des deutschen Einkommensteuerrechts: Geset-
zestextentwurf und Begründung, Verlag Otto Schmidt, Köln.
Moore, J. C. (2007). General Equilibrium and Welfare Economics, Springer, Berlin,
Heidelberg und New York.
Mroz, T. (1987). The sensitivity of an empirical model of married womens hours
of work to economic and statistical assumptions, Econometrica 55: 765799.
220 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Müller, H. (2004). Das Aufkommen der Steuern vom Einkommen in Deutschland,
Deutscher Universitäts-Verlag, Wiesbaden.
Müller, H. (2005). Ein Vergleich der Ergebnisse von Mikrosimulationen mit denen
von Gruppensimulationen auf Basis der Einkommensteuerstatistik, FDZ-
Arbeitspapier Nr. 1.
Murphy, R. (2006). Flat Tax: Not as Simple as Theyd Have You Think , IB
Review XXXX: 94100.
Musgrave, R. (1959). The theory of public nance, McGraw-Hill, New York.
Musgrave, R. A. and Thin, T. (1948). Progressive Taxation in an Inationary
Economy, Journal of Political Economy 56: 498514.
Nicodeme, G. (2007). Flat tax: Does one rate t all?, Intereconomics 42(3): 138
142.
Nielsen, S. B., Frederiksen, N. K. and Lassen, D. D. (1999). Would the at tax fall
at in Denmark?, in T. M. Andersen, S. E. H. Jensen and O. Risager (eds),
Macroeconomic Perspectives on the Danish Economy, MacMillan, pp. 106
133.
Ochmann, R. and Peichl, A. (2006). Measuring Distributional E¤ects of Fiscal
Reforms, CPE discussion paper 06-09, University of Cologne.
OECD (1996). Tax Expenditures. Recent experiences, OECD, Paris.
OECD (2006). Fundamental reform of personal income tax, OECD Tax Policy
Studies 13.
OECD (2007). Fundamental Reform of Corporate Income Tax, OECD Tax Policy
Studies 16.
OHare, J. and Gupta, A. (2000). Practical Aspects of Microsimulation Modelling,
in A. Gupta and V. Kapur (eds), Microsimulation in Government Policy and
Forecasting, North-Holland, Amsterdam, pp. 563640.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 221
Okner, B. (1972). Constructing a New Data Base from Existing Microdata Sets:
The 1966 Merge File, Annals of Economic and Social Measurement pp. 325
342.
Orcutt, G. (1957). A new type of socio-economic system, Review of Economics
and Statistics 58: 773797.
Orcutt, G. (1967). Microeconomic Analysis for Prediction of National Accounts,
in H. Wold, G. H. Orcutt, E. A. Robinson, D. Suits and P. de Wol¤ (eds),
Forecasting on a Scientic Basis - Proceedings of an International Summer
Institute, Gulbenkian Foundation, Lisbon.
Orcutt, G., Greenberg, M., Korbel, J. and Rivlin, A. (1961). Microanalyis of
Socioeconomic Systems: A Simulation Study, Harper and Row, New York.
Paass, G. (1986). Statistical match: Evaluation of existing procedures and im-
provements by using additional information, in G. H. Orcutt and H. Quinke
(eds), Microanalytic Simulation Models to Support Social and Financial
Policy, Elsevier Science, Amsterdam, pp. 401422.
Pechman, J. A. (1987). Tax reform: Theory and practice, Economic Perspectives
1 (1): 1128.
Peichl, A. (2005). Die Evaluation von Steuerreformen durch Simulationsmodelle,
Finanzwissenschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge Nr. 05-01.
Peichl, A. (2008). The benets of linking CGE and Microsimulation Models - A
Flat Tax Exercise, Working Paper,University of Cologne.
Peichl, A. and Schaefer, T. (2006). Documentation FiFoSiM: Integrated Tax
Benet Microsimulation and CGE Model, Finanzwissenschaftliche Diskus-
sionsbeiträge Nr. 06 - 10, Universität zu Köln.
Peichl, A. and Schaefer, T. (2008). Wie progressiv ist Deutschland? Das Steuer-
und Transfersystem im europäischen Vergleich, Discussion Paper, University
of Cologne.
222 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Peichl, A., Schaefer, T. and Scheicher, C. (2006). Measuring Richness and Poverty
- A micro data application to Germany and the EU-15, CPE discussion paper
No. 06-11, University of Cologne.
Pyatt, G. and Round, J. (1985). Social Accounting Matrices. A Basis for Planning,
The World Bank, Washington D.C.
Quinke, H. (2001). Erneuerung der Stichprobe des ESt-Modells des Bundesmin-
isteriums der Finanzen auf Basis der Lohn- und Einkommensteuerstatistik
1995, GMD - Forschungszentrum Informationstechnik GmbH, Technical Re-
port.
Radner, D., Allen, R., Gonzales, M. E., Jabine, T. B. and Muller, H. J. (1980). Re-
port on exact and statistical matching techniques, Statistical Policy Working
Paper 5, Federal Committee on Statistical Methodology.
Radulescu, D. and Stimmelmayr, M. (2004). Implementing a Dual Income Tax in
Germany: E¤ects on Investment and Welfare, Mimeo, Universität München.
Ramsey, F. (1928). A Mathematical Theory of Saving, Economic Journal 543-
559: 28.
Rässler, S. (2002). Statistical Matching, Springer, New York [u.a.].
Rausch, S. and Rutherford, T. F. (2007). Computation of Equilibria in OLG
Models With Many Heterogeneous Households, Ruhr Economic Paper No.
15.
Reynolds, M. and Smolensky, E. (1977). Public Expenditures, Taxes, and the Dis-
tribution of Income: The United States, 1950, 1961, 1970, Academic Press,
New York.
Rosen, H. S. (1978). The Measurement of Excess Burden with Explicit Utility
Functions, Journal of Political Economy 86(2): 121135.
Rosenbaum, P. R. and Rubin, D. B. (1983). The Central Role of the Propensity
Score in Observational Studies for Causal E¤ects, Biometrika 70: 4155.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 223
Rubin, D. (1987). Multiple Imputation for Nonresponse in Surveys, John Wiley &
Sons, New York.
Rutherford, T. (1999). Applied General Equilibrium Modeling with MPSGE as
a GAMS Subsystem: An Overview of the Modeling Framework and Syntax,
Computational Economics 14: 146.
Rutherford, T., Tarr, D. and Shepotylo, O. (2005). Poverty E¤ects of Russias
WTO Accession: Modelling RealHouseholds and Endogenous Productivity
E¤ects, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3473.
Saez, E. (2001). Using elasticities to derive optimal income tax rates, Review of
Economic Studies 68: 205229.
Saez, E. (2002). Optimal income transfer programs: intensive versus extensive
labor supply responses, Quarterly Journal of Economics 117: 10391073.
Samuelson, P. (1954). The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure, The Review of
Economics and Statistics 36(4): 387389.
Samuelson, P. and Nordhaus, W. (2005). Economics, McGraw-Hill.
Savard, L. (2003). Poverty and Income Distribution in a CGE-Household Micro-
Simulation Model: Top-Down/Bottom Up Approach, CIRPÉE Centre inter-
universitaire sur le risque, les politiques économiques et lemploi. Working
Paper 03-43.
Schafer, J. L. (1997). Analysis of incomplete multivariate data, Chapman & Hall,
London.
Schmidt, A. (2004). Statistische Messung der Einkommenspolarisation, Reihe:
Quantitative Oekonomie, Band 141, Eul-Verlag, Lohmar.
Schmidt, C. and Straubhaar, T. (1996). Bevölkerungsentwicklung und Wirtschaft-
swachstum - Eine Simulationsanalyse für die Schweiz, Schweizerische Zeits-
chrift für Volkswirtschaft und Statistik 132(3): 395414.
224 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Sen, A. (1976). Poverty: An Ordinal Approach to Measurement, Econometrica
44: 219231.
Shorrocks, A. (1980). The Class of Additively Decomposable Inequality Measures,
Econometrica 48: 613625.
Shorrocks, A. (1984). Inequality Decomposition by Population Subgroups, Econo-
metrica 52: 13691385.
Shoven, J. and Whalley, J. (1984). Applied General Equilibrium Models of Tax-
ation and International Trade: An Introduction and Survey, Journal of Eco-
nomic Literature 22: 10071051.
Shoven, J. and Whalley, J. (1992). Applying General Equilibrium, Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge.
Sims, C. A. (1972a). Comments, Annals of Economic and Social Measurement
1: 343345.
Sims, C. A. (1972b). Rejoinder, Annals of Economic and Social Measurement
1: 355357.
Sims, C. A. (1974). Comment, Annals of Economic and Social Measurement
3: 395397.
Slemrod, J. (1984). Optimal Tax Simplication - Toward a Framework for Analysis,
Proceedings of the Seventy-Sixth Annual Conference on Taxation - National
Tax Association - Tax Institute of America pp. 158167.
Slemrod, J. (1989). The return to tax simplication: An econometric analysis,
Public Finance Quarterly 17 (1): 327.
Slemrod, J. (1992). Did the Tax Reform Act of 1986 Simplify Tax Matters?,
Journal of Economic Perspectives 6: 4557.
Slemrod, J. (1997). Deconstructing the Income Tax, American Economic Review
87(2): 151155.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 225
Slesnick, D. T. (1998). Empirical Approaches to the Measurement of Welfare,
Journal of Economic Literature 36(4): 21082165.
Small, K. and Rosen, H. (1981). Applied Welfare Economics with Discrete Choice
Models, Econometrica 49(1): 105130.
SOEP Group (2001). The German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) after more
than 15 years - Overview, Vierteljahrshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung 70: 7
14.
Sørensen, P. (2002). The German Business Tax Reform of 2000 - A General
Equilibrium Analysis, German Economic Review 3: 347378.
Spahn, P., Galler, H., Kaiser, H., Kassella, T. andMerz, J. (1992).Mikrosimulation
in der Steuerpolitik, Physica, Heidelberg.
Statistisches Bundesamt (2005). Volkswirtschaftliche Gesamtrechnungen: Input-
Output-Rechnung, Fachserie 18, Reihe 2.
Steiner, V. and Wrohlich, K. (2004). Household Taxation, Income Splitting and
Labor Supply Incentives - A Microsimulation Study for Germany, CESifo
Economic Studies 50(3): 541568.
Stokey, N. L. and Rebelo, S. (1995). Growth E¤ects of Flat-Rate Taxes, Journal
of Political Economy 103(3): 519550.
Suits, D. (1977). Measurement of Tax Progressivity, American Economic Review
67: 747752.
Sutherland, H. (2001). EUROMOD: An Integrated European Benet-Tax Model
- Final Report, EUROMOD Working Paper EM9/01.
Sutherland, H. (2007). Euromod: the tax-benet microsimulation model for the
European Union, in A. Gupta and A. Harding (eds), Modelling Our Future:
Population Ageing, Health and Aged Care, Vol. 16 of International Symposia
in Economic Theory and Econometrics, Elsevier, pp. 483488.
226 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Sutherland, H., Taylor, R. and Gomulka, J. (2002). Combining Household Income
and Expenditure Data in Policy Simulations, Review of Income and Wealth
48(4): 517536.
Theil, H. (1967). Economics and Information Theory, North Holland, Amsterdam.
Train, K. (2003). Discrete Choice Models Using Simulation, Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge.
Tran-Nam, B. (2000). Tax Reform and Tax Simplicity: A New and "Simpler" Tax
System?, UNSW Law Journal 23: 241251.
Triest, R. (1990). The e¤ect of income taxation on labor supply in the United
States, Journal of Human Resources 25: 491516.
Tuomala, M. (1990). Optimal Income Tax and Redistribution, Clarendon Press,
Oxford.
Usher, D. (2006a). Should the Samuelson Rule Be Modied to Account for the
Marginal Cost of Public Funds?, Queens Economics Department Working
Paper Nr. 1065.
Usher, D. (2006b). The Marginal Cost of Public Funds Is the Ratio of Mean
Income to MedianIncome, Public Finance Review 34(6): 687711.
van Praag, B. M. S. (1991). Ordinal and cardinal utility : An integration of the two
dimensions of the welfare concept, Journal of Econometrics 50(1-2): 6989.
Van Soest, A. (1995). Structural Models of Family Labor Supply: A Discrete
Choice Approach, Journal of Human Resources 30: 6388.
Van Soest, A. and Das, M. (2001). Family Labor Supply and Proposed Tax Re-
forms in the Netherlands, De Economist 149(2): 191218.
Van Soest, A., Das, M. and Gong, X. (2002). A Structural Labour Supply Model
with exible Preferences, Journal of Econometrics 107: 345 374.
Varian, H. (2001). Grundzüge der Mikroökonomik, Oldenbourg, München.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 227
Ventura, G. (1999). Flat Tax Reform: A Quantitative Exploration, Journal of
Economic Dynamics and Control 23: 14251458.
Verbist, G. (2004). Redistributive e¤ect and progressivity of taxes. An Interna-
tional Comparison across the EU using EUROMOD, EUROMOD Working
Paper No. EM 5/04.
Vermeulen, F. (2002). Collective Household Models: Principles and Main Results,
Journal of Economic Surveys 16(4): 533564.
Vermeulen, F. (2005). And the winner is... An empirical evaluation of unitary and
collectivelabour supply models, Empirical Economics 30(3): 711734.
von Loe¤elholz, H. D. and Rappen, H. (2003). Ermittlung von tax compliance
cost, Gutachten im Auftrag des Bundesministers der Finanzen, RWI Essen.
Wagenhals, G. (2001a). Incentive and Redistribution E¤ects of the German Tax
Reform 2000, Finanzarchiv 57: 316332.
Wagenhals, G. (2001b). Incentive and Redistribution E¤ects of the Karlsruher
Entwurf zur Reform des Einkommenssteuergesetzes, Schmollers Jahrbuch
4: 425437.
Wagenhals, G. (2004). Tax-benet microsimulation models for Germany: A Sur-
vey, IAW-Report / Institut fuer Angewandte Wirtschaftsforschung (Tübingen)
32(1): 5574.
Wagenhals, G. and Buck, J. (2006). GMOD+: An innovative taxbenet mi-
crosimulation modeling tool, in W. Borutzky, A. Orsoni and R. Zobel (eds),
Proceedings 20th European Conference on Modelling and Simulation, ECSM,
Bonn, pp. 354359.
Wagner, F. (2006). Was bedeutet Steuervereinfachung wirklich?, Perspektiven der
Wirtschaftspolitik 7: 1933.
Wang, Y.-Q. and Tsui, K.-Y. (2000). Polarization Orderings and New Classes of
Polarization Indices, Journal of Public Economic Theory 2(3): 349363.
228 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Watts, H. (1968). An Economic Denition of Poverty, in D. Moynihan (ed.), On
Understanding Poverty: Perspectives from the Social Sciences, Basic Books,
New York.
Welsch, H. (2001). Armington Elasticities and Product Diversity in the European
Community: A Comparative Assessment of Four Countries, Working Paper,
University of Oldenburg.
Williams, H. (1977). On the formation of travel demand models and economic
evaluation measuresof user benet, Environment and Planning A 9(3): 285
344.
Willig, R. D. (1976). ConsumersSurplus Without Apology, American Economic
Review 66(4): 589597.
Wissenschaftlicher Beirat beim Bundesministerium der Finanzen (2004). Flat Tax
oder Duale Einkommensteuer? Zwei Entwürfe zur Reform der deutschen
Einkommensbesteuerung, http://www.bundesnanzministerium.de.
Wolfson, M. (1997). Divergent Inequalities: Theory and Empirical Results, Review
of Income and Wealth 43(4): 401421.
Wolfson, M. C. (1994). When Inequalities Diverge, American Economic Review
84(2): 353358.
